2011年6月26日

Dragon Fire

Dragon Fire

The U.S. military is getting ready to leave Iraq and Afghanistan. The next threat is much bigger.

Even the most casual observer seems to know that China's economy has been growing at a roughly 10% annual rate for much of the past decade. Less recognized and arguably more important to the state of the world is the fact that China's defense spending rose even faster than that -- 12% or more a year between 2000 and 2009.

"The accelerating pace of China's defense budget increases is driving countries in the region, as well as the U.S., to react to preserve a balance of power and stability," says Jacqueline Newmyer, head of Long-Term Strategy Group, a Cambridge, Mass.-based defense consultant. "There is a real potential for arms races to emerge," she adds. "While once we assumed we'd have access to areas to conduct anti-terrorism or anti-insurgency operations, now we're compelled to think about preserving our ability to gain access to East Asia."

Stephen Rosen, Harvard's Beton Michael Kaneb professor of national security and military affairs, agrees. "All of us are clearly moving in that direction: We, the Japanese, the Indians. The only thing stalling it now are fiscal problems in Japan and the United States," says the former advisor to one-time presidential hopeful Rudy Giuliani.

Highlighting one of the fastest military buildups in history was China's debut of its stealth jet just hours before the January visit to Beijing by outgoing U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates. The fighter will rival the U.S.'s F-22 Raptor, the world's only operational stealth fighter. Larger than the F-22, with bigger fuel tanks, it will fly higher, faster and with less chance of detection. It's one of many Chinese weapons that will impede the U.S. military's ability to roam freely in the region.

Nelson Ching/Bloomberg News

An Asian arms race is getting under way, driven by China.

The investment implications for China's military modernization are only starting to take shape. But some U.S. companies like Lockheed Martin (ticker: LMT) and United Technologies (UTX), facing big budget cuts as President Obama withdraws the U.S. from wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, should get some offset from a new spending cycle worldwide. Like it or not, U.S. investors also are likely to hear more about Chinese companies such as Xi'an Aero-Engine (600893.China) and China Shipbuilding Industrial (601989.China) that are helping arm the country.

There's likely to be a steady stream of new IPOs for Chinese defense companies that some Western investors may choose to avoid. The effects go beyond equities. The sounds of new sabers rattling will stir both the bond and currency markets.

THREE DECADES AFTER Vietnamese forces defeated China's People's Liberation Army in a border fight, Beijing's military has the potential to rearrange geopolitical relationships -- and military needs. In October, China conducted a joint air exercise with Turkey, its first with a NATO member. En route, its fighters refueled in Iran, the first time Iran allowed a foreign military to refill at its airfields since the Shah departed. Though they don't constitute a far-flung naval power, China's ships increasingly sail the world. In February, Beijing dispatched a frigate to Libya to evacuate 12,000 Chinese workers; it was able to arrive quickly because it was conducting antipiracy patrols off the Horn of Africa.

These exercises seem benign, but they haven't escaped the notice of China's regional foes, particularly in Taiwan. China has about 1,500 ballistic missiles, many of them trained at Taiwan. Indeed, incoming Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told the Senate this month that China "appears to be preparing for potential contingencies involving Taiwan, including possible U.S. military intervention."

China contests its border with India, part of which analysts refer to as "Southern Tibet." It also claims sovereignty over spits of land in the East China Sea, including the Senkaku islands between Taiwan and Japan. When Japan detained a Chinese trawler there last year, China banned rare-earth exports critical to high-tech manufacturing; Japan backed down. It also asserts authority over the Spratlys and Paracels -- largely uninhabited atolls in the South China Sea that sit on the oil-rich continental shelf. Those claims are variously disputed by Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia and Taiwan.

China's claims have raised tensions. As a result, Vietnam held live-fire naval training earlier this month in the South China Sea. Meanwhile, the Philippines renamed the South China Sea the "West Philippine Sea," and Taiwan said it would dispatch missile boats and tanks to the Spratlys. Most worrying, of course, is control of the sea lanes, through which valuable merchandise and energy shipments pass.

China maintains there's no ill intent. "We do not want to use our money to buy equipment or advanced weapons to challenge the United States," People's Liberation Army Chief of Staff Chen Bingde said in a visit to Washington, D.C., last month. He noted the "gaping gap" between Chinese and U.S. military capability.

Many analysts are skeptical. Bradley Kaplan, a consultant to U.S. Pacific Command, says "Sun-tzu taught that the weaker power never demonstrates its intent or capability."

