2010年12月30日

Mao and the art of management毛泽东与管理艺术

Staying at the top居高不下
Mao and the art of management毛泽东与管理艺术

Dec 19th 2007
From The Economist print edition

A role model, of sorts
负面榜样



                                                                                         Corbis


Books on management tend to define success in the broadest possible terms―great product, happy employees, continuous improvement, gobs of profits, crushed competitors. Even when words such as "excellence" and "success" are omitted from the title, they are often implicit. A case in point is the book which many would say defined the genre, Alfred Sloan's "My Years with General Motors", published in 1963 when GM was still an iconic company and Sloan correctly acknowledged as the architect of the well-run, decentralised, global corporation.
  管理类书籍总是用尽可能泛泛的表达来定义成功――如产品众多、员工快乐、改进不断、利润巨大以及对手受制等等。即便"卓越"和"成功"这类词未在标题中出现,这些表达往往都是暗示。艾尔弗雷德•斯隆(Alfred Sloan)的《我在通用汽车的岁月》就是其中一例,该书于1963年出版,当时通用还是一个标志性公司,而斯隆也因高效运作、分散经营和跨国企业缔造者的身份而闻名于世。


But focusing on how the best produce the best has its limits. Most managers, after all, do not stitch an industrial triumph from a vast bankrupt junkyard, as Sloan did. They do not delight their customer, crush competitors and create vast wealth. They struggle. They stumble.
  然而关注于如何最优生产出最好产品,仍有其局限性。毕竟大多数经理人不像斯隆,能将一个频临破产的巨大烂摊子整合为行业翘楚。他们不懂取悦顾客、打压对手以及创造丰厚财富。他们且战且败。


Where is the book for them? Who can help the under-performing, over-compensated chief executive fighting to survive intrusive journalists, independent shareholders and ambitious vice-presidents who could do a better job? Where is the role model for the manager who really needs a role model most―the one who by any objective measure of performance cannot, and should not, manage at all?
  那么为他们准备的管理书籍在哪呢?又有谁能助这些尸位素餐的高管一臂之力,让他们能从同侵扰不断的记者、独立董事与野心勃勃打算取代自己的副手之间的战争中生存下来?经理人的榜样在哪里呢?这些经理人既不能对业绩给出任何客观评价,也不能管理一切,他们真正最需要榜样。


An obvious candidate is Mao. Yes, he was head of a country, not a company. But he self-consciously carried a business-like title, "chairman", while running China from 1949 until dying in office in 1976, having jailed, killed, or psychologically crushed a succession of likely replacements and therefore created the classic business problem: a succession void. He thought of himself as, in his own words, an "indefatigable teacher" and the famous "Little Red Book" drawn from his speeches is packed with managerial advice on training, motivation and evaluation of lower-level employees (cadres); innovation ("let a hundred flowers bloom"); competition ("fear no sacrifice"); and, of course, raising the game of the complacent manager (relentless self-criticism).
  显而易见,毛泽东就是一个典范。是的,他是一国之首,而非公司,但他有意选用了一个类商业的"主席"头衔。从1949年执政到1976年在这一职位上辞世,这些年间,他对那些有可能取代自己的人或关、或杀、或心理迫害,从而也造成了后继无人这一典型的商业困境。他自诩为一名"诲人不倦的老师",在那本荟萃了他言论的著名红宝书中,满是关于如何训练、激励、评价低级员工(基层干部);如何创新("百花齐放");如何竞争("不怕牺牲")的管理条目,当然也包括提醒自满者的方法(坚持自我批评)。


Mao still has at least a symbolic hold over the Chinese economy, even though it began to blossom only after death removed his suffocating hand. His portrait is emblazoned on China's currency, on bags, shirts, pins, watches and whatever else can be sold by the innumerable entrepreneurial capitalists that he ground beneath his heel when in power. No other recent leader of a viable country (outside North Korea, in other words) is so honoured―not even ones that did a good job.
  至少现在,毛泽东对中国经济的拖累仍有象征意义,只有在他死后,中国经济才摆脱他那只扼杀的手开始走向繁荣。他的肖像被印在人民币上,印在书包、T恤、像章、手表和一切能够被无数资本家出售的商品上。而这些资本家,在他掌权时都被踩在其脚下。如此的殊荣,没有哪一个理性国家(换句话说,朝鲜除外)的近代领导人享受过――即使是那些造福于民的领袖们。


