Jobless benefits and the unemployment rate 失业救济和失业率

Jobless benefits and the unemployment rate 

失业救济和失业率

 
Dec 10th 2010, 15:14 by R.A. | WASHINGTON

THERE was a very peculiar discussion about the impact of unemployment benefits on the unemployment rate on the internet yesterday. The Wall Street Journal's Kelly Evans wrote a short piece suggesting that extended unemployment benefits might lead to an increase in the unemployment rate. This led to much gnashing of teeth in other corners of the blogosphere, namely, those occupied by Felix Salmon. Mr Salmon made the correct point that jobless benefits have two key effects on employment levels: a positive one through demand-side stimulus and a negative one through the incentive effect on workers. And he made the further correct point that with the unemployment rate very high, the first impact almost certainly dominates the second, meaning that the net impact of unemployment benefits on employment is positive.
昨天在网上有一个关于"失业救济对失业率的影响"的非常特殊的讨论。华尔街日报的Kelly Evans撰写了一篇短文，暗示延长失业救济也许会导致失业率的增加。这引起了来自其他博客角落的尖锐批评，换句话说，这些批评主要来自Felix Salmon。Salmon先生提出的修正的观点是――失业救济金对失业水平有两个基本的影响：积极的影响来自对需求方面的刺激，消极影响来自对就业工人的激励效果。同时他提出了进一步的修正观点，随着失业率的居高不下，第一种影响几乎可以确定的会压倒第二种影响，意味着失业救济金对失业的净影响是正面的。

But that doesn't seem to be the point Ms Evans was making. She wrote:
Yet that hasn't been accompanied by a similar improvement in the unemployment rate. It rose to 9.8% in November from a recent low of 9.5% over the summer. That is largely because the sluggish pace of job creation hasn't been strong enough to absorb growth of the labor force.
但这似乎并不是Evans女士提出的观点。她写到：
但是在失业率方面并没有伴随着类似的改进。它从整个夏季的9.5%的近期低点，上涨到11月份的9.8%。这主要是因为缓慢的、创造工作机会的速度，还没有强大到足以吸收劳动力的增长。

The extension of jobless benefits is likely to worsen that trend for at least several months. For one, individuals not actively searching for work or willing to take available jobs may claim they are unemployed in order to receive benefits. That could artificially boost the size of the labor force, which is used to determine the unemployment rate.
失业救济金的延长有可能使这种趋势在最近几个月更加恶化。举个例子，个人将不会去积极寻找工作或者自愿接受能提供的有效工作，他们失业是为了得到救济。那样会人为的增加影响失业率的那部分劳动力的规模。

Mr Salmon acknowledges this argument but dismisses it:
Evans isn't very good at math...
Well yes, the labor force is indeed used to determine the unemployment rate, but it's the denominator in that calculation. If the denominator goes up, the rate goes down. The problem is rather that in any ratio less than 100%, if you increase the numerator and the denominator by the same amount, then the ratio goes up.
Salmon先生认可这个观点，但是反驳说：
Evans在数学方面真的不怎么样...
是的，劳动力确实用于测定失业率，但它在计算中是分母。如果分母增长，比率就会下降。问题是在任意小于100%的比率中，如果分子和分母同时增加相同的量，比率就会上升。

This is precisely what she's saying, but Mr Salmon doesn't seem to get it. Imagine we have a labour force with 100 workers, 10 of which are unemployed. In that case, the unemployment rate is 10/100 or 10%. Let's say that extension of unemployment stimulates demand such that 5 jobless workers are hired, but that it also encourages 10 new jobless workers to enter the labour force. In that case, the labour force is now 110 workers, 15 of which are unemployed. In that case, the unemployment rate is now 15/110 or 13.6%.
她所说的话非常明确，但Salmon先生似乎并不认可。假设我们有一个100个工人的劳动力市场，其中10人没有被雇佣。在这种情况下，失业率是10/100或10%。比方说延长失业救济刺激了需求导致5个失业工人被雇佣，但这也激励了10个新失业者进入这个劳动力市场。这个时候，劳动力市场现在有110个工人。其中15人没有被雇佣。这种情况下，失业率现在是15/110或13.6%。

Now one could rightfully say that the 13.6% unemployment rate in the latter case corresponds to a healthier labour market than the 10% unemployment rate in the former case. Employment is unambiguously higher in the latter scenario. But it's still true that the impact of unemployment benefits is to increase the unemployment rate―not through the incentive effect on workers weighing whether or not to take jobs, but through the incentive effect on workers weighing whether or not to remain in the labour force.
现在人们可以堂堂正正的说后者13.6%的失业率比前者10%的失业率更加符合健康的劳动力市场。在后面的情况下雇佣的工人也确实更多。但是更真实的是，失业救济增加了失业率――这不取决于权衡是否接受工作的那些工人产生的诱因效应，而是取决于权衡是否留在这个劳动力市场中的那些工人产生的诱因效应。