Barron's has interviewed about two dozen experts on China's arms buildup; they date its modernization to Desert Storm, when Chinese generals saw how quickly the U.S. and its allies vanquished Iraq. Then came the election of Lee Teng-hui, the first native Taiwanese to become the island nation's president, which triggered the third Taiwan Strait crisis. The first Bush administration sold Taiwan 115 F-16 fighters. "In 1993, the PLA air force was in such poor shape that the F-16s made a difference," says David Finkelstein, director of China Studies at Center for Naval Analyses.

China's increasing wealth pays for a big budget. Following its decade of spending increases, China's defense outlays are scheduled to rise another 12.7% in 2011 to 601 billion yuan (nearly $100 billion). That's far less than the U.S.'s $708 billion defense budget -- but the two are headed in opposite directions.

Early in its buildup, the mainland bought most of its armaments from Russia. In a move familiar to U.S. technology executives, it then began copying them, infuriating Moscow. Now it's on the brink of creating indigenous combat vehicles and weapons. The J-20 stealth fighter, which is expected to be ready in 2018, appears to combine both advanced Russian and U.S. designs, says Roger Cliff, China expert at Rand Corp. This week, the 90th anniversary of the Communist Party, China is slated to float its first aircraft carrier, a Soviet design. Ukraine originally sold the ship to China to serve as a casino.

The biggest gains have been in China's navy and in its strategic missile forces, called the Chinese Second Artillery Corps. Most of its arsenal is short- and medium-range missiles that can fly up to 1,500 kilometers (930 miles), within easy distance of U.S. bases in the Pacific. Increasingly, though, they are longer range, and the military's new anti-ship missile would severely curtail the ability of U.S. carriers to deliver military aid to Asian allies.

China has more warships than its neighbors and as many attack submarines as the U.S. Aircraft carriers will allow China to use them as floating military bases, cheaper to move wherever and whenever it needs them.

The arms race could produce a mini-boom in Chinese equity offerings. At present, most of the biggest defense contractors are unlisted state-owned companies, but China wants to take them public. "The defense industry's footprint in the broader capital markets -- bond issues, bank loans, non-listed share transfers -- is also growing," says Tai Ming Cheung, a China expert at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation and author of "Fortifying China: The Struggle to Build a Modern Defense Economy."

Taking companies public "is a clear strategic priority" that also "promotes development of a dual-use economy" that serves military and civilian needs, says Cheung. Already, there are scores of dual-use firms listed just the way Boeing (BA) is in the U.S. Most of them are on the A-share market open to domestic investors and to qualified foreign institutions. Over the past five years, military stocks have far outgained the Shanghai Composite, though they have deflated this year. Right now, the group trades at price-earnings multiples of 25 to 30, low by historical standards for the sector. That's still too high for Samantha Ho, investment director of Invesco Hong Kong and manager of the Invesco China Fund (AACFX), even though she believes China will spend much more on military and national defense.

"It's certain military assets will be listed," says Wang Tianyi, a defense analyst at Shanghai's Orient Securities. Among the beneficiaries of the modernization, according to Wang: Xi'an Aero-engine, the only listed flagship company to produce engines for China's fighter jets, and AVIC Heavy Machinery (600765.China), one of the listed arms of a state-run defense contractor.

Yang Liu, manager of the Atlantis China Fund, owns China Shipbuilding Industrial (601989.China), the country's largest shipbuilder, which makes submarines and torpedoes and supplies the navy. "It's the No. 1 navy-equipment marine maker," says Liu. "One day China will build its own aircraft carrier. This company is very likely to produce one."

Such sentiments have reset spending priorities among China's neighbors. The Sendai earthquake temporarily silenced Japan, a harsh critic of China's buildup.

Japanese self-defense forces "are clearly reoriented to China as opposed to Russia," says Dean Cheng of the Heritage Foundation. Japan plans to add submarines and warships.

India is holding a competition for a supplier of 126 mid-range combat aircraft, its biggest defense deal. The short list includes the Eurofighter Typhoon, made by European Aeronautic Defence & Space (EAD.France); Alenia Aeronautica, a unit of Finmeccanica (FNC.Italy), and BAE Systems (BA.UK). Also contending is the Dassault Rafale, made by Dassault Aviation (AM.France). The fighters will be manufactured with the country's Hindustan Aeronautics, the state-owned defense contractor that plans to go public this year. India also plans a three-carrier fleet.

Australia is having its largest military expansion since World War II, spending $275 billion over the next 20 years for submarines, frigates, destroyers and the F-35 joint strike fighter. Singapore, South Korea and Vietnam all plan to buy submarines.

