The dangers of a rising China 中国崛起之危
China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists
中美必将成为对手，但不一定会成为敌手
Dec 2nd 2010 | from PRINT EDITION 2010年12月2日 | 《经济学人》发行版文章
TOWARDS the end of 2003 and early in 2004 China's most senior leaders put aside the routine of governing 1.3 billion people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of great powers. You can imagine history's grim inventory of war and destruction being laid out before them as they examined how, from the 15th century, empires and upstarts had often fought for supremacy. And you can imagine them moving on to the real subject of their inquiry: whether China will be able to take its place at the top without anyone resorting to arms.
2003年岁末至2004年年初，中国最高层领导人放下管理13亿人的日常公务，专程花了几个下午的时间研究大国崛起。当他们审视为何自15世纪以来帝王和叛军首领总是为了皇权而战时，你可以想象摆在他们面前的这张严峻的历史清单是受人唾骂的战争和破坏。你也能想象得到他们正推进其所研究的现实议题：中国能否和平崛起。
In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means only peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisations. When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour.
中国以多种方式努力尝试使忧心仲仲的世界各国安心。它已经一再承诺只会以和平的方式崛起。它提供了慷慨的援助、投资以及与其邻国进行边界谈判，并且积极参与联合国维和部队和国际性组织事务。当上月朝鲜炮击韩国时，中国至少尝试过建立（六方会谈）框架以约束其邻国。
But reasonable China sometimes gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue any condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastguard vessels around some disputed islands―and then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for Japanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea.
然而理性的中国有时也会咄咄逼人。今年三月，当朝鲜击沉韩国的军舰（46名海军官兵阵亡）时，中国未曾发表任何谴责声明。数月后它为一些中国渔民与日本发生争执，这些中国渔民因在某争议岛屿附近冲撞日本海岸防卫队的船只而遭到逮捕――中国随后扣压数名日本商人并阻止日本工业必需的稀土出口。而且它已经强硬地重申对南沙与西沙群岛以及几乎整个南中国海拥有主权。
As the Chinese leaders' history lesson will have told them, the relationship that determines whether the world is at peace or at war is that between pairs of great powers. Sometimes, as with Britain and America, it goes well. Sometimes, as between Britain and Germany, it does not.
就象中国领导人的历史课所示，决定世界是否维持和平还是陷入战争的是大国间的关系。象英美那样就能相处得很好。而如果象英德，那就麻烦不断了。
So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American security has focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power that will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered economic and military might, will express itself (see our special report).
迄今为止，中美之间相处得非常之好。中国致力于自身的经济成长，美国则忙于自身的安全事务，把重心放在应对伊斯兰恐怖袭击和伊拉克、阿富汗之战。但两国仍然互不信任。中国把美国视作衰退中的超级大国，认为其终将寻求遏制中国崛起。而美国担心中国被经济及军事实力重新激活的民族主义将会站到台前（请看本报的专题报道）。
The Peloponnesian pessimists
伯罗奔尼撒之战的悲观主义者
Pessimists believe China and America are condemned to be rivals. The countries' visions of the good society are very different. And, as China's power grows, so will its determination to get its way and to do things in the world. America, by contrast, will inevitably balk at surrendering its pre-eminence.
悲观主义者相信中美注定会成为对手。两国对美好社会的愿景是截然不同的。随着中国的实力逐渐增长，它对于执行自定方针和影响世界的决心也随之增强。相反，美国则必定不愿放弃自己的霸主地位。
They are probably right about Chinese ambitions. Yet China need not be an enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is no longer in the business of exporting its ideology. Unlike the 19th-century European powers, it is not looking to amass new colonies. And China and America have a lot in common. Both benefit from globalisation and from open markets where they buy raw materials and sell their exports. Both want a broadly stable world in which nuclear weapons do not spread and rogue states, like Iran and North Korea, have little scope to cause mayhem. Both would lose incalculably from war.
对于中国的野心，或许他们是正确的。然而没有必要把中国当成敌人。不象苏联，它不再对外输出意识形态。也不象19世纪的欧洲列强，它不谋求扩张新的殖民地。而且中美有许多共同点。两国都从全球化和开放市场中受益，他们以此购买原材料和销售出口商品。两国都期望一个大致稳定的全球环境，维护核不扩散原则并限制"流氓国家"（譬如伊朗和朝鲜）不能制造蓄意破坏。而且两国都会因战争而付出巨大代价。
The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relations between China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons. Now America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China's military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan and American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the Pacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm―if they wanted only to ensure their own security―each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.