It was not a nurturing management style that won Mao this adulation. According to Jung Chang's and Jon Halliday's "Mao, the Unknown Story", admittedly an unsympathetic portrait, he was responsible for "70m deaths, more than any other 20th-century leader". But why stop at the 20th century? In Chinese history, only Emperor Qin Shi Huang, who started building the Great Wall (in which each brick is said to have cost a life), was competition for Mao; and since the population was much smaller then, Mao is likely to have outdone him in absolute numbers.
  毛泽东赢得这些谄媚,并非因为培养式的管理风格。在张戎(Jung Chang)和乔•哈里戴(Jon Halliday)所著的《毛泽东:鲜为人知的故事》一书中,他分明是一个无情的人,他应该为"7000万亡魂负责,这是20世纪领导者之最。"但为什么只停留在20世纪?中国历史上,也只有兴建长城(一条人命砌一口砖)的秦始皇能与之媲美了。而且秦代的人口远远少于现代,因此毛泽东在绝对数上还要胜过秦始皇。


Botched economic policies caused most of the carnage. Deng Xiaoping, Mao's successor, turned the policies, and eventually the economy, around. Yet he does not even merit an image on a coin.
  拙劣的经济政策是这场大屠杀的主因。而毛泽东的继任者邓小平,虽然是他改变了这样的政策,并最终扭转了中国经济。然而,他甚至没有在一枚硬币上享受过如此的荣耀。


The disparity between Mao's performance and his reputation is instructive, for behind it are four key ingredients which all bad managers could profitably employ.
  毛泽东的成就与其盛誉之间的差距,源于其背后的四个因素,它们对于所有糟糕的经理人而言都有借鉴意义。


• A powerful, mendacious slogan
• 激昂却虚假的口号


Born a modestly well-off villager, Mao lived like an emperor, carried on litters by peasants, surrounded by concubines and placated by everyone. Yet his most famous slogan was "Serve the People". This paradox illustrates one aspect of his brilliance: his ability to justify his actions, no matter how entirely self-serving, as being done for others.
  生于富农家庭的毛泽东,过着帝王般的生活:出门坐轿、妻妾围绕、众民顺朝。然而,他最有名的一句口号竟是"为人民服务"。这一矛盾反映出他的某方面的智慧:他能将其所为合理化处理,即不论他是如何完全的为自己服务,也是为别人服务。


Corbis

Psychologists call this "cognitive dissonance"―the ability to make a compelling, heartfelt case for one thing while doing another. Being able to pull off this sort of trick is an essential skill in many professions. It allows sub-standard chief executives to rationalise huge pay packages while their underlings get peanuts (or rice).
  心理学家称此为"认知失调"――虽然做的是一套,嘴上说的另一套却能使人由衷信服。对于某些从业者而言,这是一项不可或缺的职业技能。这能使得在基层只能获取微利的时候,那些不称职的高管还能理所当然的享受高薪福利。


But Mao did not just get a stamp from a compliant board and eye-rolling from employees. He convinced his countrymen of his value. That was partly because, even if his message bore no relation to his actions, it expressed precisely and succinctly what he should have been doing. Consider the truth and clarity of "serve the people" compared with the average company's mission statement, packed with a muddle of words and thoughts tied to stakeholders and CSR, that employees can barely read, let alone memorise.
  但是顺从的政治局没有抱怨毛泽东,而广大人民也没有翻白眼。他的价值观牢牢控制着国民。这部分的原因是,即使他表达的内容与其行为无关,但也简明的表达出他该做什么。想想吧,"为人民服务"的真理性与透彻性,岂是一般企业满纸股东与社会责任的宗旨所能比的?员工读起来都困难,何谈牢记?


Deng Xiaoping's slogan, which he used in his campaign to revive the economy, had similar virtues. "Truth from facts" is a sound-bite that Sloan would have loved and every manager should cherish, but you won't find it chiselled on a Chinese wall. It doesn't have the hypocritical idealism of Mao's version―nor was it pushed so hard.
  邓小平在恢复经济时提出的"实事求是"口号也有类似的优点。这是一个会使斯隆喜欢、每个经理人喜爱的语录,但你会发现它没有像"为人民服务"一样被刻在中国的墙上。因为它既没有毛泽东式伪善的理想主义,也没有被极力推广。


• Ruthless media manipulation
• 肆无忌惮的媒体操纵


Mao knew not just how to make a point but also how to get it out. Through posters, the "Little Red Book" and re-education circles, his message was constantly reinforced. "Where the broom does not reach", he said, "the dust will not vanish of itself." This process of self-aggrandisement is often dismissed as a "personality cult", but is hard to distinguish from the modern business practice of building brand value.
  毛泽东不仅善于提出想法,还善于传播想法。通过各种海报、"红宝书"以及再教育循环,他的教导不断被追捧肯定。因为他深知"扫帚不到,灰尘照例不会自己跑掉"的道理。自我扩张的过程常被视为"个人崇拜"而被人鄙视,却又很难同建设品牌价值的现代商业行为区别开来。


