2010年12月19日

China's secret media中国的神秘媒体

China's secret media
中国的神秘媒体

Chinese whispers
中国人的传言


Not believing what they read in the papers, China's leaders commission their own
中国领导人的不相信在报纸里面读到的信息,他们有自己获取信息的方式


Jun 17th 2010
2010/6/17




①    IN A country where independent information-gathering is kept in check, what China's leaders know and how they know it matters hugely. A recently leaked speech by Xia Lin, a senior editor at Xinhua, China's government-run news agency, suggests that even though press controls have been somewhat loosened in recent years, leaders still rely heavily on secret reports filed by Xinhua journalists. Other evidence indicates this fault-prone system is actually gaining in importance.
在一个国家自主信息被汇总审查的地方,是被中国领导人所知道的,怎样知道重大事件的。一份来自新华社中国政府新闻通讯社代表处的高级编辑夏林的漏洞报告,暗示尽管近几年领导人对新闻媒体的控制宽松了些,但他们仍然很依仗新华社记者收集的机密报告。其他证据表明这些有缺点的系统事实上带来巨大收益。


②    In the speech last month Mr Xia revealed that the news agency's public reports about an eruption of ethnic rioting in the far-western region of Xinjiang last July had played down revenge attacks by Han Chinese against members of the region's biggest ethnic group, the Uighurs. Mr Xia said it was only after reading a classified "internal reference" report on the reprisals that China's president, Hu Jintao, cut short an overseas tour. A summary of Mr Xia's remarks was posted online by one of the audience. Censors removed it and tried to stop it circulating elsewhere.
在上个月的这份报告中夏先生揭露了新闻通讯社公共报道中关于去年发生在遥远的中国西部新疆地区的种族骚乱,镇压这个地区最大反对汉族的种族成员维吾尔族的打击报复。中国的主席胡锦涛在读到内部的关于报复的报道,缩短了国外的访问行程。审查员去掉这些信息并试图阻止骚乱信息到处传播。


③   The summary has not been verified. But filing secret bulletins to the leadership is one of Xinhua's crucial roles. Many of China's main newspapers also have classified versions covering news considered too sensitive for public consumption. They do not rely on secret intelligence, but merely report on issues that in most other countries would be the staple of journalism: public complaints; official wrongdoing; bad economic news; and foreign criticism.
这些报告还没有完全被查清。但是新华社扮演的重要教角色之一是给收集重要机密情报给中国领导人。中国许多的新闻媒体将对公众来说太敏感的话题进行分类处理。这些媒体主要职责不依赖机密情报,而只是像其他一些国家的一些媒体一样报告:公众抱怨,官员犯罪,糟糕的经济新闻,还有国外媒体的评论。


④   In recent years China's open media―which, thanks to the withdrawal of government subsidies, are now more commercially driven―have also been straying into these once-forbidden realms. But despite the growing assertiveness and reliability of at least a handful of open publications, the secret media have shown no sign of withering away. Some of them have gained a new lease of life―secret-sounding information sells well. China's rapid adoption of the internet has even provided rich material for a whole new genre of classified reporting. And China's leaders appear to be lapping it up.
由于收回了政府补贴,近几年曾经迷失在这个一度禁止媒体开放的国度---中国政府加大开放媒体的力度,而媒体也变的更加商业化。起码有少数公开刊物正愈加自信和可靠,尽管如此,秘密媒体毫无消亡迹象。一些媒体好像获得了新的生命---机密情报销路很好。中国神秘媒体快速采用通过提供很丰厚的物质报酬方式来换取分类情报。中国的领导人似乎越来越看重这种方式。

⑤   The outbreak of SARS, a deadly lung disease, in 2003 exposed critical weaknesses in the "internal reference", or neican, system. Xinhua's first SARS report, for leaders' eyes only, did not appear until February 9th, by when there had been some 300 cases and five deaths, dating back to November 2002. Only two days later did the leadership release the news and tell the World Health Organisation. China's secretiveness and dilly-dallying were widely blamed for the spread of SARS.
2003年一种致命的肺病SRAS的爆发,暴露这种所谓内部情报的缺点,或者是地震情报中心。只受到中国领导人审视的新华社第一次关于SARS的报告一直到2003年2月才出现,那时从2002年11月开始已经产生了300个病例,5例死亡。直到两天后领导人释放消息并通报世界卫生组织。中国媒体对信息的隐秘和时间的延误使得SRAS疫情在中国大面积蔓延。


⑥   It was not until April 20th that China's leaders allowed the press to report the outbreak freely. But even as the number of open reports jumped, so too did Xinhua's neican coverage. Between April 1st and July 10th, the news agency issued more than 2,700 public SARS-related reports in Chinese. It also filed more than 1,000 secret ones, and over six hours' worth of classified audio-visual material.
直到20003年4月20号中国的领导人才允许媒体可以只有播报疫情状况。尽管大量的报告涌现出来,那仅仅是新华社国家地震情报中心覆盖的范围之内。在4月1号到7月10号,新闻代理机构对中国民众发布多达2700条SRAS的相关新闻。那里面包含了多达1000多条的机密信息,和长达6个小时的有价值的分类视听资料。