OF COURSE, THE U.S. must respond as well. Incoming Defense Secretary Panetta has stressed that the U.S. "must be prepared" for adversaries armed with air-defense systems, long-range ballistic missiles, and anti-ship cruise missiles. That means it needs to modernize long-range strike and surveillance capabilities.

Expect to hear the term "AirSea Battle" more often. It's a concept promoted by the independent think tank Center for Strategic & Budgetary Assessments. This strategy would integrate U.S. air and naval forces to defeat enemies with sophisticated abilities to deny them access. The idea would be to develop ways to blind satellites and defend against or attack with long-range strikes. It's a defense against both China and Iran.

"This will shift demand from counterinsurgency warfare toward more traditional systems like long-range strike aircraft and missiles, high-end naval forces and robust space and cyber capabilities," says Jeffrey Roncka, managing partner at defense consultant Renaissance Strategic Advisors.

Thus, Panetta supports the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program, with fighters capable of vertical takeoff and landing. To date the program has been plagued by delays and cost overruns. One big beneficiary is Lockheed Martin, although it's also been blamed for the delays. Lockheed also produces the Aegis combat system. There also is support for a new, long-range bomber. Likely winners in this area include Northrop Grumman (NOC), which makes the B-2 bomber, and United Technologies, which owns Pratt & Whitney, whose PW9000 engine is a strong contender for the new bomber.

Long-range aircraft need air-to-air refueling; the Air Force has just awarded Boeing a $35 billion contract for air tankers. Another area of focus for is cyber-warfare.

China isn't about to supplant U.S. military primacy. Its own estimate is that military modernization will take many years. One example of the gap: China has 71 submarines, yet fewer than a dozen are nuclear-powered, so the rest must resurface periodically; all of the U.S.'s 71 are nuclear-powered, with reactor fuel that lasts 20 years. That's a big difference, but not an insurmountable one.

China Play May Buffet Buffett

China Play May Buffet Buffett

A wager on auto and battery maker BYD could go south on the Oracle of Omaha.

Berkshire Hathaway CEO Warren Buffett's stellar reputation as an investor has been burnished by some lucrative bets in China. In late 2007, for example, Berkshire got $4 billion for a stake in Chinese oil major PetroChina (ticker: 857.Hong Kong) that had cost it $488 million―producing a 700% return over five years. But not all of Buffett's China ventures have worked out.

In September 2008, MidAmerican Energy Holdings, a Berkshire Hathaway (BRKA) unit, swooped in on Chinese battery and auto company BYD (1211.Hong Kong) days after Lehman Brothers collapsed. The deal was hailed as classic Buffett―buying a 9.9% stake in an undervalued firm at the market's bottom. By early last year, BYD had surged from eight Hong Kong dollars (US$1.03) when Buffett bought it to HK$88―turning a US$230 million investment into a US$2.3 billion paper profit in 15 months.

Buffett's bet was on electric cars. On magazine covers and on TV, the Oracle of Omaha was plugging a $35,000 Chinese-made model dubbed the BYD E6. Three years on, BYD shares are down 72% from their peak, and the company, controlled by entrepreneur Wang Chuan Fu―described by Buffett's colleague Charlie Munger as "a combination of Thomas Edison and Jack Welch"―isn't looking so good. Buffett's paper profit is down to $430 million, and analysts have been cutting estimates for BYD, which could plunge another 20% to 25%. "I have been bearish on BYD for over a year now, because I just don't buy their electric-car story," says Scott Laprise, an analyst for CLSA in Beijing. He has a HK$16.68 price target, the lowest of any analyst.

Last week, BYD raised US$219 million in a secondary offering in China of Shenzen-listed A shares (available to locals and to qualified foreign institutions) but at 35% below the original goal. "BYD needs to raise [more] cash as quickly as possible, given its mounting short-term debt," says Credit Suisse's Adrian Chan, He adds that it faces a cash shortfall exceeding US$1.3 billion for its projects. Though the company could raise this through bank borrowings, rising interest rates in China will boost financing costs.

BYD rode China's car boom by churning out conventional sedans and subcompacts as it readied a slew of hybrids and electric cars. But only a handful of E6 electric taxis have been sold, and the company hasn't had much success with its F3DM plug-in hybrids. Worse, it's been losing market share in conventional cars. This year, BYD's total car sales are down 22%, and its gross margin slid to 11% in the first quarter, from 27% a year earlier.

Last month, China's auto sales plunged 4% year over year, as Beijing withdrew subsidies for new cars. CLSA's Laprise says a bigger problem is that BYD hasn't refreshed its aging flagship F3/F6 models.