Yet within China economic growth was pathetic and living conditions were wretched. So why did a vast list of Western political, military and academic leaders accept the value of Mao's brand at his own estimation? Even Stalin, no guileless observer, believed in and, to his later regret, protected Mao. The brand-building lesson is that a clear, utopian message, hammered home relentlessly, can obscure inconvenient facts. Great salesmen are born knowing this. Executives whose strategies are not delivering need to learn it.
  虽然当时中国的经济增长停滞,生活条件恶劣。但为什么有那么多西方军政要人、学术都会接受毛泽东自我构建的品牌价值呢?甚至斯大林这么一个圆滑的旁观者,相信并保护了毛泽东,虽然他后来后悔了。通过毛的品牌建设,我们可以看到一个简明却幻想式的言辞,经过极端的不断重复,便可以掩盖事实。伟大的推销员天生深谙此道,但那些战略执行不利的管理者需要好好补上一课。


Chief executives are not in a position to crush the media as Mao did. Nevertheless, his handling of them offers some lessons. He talked only to sycophantic journalists and his appeal in the West came mainly from hagiographies written by reporters whose careers were built on the access they had to him.
  当然,企业高管们不能像毛泽东那样控制媒体。但毛泽东的处理方式能为他们提供一些参考。毛泽东只接受马屁精记者的采访,他对西方的魅力也大多来自这些记者神化过的传记,而这些记者就是靠和毛泽东打交道吃饭的。


The law constrains the modern chief executive's ability to imitate Mao's PR strategy. Publicly listed companies have to publish information, rather than hand it out selectively. But many, within bounds, emulate Mao's media management; others, determined to control information about them, are delisting. Burrow beneath laudatory headlines on business and political leaders, and it becomes clear that the strategy works.
  法律约束着这些高管们模仿毛泽东公关策略的才能。上市公司必须披露信息,而不是选择性的发布。但是仍有很多公司在合理范围内效法毛的媒体管理,当然也有一些试图操控信息的公司被摘牌。挖掘赞誉标题背后的商政要人,这个策略已变得有效。


• Sacrifice of friends and colleagues
• 朋友与同志的牺牲


"Who are our friends? Who are our enemies? This is a question of first importance," Mao wrote. Sloan agreed. He worried that favouritism would come at the expense of the single most valuable component of management: the objective evaluation of performance.
  毛泽东写道"谁是我们的敌人?谁是我们的朋友?这个问题是革命的首要问题。"斯隆对此也表示认可。他担心偏袒会带来"客观评价表现"这一管理中最有价值构成的损失。


Corbis

Mao had a different goal: he did not want people too close to him, and therefore to power; so being Mao's friend often proved more dangerous than being his enemy. One purge followed another. Promotions and demotions were zealously monitored. Bundles of incentives were given and withdrawn. Some demotions turned out well. Deng Xiaoping's exile in a tractor factory may have helped him understand business, and thus rebuild the economy, but that was an unintended benefit.
  毛泽东有个不一样的目标:他不喜欢别人太接近他,因而接近权力;所以成为毛泽东的朋友,往往被证明比成为敌人的处境还要危险。一次接一次的清洗,升贬都被狂热所左右,大量奖励派送出去,然后又被收回去。结果有些贬谪并不是件坏事,下放到拖拉机厂能使邓小平更懂商业,因此他重建了经济,虽然这只是个意外的好处。


This approach makes sense. Close colleagues may want your job, and relationships with them may distract you. Mao's abandonment of friends and even wives and children seemed to be based on a calculation of which investments were worth maintaining and which should be regarded as sunk costs. Past favours were not returned. According to Ms Chang and Mr Halliday, a doctor who saved his life was left to die on a prison floor after being falsely accused of disloyalty. Mao let it happen: he had other doctors by then.
  这种做法是有道理的。亲密的同志可能抢了你的饭碗,而且处理和他们之间的关系可能让你分心。毛泽东对妻儿朋友的抛弃似乎是以计算为基础的:那些投资是值得的,而那些应当视为沉没成本。即便过去有恩也得不到报答。据张戎和乔•哈里戴的记载,一位曾经救过他命的医生,被错误指控为不忠后死在了监狱。而他任其发生:那时他已有其它医生了。