⑦   In 2003 the number of comments written by leaders in the margins of Reference Proofs, a secret bulletin on international affairs for very senior officials rose by 88% compared with the year before. Six were by President Hu. Xinhua compiles such statistics assiduously to measure the impact of its work. An even more secret version of the bulletin, Reference Proofs (Supplementary Sheets), published more than three times as many reports as in 2002.
2003年,领导人在《参考清样》――供高级官员阅读参考的关于国际事务的秘密公报――空白处的批示比去年多了88%,其中胡主席的批示有6条。新华社一丝不苟进行这些统计,是为了评价其此项工作的影响力。《参考清样(附页)》是一份密级更高的公报,像2002年一样,至少出版了3期。

⑧   Internet usage in China soared after SARS, which boosted the appeal of virtual encounters and e-commerce. In parallel there was a surge in demand from China's leaders for rapid updates on what the "netizens" were up to. Xinhua compiles these into another laboriously titled bulletin,Proofs of Domestic Trends (A Digest of Online Public Sentiment). In 2007 the agency's yearbook reported a 15% growth in the number of such reports and a 50% increase in leaders' comments on them. It seems unbothered by the paradox: public internet chat is rehashed in top-secret reports, divulging the contents of which could result in a lengthy prison term.
在SARS后互联网在中国的使用被抬到一个新的高度,这使得现实与电子商务产生冲突与此同时,中国领导人亟需了解"网民"的最新动向。新华社兢兢业业地编纂了另一份公报,《国内动态清样(网络舆情文摘)》。在2007新闻年刊上有报告说类似报告有了15%的增长,其中里面50%的是关于领导人的评论。看起来似乎毫不相干的论点:公众网络谈论涉及高度机密的报告,泄露报告的内容可能会导致长期监禁。


⑨   The plethora of information on the internet deemed too sensitive for China's traditional media has spurred the growth of neican. Last July the Communist Party's flagship newspaper, the People's Daily, launched a new weekly journal for senior officials, called Online Public Sentiment: Three Rurals Internal Reference.
泛滥的互联网信息,虽然对中国传统媒体来说太过敏感,但却刺激了内参的发展。去年7月,共产党的旗舰新闻报纸,《人民日报》,创立了一份新的周刊供高级官员调阅,称为《网络舆情:三农内参》。

⑩   The similarity of its title to Xinhua's far more restricted digest might well be calculated to give the impression that it is offering inside information on the dissatisfaction-plagued "three rurals", which is the party's way of referring to peasants, villages and agriculture. A sample edition available online is humdrum, but its aura of secrecy commands a subscription rate two or three times that of a standard (and far more informative) weekly magazine. A Chinese editor familiar with Reform Internal Reference, a secret weekly for low-level officials and academics, says much of its contents could be found online.
"三农"是党对农民、农村和农业的简称。这份内参的刊名与一份密级更高新华文摘的刊名相似,这可能是出于这一深虑:该刊名要给读者一种印象,即提供怨声载道"三农"问题的深度报告网络版乏味而简单,但其神秘的光环吸引来的定阅量是一份标准(信息量要多得多)周刊的两到三倍。一位熟悉《改革内参》――为一般官员和学术界提供秘密周刊――的中国编辑曾说,该刊物的大量内容都可在网上找到。

⑾   Chinese leaders themselves sometimes seem to take neican reports, produced as they are by the party's own faithful, with a pinch of salt. In a commentary in the People's Daily in April, China's prime minister, Wen Jiabao, revealed that leaders sometimes had to sneak out incognito in search of unadulterated information.
内参报道都是出于对党的忠心而编辑,中国领导人自己有时似乎也会觉得其内容异常。《人民日报》四月的一篇评论员文章中,中国国家总理温家宝透露,领导人有时不得不通过暗访搜集未掺假的信息。

⑿   The open press, subject as it is to a host of censorship directives, is usually even less reliable. At the party's five-yearly congress in 2007, Xinhua issued more than twice as many neican reports as it had at the 2002 event. In 2009 a senior provincial official called for efforts to ensure that everyone eligible for Xinhua's neican did subscribe. There must be no "blank spots", he said. In the realm of the censored, half-censored content is king.
饱受审查文件束缚的公开媒体往往不可轻信。在2007年五年一次的党代会期间,新华社发表的内参报道量是2002年的两倍多。2009年,一位省级高官要求,确保所有具备资格的人员都确实订阅了新华内参;他声称,必须不留空白。在这个充满审查的国度,半审查内容统临天下

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