Another problem is beleaguered cellphone firm Nokia (NOK). The Finnish company's woes are weighing on BYD's 66%-owned subsidiary BYD Electronics, a contract handset maker. Nokia accounts for more than 40% of the unit's revenue.

Is it time to buy BYD stock, which is trading at 19 times this year's estimated earnings and around two times price-to-book value? Probably not. A big worry is that Buffett might decide to unload his stake before it tanks below his purchase price. The stock, analysts say, carries a 20% "Buffett premium," meaning it could lose a fifth of its value if the Oracle of Omaha decamps.

That might not happen, but the prudent―especially anyone with a profit in the shares―probably should motor away from the stock now. 

Better News

China shares leaped as Premier Wen Jiabao said inflation was under control.

[b-AsiaTrad-0927]

ASSIF SHAMEEN covers Asian capital markets from Singapore.

 

Where do you live?

Where do you live?
你生活在哪里?

Town- and country-dwellers have radically different prospects
城镇居民和农村居民的前途是截然不同


Rus in urbe

IN DAYI COUNTY, a couple of hours' drive down a motorway from the city of Chengdu, the capital of Sichuan Province, Chinese tourists stroll through the meandering courtyards of a rural mansion. In the 1950s, soon after Mao seized power, the mansion was turned into a museum, intended as a showcase of evil. It once belonged to Liu Wencai, a landowner supposedly notorious for ill-treating his tenant farmers. Liu embodied a class despised by Mao, who came to power on the back of a promise to give land back to the peasants.
在大邑县,距离四川省府成都市数小时车程的一个县城里,中国游客漫步于一家乡间宅所那曲折的庭院里。在1950年代,在毛泽东掌权后不久,这栋宅所被辟为了一家博物馆,以作为罪恶的展品。它曾一度归属为刘文财(Liu Wencai),作为地主,刘文财因被断定虐待他自己的长工而臭名昭著。刘文财代表了为毛泽东所鄙视的那样一个阶级。而毛泽东在掌权后支持兑现了这样一个将土地归还给农民的诺言。

In its Maoist heyday the museum was a place of pilgrimage. Red Guards swarmed there for ritual denunciations of Liu and his ilk. A high point of their visit was a trip to the "water dungeon", a room with several inches of water covering the floor where Liu had allegedly kept disobedient farmers. Another was a series of life-size sculptures of peasants and their vicious oppressors. A politically disfavoured curator from Beijing's Forbidden City who happened to look like Liu was forced to stand next to the sculptures as a "living Liu Wencai" so that visitors could shout and (though not strictly permitted) spit at him, according to Geremie Barmé of Australian National University.
在毛泽东思想的全盛期,这个博物馆就是个圣地。红卫兵扫荡了这里,为的就是仪式性的宣示刘文财和他的同类。他们的串联的一个高潮是参观"水龙",即刘文财非法拘禁不守规矩的长工的地方:一间数尺深的水漫过地面的房间。而另外一个高潮是,一套由长工和他们恶毒的压迫者组成的真人大小的雕塑。据澳洲大学的Geremie Barmé讲,一位来自北京紫禁城的,在政治上的失宠的馆长,因碰巧长得像刘文财而被作为"活刘文财"强迫站在这些个雕塑边上,以让参观者能够对着他大声喊叫,大吐口水(尽管严格的说,并没有得到这样的允许)。

The sculptures are still there, but in recent years a wave of revisionism has been sweeping across Dayi. Local officials were already having second thoughts by the early 1980s. But it was a book reassessing Liu's life published by an outspoken journalist in 1999 that finally convinced many that the man was really not that bad. His water dungeon was a government fabrication, the museum now points out. He spent a lot of money on local schools and paid for a road to be built from Chengdu to Dayi. Last year a grandson organised a get-together in Dayi for the extended Liu clan, whose members would once have been terrified of revealing their ties. More than 1,000 turned up.
那些雕塑还在,但是近年来的一波回头客在大邑县境内来了次旧地重游。当地官员在1980年代就已经有了另外一种想法。在1999年,一本由一位率性直言(大嘴巴)的记者出版的一本重估刘文财的人生的书最终证实了刘文财这个人也并没有(上面写的)那么坏得透顶。现在的博物馆方面指出到,他的"水龙"是政府捏造的。刘文财为当地学校花费了大量钱财,出资相互修建从成都到大邑县的公路。去年,刘文财的一位重孙为了延续刘氏的香火,在大邑县组织了一次大团聚。这些人员曾一度对于自己身份的泄露而倍感恐惧,而那次团聚的出场人数超过1000人。