Enemies, conversely, can be useful. Mao often blamed battlefield losses on rivals who were made to suffer for these defeats. The names of modern victims of this tactic will be visible on the list of people sacked at an investment bank after a rough quarter; the practitioners are their superiors, or those who have taken their jobs.
  相反,敌人可能是有用的。毛泽东常常把战争失利归咎于自己的对手,让他们承担失败的后果。这一伎俩的现代受害者名字可以在投资银行的解雇名单上看到,在一个糟糕的财季之后,肇事的人还稳居高位,或已经顶替了他们的位置。


• Activity substituting for achievement
• 以行动取代成绩


Mao was quite willing to avoid tedious or uncomfortable meetings, particularly when he was likely to be criticised. But maybe that helped him avoid getting bogged down. From the Anti-Rightist Movement of the late 1950s to the Great Leap Forward, a failed agricultural and industrial experiment in the early 1960s, to the Cultural Revolution in the late 1960s, Mao was never short of a plan.
  毛泽东喜欢避开沉闷或者不快的会议,尤其是他有可能被批判的时候。但这能帮助他避免陷入困境。从50年代末期的反右运动,到60年代初弄砸工农业的大跃进,再到60年代后期的文化大革命,毛泽东从来不缺乏逃避的办法。


Under Mao, China didn't drift, it careened. The propellant came from the top. Policies were poor, execution dreadful and leadership misdirected, but each initiative seemed to create a centripetal force, as everyone looked toward Beijing to see how to march forward (or avoid being trampled). The business equivalent of this is restructuring, the broader the better. Perhaps for the struggling executive, this is the single most important lesson: if you can't do anything right, do a lot. The more you have going on, the longer it will take for its disastrous consequences to become clear. And think very big: for all his flaws, Mao was inspiring.
  在毛泽东的领导下,中国没有偏离航线,只是在摇摆中前行。推动力来自于高层。下面缺失政策、执行不力而且领导无方,但是每个自发行动似乎都能形成向心力,每个人都心向北京,想知道如何前行(或者避免被踩踏)。这类似于商业中的重组,范围越宽越好。也许,对于挣扎的管理者而言,唯一重要的教训是:如果你不能保证每件事都做对,那么就多做。你做得越多,出现灾难性后果的时间就会越延后。而且要敢想:对于他的所有缺点而言,毛泽东是有启发性的。


In the long run, of course, the facts will find you out. But who cares? We all know what we are in the long run.
  不过,事实最终会揭露你是个什么人。但谁在乎?最终我们都会知道我们是谁。