把中国变成对手的最佳方法就是将它当作对手那样看待。正如一战前数十年中英德友好关系的破灭那样，危险来自破坏中美关系的摩擦。这样的摩擦已经在国防领域显现。感受到来自美国海军武力的威胁，中国已不断更新他们的导弹、潜水艇、雷达、网络战和反卫星装置等武器。现在美国感受到了中国在军事上的勇猛势头。当前五角大楼对中国军事力量的评估已警告其对台湾和美军基地以及靠近中国海岸的航母构成威胁。美国海军也已着手在太平洋地区部署了更多部队。感受到新威胁，中国可能还会有所反应。即便中美都无意侵犯对方――假定他们想要的仅仅是为了确保自身安全――他们仍然可能视对方为日益增长的威胁。
Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But a weaker America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the peaceful conduct of trade and commerce on which America's prosperity depends. America therefore needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from Chinese attack.
有人会说解决方式是美国退出军事竞赛。但一个处于弱势的美国将导致东亚局势长期不稳，进而威胁到美国繁荣所依赖的贸易和商业必需的和平环境。因此，美国需要足够强大以保证海域安全并保护台湾不受中国袭击。
How to take down the Great Wall
如何消除分岐
History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied by a build-up of trust.
历史表明：当崛起中的大国认为自身的发展不受外界影响，而且现有大国确信其上升途径不会对世界构成本质威胁时，超级大国就能和平共处。因此，军事实力积累的同时应该增进彼此的信任。
There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be more open about its military doctrine―about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North Korea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.
在亚洲有很多方法可以建立互信。有一种方法能有助于保证争议和误解不会失控。即中国应在关于核战略，航空母舰以及导弹计划上采取更加开明的军事策略。同样，中美需要在包括朝鲜、台湾、太空和网络战问题上建立处理争议的机制。同时亚洲作为一个整体需要形成共识以防止每次海域冲突都演变成国家实力的检验。
America and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today's confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East Asia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.
中美应该设法进行多边协作。亚洲需要的是单一区域安全论坛，诸如东亚峰会，而非眼下这种互相矛盾的混乱局面。亚洲各国还可以就增加互信和在非传统安全领域进行更多的合作，譬如卫生健康、环境保护、打击海盗以及反恐，这些威胁本质上就是跨国界的。
If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them―by, for instance, protectionism―it feeds China's suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.
如果美国想要中国遵守他所提倡的自由秩序的规则，那么它需要以身作则。每当美国违背它们――例如说，自由贸易保护主义――都会加深中国的怀疑并破坏其所要谋求的这一秩序。
China and America have one advantage over history's great-power pairings: they saw the 20th century go disastrously wrong. It is up to them to ensure that the 21st is different.
中美比历史上相互竞争的强国有一个优势：他们见证了20世纪所遭受的悲惨错误。这使他们确信21世纪将会有所不同。
China and America are bound to be rivals, but they do not have to be antagonists
中美必将成为对手，但不一定会成为敌手
Dec 2nd 2010 | from PRINT EDITION 2010年12月2日 | 《经济学人》发行版文章
TOWARDS the end of 2003 and early in 2004 China's most senior leaders put aside the routine of governing 1.3 billion people to spend a couple of afternoons studying the rise of great powers. You can imagine history's grim inventory of war and destruction being laid out before them as they examined how, from the 15th century, empires and upstarts had often fought for supremacy. And you can imagine them moving on to the real subject of their inquiry: whether China will be able to take its place at the top without anyone resorting to arms.
2003年岁末至2004年年初，中国最高层领导人放下管理13亿人的日常公务，专程花了几个下午的时间研究大国崛起。当他们审视为何自15世纪以来帝王和叛军首领总是为了皇权而战时，你可以想象摆在他们面前的这张严峻的历史清单是受人唾骂的战争和破坏。你也能想象得到他们正推进其所研究的现实议题：中国能否和平崛起。
In many ways China has made efforts to try to reassure an anxious world. It has repeatedly promised that it means only peace. It has spent freely on aid and investment, settled border disputes with its neighbours and rolled up its sleeves in UN peacekeeping forces and international organisations. When North Korea shelled a South Korean island last month China did at least try to create a framework to rein in its neighbour.