The slaughter of many thousands of landlords (not including Liu, who died of natural causes) by officials and vengeful peasants shortly after the communist takeover resulted in profound changes in the system of rural land ownership. Peasants got the land Mao promised them, but only briefly. In the late 1950s the party took it back again and forced farmers into collectively owned "people's communes". The legacy of that disastrous decision, which contributed to a famine that left tens of millions dead, still weighs heavily on rural China. So too does a decision to confer hereditary status on peasants, who would be all but barred from cities to stop them rushing in to find work.
在共产党取得政权之后的极短时间里,政府官员和仇恨的农民就屠杀了数以千万计的地主(不包括刘文财,他死于自然原因),这导致了农村土地所有权体制的深刻变化。农民正如毛主席保证的那样夺取了土地,但仅仅是短暂的取得。在1950年代晚期,党又把土地收了回来,并强制农民加入集体所有的"人民公社"。这一灾难性的决策遗留下的祸害之处就是,招来了一场对中国农村仍然造孽深重的数以千万人死亡的饥荒。一个对只会被城市所阻止的,为了寻找工作而涌入城市的农民的世代相传的权利状态进行转变的决策,只会带来同样(的结果)。

The curse of the hukou
户口的诅咒


The hukou system, as this one-time apartheid is commonly known, applied to urban as well as rural dwellers, but peasants got a worse deal because they received hardly any welfare benefits, and job prospects in the countryside were dismal. The system has been much eroded since the Mao era because of the need for cheap labour to fuel China's manufacturing boom. But its lingering impact, combined with the still collective ownership of rural land, will retard China's urbanisation in the years ahead just when the country is most in need of its consumption-boosting benefits. Two researchers from China's finance ministry, Chen Xiaoqiang and Liu Ling, wrote in March that it was time to start returning land to the peasants, both to spur consumption and to help defuse growing rural unrest. Most officials dare not say this so bluntly, but they admit that change is needed.
户口体制,这个为人所共知的一度起着隔离(城乡居民)体制,被同样施加于城市和农村居民身上。但农民的被更加恶劣的对待,因为他们几无福利,且在乡下的工作前途简直是凄惨。这一体制自毛泽东时代起就因为对推动制造业繁荣的廉价劳动力的需要而一步步的受到侵蚀。但是其绵延的影响,与农村土地仍在实施的集体所有制相结合,将会在接下来的几年里,在这个国家最为急切需要的消费拉动效益上拖累中国的城镇化。3月,中国财政部的两位研究员Chen Xiaoqiang和Liu Ling撰文指出,是该开始向农民归还土地的时候了,这样既可以刺激消费,又可以帮助消解农村持续增长的动荡。大多数政府官员并不敢在此事上如此直抒胸臆,但是他们承认变革是必需的。

In 2007 Chengdu, and Chongqing to its south-east, were given licence to experiment. The principle of collective ownership could not be changed, but farmers' rights could be clarified and rural land markets of sorts could be established. In Chengdu, which is responsible for a large rural area including Dayi county, officials spoke of initiating a "new land reform" (hinting at similarities to the great land reform that divvied up the estate of landlord Liu). They began a drive to ensure that farmers at last got long-promised certificates showing the exact boundaries of their fields and housing as well as confirming their rights to use them (farmland is subject to a 30-year renewable contract).
2007年时,成都和位于其东南方向的重庆被授予进行探索实践的资质。集体所有制的根本原则不能动摇,但是农民的权益可以进行明确,各种类别的农村土地市场也可以建立起来。对包括大邑县在内的大片的农村地区负责的成都市的官方人员都在谈论对"新土改"的(暗示在一定程度上类似于划分刘地主的田产)尝试。他们开始了一轮保证农民最终能有显示他们的田产和房产的精确边界的得到长期保证的证明,同时也确认农民的使用它们的权利( 农田承包合同30年不变。)