学谦评:
  这篇文章,无疑是我在《经济学人》上看到过最烂的一篇文章了。
  说烂,不仅是因为文章的观点、逻辑站不住脚,也是因为文章最终要表达的东西,只是借管理之手,行鞭尸之事罢了。
  先从标题《毛泽东与管理艺术》谈起,乍一看还以为是对毛泽东管理思想的研究,加上用一顶圣诞帽给主席戴上,显得是如此可爱。于是,这样一个虚假的标题、伪善的封面使众多没有读懂文章的人产生了错觉,竟有不少人纷纷转载后还以为是对主席的褒扬,让我真是苦笑不得!
  细看下全文,这哪里是谈"管理艺术",分明就是谈"权术"!或者说透些,就是大肆诬蔑古人,放肆鞭尸!反正古人也不会从水晶棺里跳出来,可以随意而为了!
  好吧,且让我们看看他们是怎么鞭尸的吧。
  先通过与斯隆的对比,勾勒出一群丑陋的经理人形象。事实上,这些经理人的确很丑陋。然后笔锋一转,便把这形象转嫁到毛泽东头上了,甚至冠名以"榜样"。这样大概有两个好处:一是用熟知的丑陋形象来丑化一个人,实在是省事高效的高明类比;二是不明情况的人,自然会觉得毛是一个比丑陋更丑恶的人了。
  于是,就这样强盗般的造成一个恶人的既成事实――不容你反驳,不容你辩解,就是这样了。当然他们间或搬出一些事实,便以偏概全的定性了。这分明不是"春秋笔法",这分明就是"文革笔法"!他们敢于强奸古人,把毛泽东的"主席"头衔,称为之是有意选用的;他们敢于玩弄历史,把后人对毛泽东的怀念而在人民币上、各种纪念品上印制头像的行为,暗示为自己对荣耀的追求。他们或许觉得没有论据也说不过去,于是便一本以鞭尸为目的的《毛泽东:鲜为人知的故事》就成了他们取之不尽的素材库。而不忌讳野史、孤证不立的原则。如此三点,让人读来岂不气塞?岂不和文革无限上纲上线的整人思路不谋而合?
  好吧,这些也许是西方人士对毛泽东不了解,所以才这么幼稚吧。可是越往下读,方知人家哪里是在要写"毛泽东和管理艺术",分明就是要描述一个"恐怖的毛太祖"!且看――
  • 生于富农家庭的毛泽东,过着帝王般的生活:出门坐轿、妻妾围绕、众民顺朝。
  我不知道他老人家有车不坐,为什么要坐轿?如果这里的轿指车的话,那么难道布什、布莱尔等人平时出门是走的么?再有"妻妾围绕"一条,我不知道江青同志会怎么想?大概那些妾,应该都死得很惨吧!还有"众民顺朝",人们爱戴不可以么?众所周知,中国人到现在还有封建残余思想,人家把国家领导人当作帝王膜拜,难道就是一定他老人家的错?如此下笔,用心何其险恶。如此荒谬的论调一出,"为人民服务"这句话也成了毛泽东"认知失调"的明证了。于是他们洋洋洒洒的自由发挥,却不敢再提毛泽东到底为人民做了多少事的事实。
  • 毛泽东不仅善于提出想法,还善于传播想法。通过各种海报、"红宝书"以及再教育循环,他的教导不断被追捧肯定。
  • 毛泽东只接受马屁精记者的采访,他对西方的魅力也大多来自这些记者神化过的传记,而这些记者就是靠和毛泽东打交道吃饭的。
  是的,我承认中国领导人有个通病,就是喜欢出版选集。但是仔细想想,广为传播这些著作也不是一件坏事,只是怕利用、歪曲这些著作上纲上线的迫害人。文革时期,是有不可回避和否认的污点,但是局限于这么一点就盖棺定论,是很不客观,也很不理性的。而且这段话,毫无根据的就把毛泽东语录的疯传,当作是毛泽东本人的意愿了,这也是极不负责任,不了解那段历史,或者根本就是利用那段历史鞭尸。另外,毛泽东肯定不止接受过斯诺等赞同中国革命的记者采访,只是其它意识形态的记者,固然不可能全面地了解一个人,怎么可能写得出《西行漫记》这样的文章呢?而且,所谓的"马屁精记者"对中国革命和毛的赞扬,引起了西方社会极大的不满,纷纷排挤、打压"马屁精记者"。那么,这些记者在自家吃不饱饭,来毛泽东这里讨些题材,不也是很正常的吗?关键是看什么心态去对待了。
  • 毛泽东对妻儿朋友的抛弃似乎是以计算为基础的:那些投资是值得的,而那些应当视为沉没成本。即便过去有恩也得不到报答。
  • 据张戎和乔•哈里戴的记载,一位曾经救过他命的医生,被错误指控为不忠后死在了监狱。而他任其发生:那时他已有其它医生了。
  对朋友的抛弃,或许是政见不合了,或许是个人原因;对妻儿的抛弃,难道就是他愿意的吗?毛岸龙、还有一个长征途中送掉的女儿,不都是迫不得已吗?是的,西方人士最讲人性,他们以为毛泽东就应该坚持不抛弃这些幼子,让他们跟随部队转移,让部队为了保护他们而付出更大代价,造成更大牺牲也是值得的。还有毛岸英,那样的死去难道也是抛弃吗?讲人性的人,在写此文的时候究竟有没有人性?!
  张戎和乔•哈里戴的故事,又一次被引用了,只是没有人知道这是不是杜撰,背后有没有其它原因,甚至毛泽东本人知不知道他的救命恩人被关押了。但是这些都不重要,重要的是,这是可以证明毛泽东"无情"的"有力证据"。
  • 毛泽东喜欢避开沉闷或者不快的会议,尤其是他有可能被批判的时候。但这能帮助他避免陷入困境。从50年代末期的反右运动,到60年代初弄砸工农业的大跃进,再到60年代后期的文化大革命,毛泽东从来不缺乏逃避的办法。
  作者也许忽略了一点,自从中国有了民主起,借民主整人、开批斗会的事件就自然而然的发生了,这并不是毛的创造,要找可以先找王明算账。反右、大跃进以及文化大革命,是有问题的。但是,我想,如果没有西方世界的排斥与对抗,相互多一些宽容与理解,中国的历史也将改写吧。

  最后,我想表明一个个人观点。从这篇文章的文风来看,不太像《经济学人》一贯的行文和逻辑风格,倒是有些美式。而且,看得出来文章中明显的贬毛尊邓倾向,对于以意识形态一刀切的西方人士而言,似乎不会有这样分明的爱憎取向。因此我猜测,这大概是出自特殊年代受过迫害的华人(或后代)之笔
 

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