中国以多种方式努力尝试使忧心仲仲的世界各国安心。它已经一再承诺只会以和平的方式崛起。它提供了慷慨的援助、投资以及与其邻国进行边界谈判，并且积极参与联合国维和部队和国际性组织事务。当上月朝鲜炮击韩国时，中国至少尝试过建立（六方会谈）框架以约束其邻国。
But reasonable China sometimes gives way to aggressive China. In March, when the North sank a South Korean warship, killing 46 sailors, China failed to issue any condemnation. A few months later it fell out with Japan over some Chinese fishermen, arrested for ramming Japanese coastguard vessels around some disputed islands―and then it locked up some Japanese businessmen and withheld exports of rare earths vital for Japanese industry. And it has forcefully reasserted its claim to the Spratly and Paracel Islands and to sovereignty over virtually the entire South China Sea.
然而理性的中国有时也会咄咄逼人。今年三月，当朝鲜击沉韩国的军舰（46名海军官兵阵亡）时，中国未曾发表任何谴责声明。数月后它为一些中国渔民与日本发生争执，这些中国渔民因在某争议岛屿附近冲撞日本海岸防卫队的船只而遭到逮捕――中国随后扣压数名日本商人并阻止日本工业必需的稀土出口。而且它已经强硬地重申对南沙与西沙群岛以及几乎整个南中国海拥有主权。
As the Chinese leaders' history lesson will have told them, the relationship that determines whether the world is at peace or at war is that between pairs of great powers. Sometimes, as with Britain and America, it goes well. Sometimes, as between Britain and Germany, it does not.
就象中国领导人的历史课所示，决定世界是否维持和平还是陷入战争的是大国间的关系。象英美那样就能相处得很好。而如果象英德，那就麻烦不断了。
So far, things have gone remarkably well between America and China. While China has devoted itself to economic growth, American security has focused on Islamic terrorism and war in Iraq and Afghanistan. But the two mistrust each other. China sees America as a waning power that will eventually seek to block its own rise. And America worries about how Chinese nationalism, fuelled by rediscovered economic and military might, will express itself (see our special report).
迄今为止，中美之间相处得非常之好。中国致力于自身的经济成长，美国则忙于自身的安全事务，把重心放在应对伊斯兰恐怖袭击和伊拉克、阿富汗之战。但两国仍然互不信任。中国把美国视作衰退中的超级大国，认为其终将寻求遏制中国崛起。而美国担心中国被经济及军事实力重新激活的民族主义将会站到台前（请看本报的专题报道）。
The Peloponnesian pessimists
伯罗奔尼撒之战的悲观主义者
Pessimists believe China and America are condemned to be rivals. The countries' visions of the good society are very different. And, as China's power grows, so will its determination to get its way and to do things in the world. America, by contrast, will inevitably balk at surrendering its pre-eminence.
悲观主义者相信中美注定会成为对手。两国对美好社会的愿景是截然不同的。随着中国的实力逐渐增长，它对于执行自定方针和影响世界的决心也随之增强。相反，美国则必定不愿放弃自己的霸主地位。
They are probably right about Chinese ambitions. Yet China need not be an enemy. Unlike the Soviet Union, it is no longer in the business of exporting its ideology. Unlike the 19th-century European powers, it is not looking to amass new colonies. And China and America have a lot in common. Both benefit from globalisation and from open markets where they buy raw materials and sell their exports. Both want a broadly stable world in which nuclear weapons do not spread and rogue states, like Iran and North Korea, have little scope to cause mayhem. Both would lose incalculably from war.
对于中国的野心，或许他们是正确的。然而没有必要把中国当成敌人。不象苏联，它不再对外输出意识形态。也不象19世纪的欧洲列强，它不谋求扩张新的殖民地。而且中美有许多共同点。两国都从全球化和开放市场中受益，他们以此购买原材料和销售出口商品。两国都期望一个大致稳定的全球环境，维护核不扩散原则并限制"流氓国家"（譬如伊朗和朝鲜）不能制造蓄意破坏。而且两国都会因战争而付出巨大代价。
The best way to turn China into an opponent is to treat it as one. The danger is that spats and rows will sour relations between China and America, just as the friendship between Germany and Britain crumbled in the decades before the first world war. It is already happening in defence. Feeling threatened by American naval power, China has been modernising its missiles, submarines, radar, cyber-warfare and anti-satellite weapons. Now America feels on its mettle. Recent Pentagon assessments of China's military strength warn of the threat to Taiwan and American bases and to aircraft-carriers near the Chinese coast. The US Navy has begun to deploy more forces in the Pacific. Feeling threatened anew, China may respond. Even if neither America nor China intended harm―if they wanted only to ensure their own security―each could nevertheless see the other as a growing threat.