Without such documents a market could not take off. Regulations dating back at least to 1997 have obliged officials to issue them. But Landesa, an American NGO, says a survey it conducted in mid-2010 in 17 provinces, along with Renmin University and Michigan State University, found that only 44% of respondents had a complete set of certificates. One in three had no documents at all. In April the central government urged the whole country to finish issuing the certificates by the end of 2012. Dayi county, chosen by Chengdu as a trailblazer for land reform, says it got the job done by the middle of last year. But one peasant fumes that officials never bothered to give her any documents and seizedher house and farmland a few months ago for a development project. "Liu was a great landlord," she says. "I wish officials today were like him."
缺少这些文书档案,市场就无法起飞。最少也能追溯至1997年的管理文件让心存感激的政府官员们得以进行登记。但一家美国NGO(非政府组织)Landesa说到,其在2010年中期与人民大学和密歇根大学一道对17个省市进行一项调查,发现仅有44%的调查对象有一套完整的凭证。三分之一的对象根本就没有这些文书档案。4月,中央政府要求全国在2012年前完成对户口的登记。被成都市选出来作为土改先行先试点的大邑县说,在去年年中它就已经完成了这一任务。但是一位农民口口声声的说政府官员从来就没有为她登记户口这事来打搅过她,反倒是在几个月之前为了一个开发项目查扣他的房屋和耕地。"刘文财真是个大地主"她说,"我希望现在的政府官员能够像他那样子"。

Both Chengdu and Chongqing have gone a step further. They have set up markets for rural land derivatives, allowing farmers who create new land for agricultural use (by giving up some of their housing plots, for example) to sell the right to use an equivalent amount of rural land for urban development. Thus a developer who wants to build on a greenfield site that has already been approved for urban construction bids first for a "land ticket", or dipiao, which certifies that such an area of farmland has been created elsewhere. The regulations say farmers get 85% of the proceeds: good news, in theory, for those in remote, dirt-poor areas who would otherwise have no chance of cashing in on the value created by urban expansion.
成都和重庆都已经更进一步。他们为农村土地流转建立了市场,允许开垦新地作为农田(比如,放弃他们的一些宅基地)的农民出售作为城镇开发用地的等量的农村土地的权利。因此,一家已经得到许可对城建进行竞标的开发商,想要在绿地上搞建设首先就要取得"土地票据(即:土票)",也就是证明这一区域的农地被在别的地方得到了开垦的凭证。监管人员说,农民得到85%的收益:理论上,这对于边穷地区是个好消息,因为那儿本来就没有多少机会能够通过城镇的扩张所创造的价值而得到资金。

This is hardly revolutionary. Especially for Chongqing's Mao-loving party chief, Bo Xilai, doing good by the peasantry would seem a canny move. But because the notion of the collective persists, the system is wide open to abuses. Local officials have considerable incentives to force farmers to give up housing land and move to more compact dwellings in order to create land for dipiao trading (some of the proceeds of which also go to village authorities). The dipiao markets in Chongqing and Chengdu have done little more than add a layer of complexity to a widespread trend in many parts of China that has often added to peasants' grievances.
这几乎就是革命。尤其对于重庆的那位热爱毛主席的党领袖薄熙来,施惠于农是会被看作是精明的行动的。但是因为国民的集体主义倾向,这个体制因大开口子而被滥用。当地政府官员因可观的激励机制而推动农民放弃宅基地,迁移到更为集中的定居点,以创造用于"地票"交易的土体(这中间的一部分利益被赋予给了村镇干部)。成都和重庆的地票市场除了比在中国的许多地区广泛风行的,通常是增加农民的满腹牢骚的错综复杂的局面更添一层复杂之外,也没有干出些别的什么。

Reform might quickly be exploited by the very forces it is meant to constrain: rapacious local governments and developers
改革很快会受到那些本来应该被平抑的力量的剥削:贪婪的当地政府和开发商。


In the name of building a "new socialist countryside" (a slogan launched in 2005), local governments have been corralling farmers into new apartment blocks in order to free up land which they can use for profitable purposes. Officials have justified the practice as a way of reducing incentives for local governments forcibly to appropriate farmland and sell it to developers. Two million peasants a year have lost their land this way in the past five years, a senior government adviser in north-east China said in March. The new strategy often means the farmers are crammed into apartments with no backyards to raise chickens or store tools, and they face a longer journey to their fields.
以建设"社会主义新农村"的名义(2005年提出的一个口号),当地政府把一群群的农民赶到新的住宅小区,就为了释放出他们为了利益企图而物有所用的土地。作为一种减少当地政府挪用适耕农田并将之出售给开发商的激励机制方式,政府官员们已经合理化了这一实践。3月,东北地区的一位政府高层参赞说到,过去5年里,每年有200万农民因这一方式而失去他们的土地。新政策通常意味着农民被塞进没有后院养鸡或者存粪的公寓,而且他们还面临着下地要走更长的路。

Though officially sanctioned, the dipiao markets are viewed warily by the central leadership. Late last year Chengdu's market was suddenly closed down. No clear explanation was given, but a Chinese scholar says higher-level officials worried that dipiao were being traded without land having first been converted to agricultural use. The risk, central officials feared, was that it would never happen at all. The market reopened in April, but the central government remains cautious. In Chongqing only 10% of the government's annual sales of undeveloped rural land are subject to the dipiao system.
尽管得到官方批准,地票市场仍然受到中央首长的谨慎关注。去年末,成都的市场被突然关闭,却一直未有明确的解释。一位华人学者说,政府高层担心地票在土地还没有转化为农业用途之前就被交易掉了。中央政府官员所害怕的这一风险根本就从未出现过。市场在4月份重开,但是中央政府仍然心存警惕。在重庆,政府的按年度出售的尚待开发的农村土体中仅有10%的进入到地票系统。

Thoroughgoing land reform, of the sort that would enable farmers to cash in on the value of their farmland and establish permanent and prosperous lives in cities (and at the same time encourage larger-scale farming), thus remains stuck. One obstacle is ideological: for all their economic pragmatism, many in the party still regard collectivism as a sacred principle. Privatisation remains a dirty word. A more practical worry is that reform might quickly be exploited by the very forces it is meant to constrain: rapacious local governments and developers. These, it is feared, would take advantage of any changes to persuade farmers unaware of land values to sell their holdings at less than market rates. The numbers of poor, landless peasants would soar, creating huge instability.
通过进行土改,在某种程度上将会能让农民现金化他们的农田的价值,并构建出在城市里永久而繁荣的生活(同时也鼓励了农场的大型化),因此也就带有阻滞。一个障碍就是意识形态上的:相对于他们所有人在的经济上的实用主义,党的许多人仍然将集体主义看做是神圣不可动摇的原则。私有化仍然是个肮脏的词语。更为实际的担心是改革很快会受到那些本来应该被平抑的力量的剥削:贪婪的当地政府和开发商。被担心的这些东西,将会利用每一丝的机会来说服还不知道土地价值的农民以少于市场的比例出售他们手中所有的东西。那些贫穷而失去土地的农民将会大声申诉,制造出巨大的不稳定。

Reformers in Beijing argue that most farmers are far cannier than officials suspect. But the global financial crisis has strengthened the case for caution in the minds of party leaders. As many as 20m workers returned to the countryside when the crisis broke in 2008 and China's exports slumped. Having farmland to go back to, many officials believe, kept the unemployed migrants from taking to the streets. As officials often say in China, "stability trumps everything."
北京的改革者争辩到,大多数农民都比政府官员所质疑的还要狡猾。但是全球财政危机强化了党的领袖们脑子里对这些案例的警惕。2008年危机爆发的时候,多达200万的工人返乡,中国的出口骤然减少。许多官员相信,只有回家还有田地,就能让失业的民工不得走上街头。就像中国的政府官员员经常说的:"稳定压倒一切"。

Prospects for reform of the hukou system are only slightly better. Both Chengdu and Chongqing have been experimenting with this. They have declared that holders of rural hukou in the countryside surrounding these cities can move into urban areas and enjoy the same welfare benefits as their urban counterparts without giving up their land entitlements. This was an important step. Though the hukou divide is widely resented, peasants have often been reluctant to give up their rural status for fear of losing their land, as well as the added benefit in the countryside of being able to have two children rather than one. In effect, Chongqing and Chengdu have created a new class of urban residents who enjoy the best of both worlds. But grand plans for hukou reform have fallen by the wayside before as officials tot up the price. The cities of Guangzhou and Zhengzhou abandoned reform efforts several years ago because of worries about the cost.
对户口体制的改革的前景看上去也只是稍微好一点。成都和重庆都已经对此进行了实践。他们宣称,这些城市周边乡下的农村户口持有人能够移居到城镇地区,并享受和他们的城镇居民同等的福利,而不用放弃他们的土地所有权。这是重要的一步。尽管户口上的待遇差别受到普遍的唾弃,农民通常都因为对失去他们土地的担心,同样还有在乡里能够生育2个而不是1个小孩的额外的好处而不情愿放弃他们的农业户口。在实施中,重庆和成都创造了一种享受两个世界的好处的新型城镇居民阶层。但是对户口体制的改革的大计划在政府官员合计了代价之前是被搁置一旁的。广州市和深圳市在数年前就因为担心成本而放弃了改革的努力。