把中国变成对手的最佳方法就是将它当作对手那样看待。正如一战前数十年中英德友好关系的破灭那样，危险来自破坏中美关系的摩擦。这样的摩擦已经在国防领域显现。感受到来自美国海军武力的威胁，中国已不断更新他们的导弹、潜水艇、雷达、网络战和反卫星装置等武器。现在美国感受到了中国在军事上的勇猛势头。当前五角大楼对中国军事力量的评估已警告其对台湾和美军基地以及靠近中国海岸的航母构成威胁。美国海军也已着手在太平洋地区部署了更多部队。感受到新威胁，中国可能还会有所反应。即便中美都无意侵犯对方――假定他们想要的仅仅是为了确保自身安全――他们仍然可能视对方为日益增长的威胁。
Some would say the solution is for America to turn its back on military rivalry. But a weaker America would lead to chronic insecurity in East Asia and thus threaten the peaceful conduct of trade and commerce on which America's prosperity depends. America therefore needs to be strong enough to guarantee the seas and protect Taiwan from Chinese attack.
有人会说解决方式是美国退出军事竞赛。但一个处于弱势的美国将导致东亚局势长期不稳，进而威胁到美国繁荣所依赖的贸易和商业必需的和平环境。因此，美国需要足够强大以保证海域安全并保护台湾不受中国袭击。
How to take down the Great Wall
如何消除分岐
History shows that superpowers can coexist peacefully when the rising power believes it can rise unhindered and the incumbent power believes that the way it runs the world is not fundamentally threatened. So a military build-up needs to be accompanied by a build-up of trust.
历史表明：当崛起中的大国认为自身的发展不受外界影响，而且现有大国确信其上升途径不会对世界构成本质威胁时，超级大国就能和平共处。因此，军事实力积累的同时应该增进彼此的信任。
There are lots of ways to build trust in Asia. One would be to help ensure that disputes and misunderstandings do not get out of hand. China should thus be more open about its military doctrine―about its nuclear posture, its aircraft-carriers and missile programme. Likewise, America and China need rules for disputes including North Korea (see article), Taiwan, space and cyber-warfare. And Asia as a whole needs agreements to help prevent every collision at sea from becoming a trial of strength.
在亚洲有很多方法可以建立互信。有一种方法能有助于保证争议和误解不会失控。即中国应在关于核战略，航空母舰以及导弹计划上采取更加开明的军事策略。同样，中美需要在包括朝鲜、台湾、太空和网络战问题上建立处理争议的机制。同时亚洲作为一个整体需要形成共识以防止每次海域冲突都演变成国家实力的检验。
America and China should try to work multilaterally. Instead of today's confusion of competing venues, Asia needs a single regional security forum, such as the East Asia Summit, where it can do business. Asian countries could also collaborate more in confidence-boosting non-traditional security, such as health, environmental protection, anti-piracy and counter-terrorism, where threats by their nature cross borders.
中美应该设法进行多边协作。亚洲需要的是单一区域安全论坛，诸如东亚峰会，而非眼下这种互相矛盾的混乱局面。亚洲各国还可以就增加互信和在非传统安全领域进行更多的合作，譬如卫生健康、环境保护、打击海盗以及反恐，这些威胁本质上就是跨国界的。
If America wants to bind China into the rules-based liberal order it promotes, it needs to stick to the rules itself. Every time America breaks them―by, for instance, protectionism―it feeds China's suspicions and undermines the very order it seeks.
如果美国想要中国遵守他所提倡的自由秩序的规则，那么它需要以身作则。每当美国违背它们――例如说，自由贸易保护主义――都会加深中国的怀疑并破坏其所要谋求的这一秩序。
China and America have one advantage over history's great-power pairings: they saw the 20th century go disastrously wrong. It is up to them to ensure that the 21st is different.
中美比历史上相互竞争的强国有一个优势：他们见证了20世纪所遭受的悲惨错误。这使他们确信21世纪将会有所不同。
博文
没有评论:
发表评论