Chongqing's plans are ambitious. Local officials estimate the cost of converting 3m people at around 200 billion yuan ($30 billion). But the municipality says it wants to double the number of urban hukou holders by turning 10m of its rural citizens (some of whom already live in urban areas) into card-carrying urbanites over the next ten years. It has made a rapid start. Since it relaxed its policy in August last year it has given urban hukou to more than 1.7m people. There are conditions: they must have been working in urban areas for at least three years, or for five years if they want to transfer their hukou to the centre of Chongqing.
重庆的计划可谓踌躇满志。当地政府估计将300万人进行转化的成本约为2亿元(合$300万美元)。但是直辖市政府说将会在接下来的10年通过将其100万农村居民(他们中的有些人已经居住在城镇地区了)转变为持卡的城镇居民倍增城镇户口的持有人数。这一计划起步迅捷。自去年8月发布政策起,已经签发城镇户口的人数就超过170万人。这里是有些限制条件的:他们必须过去至少3年在城镇地区工作,将户口迁到重庆中心区则需要至少5年。

The reform remains only partial. The benefits of being a Chongqing urbanite still cannot be transferred to any other part of the country. And if implementing such measures nationwide means raising more taxes, urbanites will dig in their heels. Local governments "don't really have the incentives and they don't have the resources" to encourage greater integration of migrants into urban life, says the World Bank's Mr Kuijs.
这一改革仍然只在单一层面展开。成为重庆城镇人的好处仍然不能随迁到全国的其他区域。而在全国范围内实现这些措施意味着加征赋税,城镇居民将会大跺其脚。当地政府"并不真正有这些激励机制,也没有资源"来鼓励对更多的民工进入城镇生活的整合。世界银行的Kuijs先生说。

Although Chinese officials define the population as being already nearly 50% urban, the number of urban hukou holders is only around 35%. Zhang Zheng of Peking University says many of those who have moved to urban areas in recent years are wrongly seen as permanent migrants. Having reached their 30s or 40s, when they can no longer do mind-numbing, fast-paced and finicky work on production lines, they will often go back to the countryside. Late last year the National Bureau of Statistics asked rural hukou holders in the north-eastern province of Jilin whether they wanted to switch to urban status. "The results were surprising," one of the bureau's researchers wrote. The majority said no, and most young people who had moved to urban areas said they wanted to go back to the countryside when they got older.
尽管中国政府界定人口已经达到接近50%城镇化,农村户口的持有者数量仅有约35%。北京大学的Zhang Zheng说,最近这些年移居到城镇地区的许多人都被错误的视为永久民工。他们年纪到了30或者40多岁时,就不会再在生产线上做头脑简单、节奏快而细琐的工作。他们通常都会回到乡下。去年下半年国家统计局询问东北省份吉林的农村户口持有人是否愿意转换成城镇户口。"结果令人吃惊",统计局的一位研究人员写到。大多数都说"不",大多数迁移到城镇地区的年轻人说他们想年纪大一点回到乡下的。

For the past two decades or more, urbanisation in China has come relatively easily. As the country proudly claims, slums and shantytowns are rare compared with other developing countries. But ensuring a continuing net inflow of migrants into the cities as the youngest cohort shrinks will mean giving workers from the countryside more incentives to stay permanently (such as affordable housing and schooling). More money is being spent on these, but not yet enough. Too much responsibility is devolved to local governments that usually try hard to shirk it.
在过去的20年或者更长的时间里,中国的城镇化来得相对轻松一些。国家自豪的宣称,其他发达国家的贫民窟和棚户区可谓是相形而下。但是,随着最年青的群体的萎缩,保证向城市的持续净流入的民工将意味着要让来自乡下的工人永久定居,就需要给予更多激励机制(比如负担得起的房价和教育费)。更多的钱被花费在这上面,但是再多也不够。太多的责任被赋予到极力推脱耍滑的当地政府头上。


Cities say they welcome migrants, but some find roundabout ways of keeping them from settling. Beijing recently launched a set of extraordinary measures to tame property prices and ease traffic congestion that included all but banning migrants (one-third of the city's population) from buying homes or cars. In the name of improving safety, it has started closing down basement dwellings where migrants (known as the rat tribe) often live. China says it wants urbanisation, and it certainly needs it. But even as some obstacles are removed, new ones spring up.
城里人说他们欢迎民工,但是有些人挖空心思的绕着弯的将他们挡在定居的外头。北京最近发布了包括禁止民工(城市三分之一的人口)购买房产或者小汽车的一系列超出常规的措施来缓和房地产价格,缓解交通堵塞。以改善安全的名义,北京开始关闭的通常作为民工生活处所的地下室(以"鼠族"而出名)。中国说,他想要城镇化化,他是真的需要城镇化。但是,即使一些障碍得以清除,新的障碍又还会出现。
 

2011年6月23日

长短期利差看美经济衰退几率

从长短期利差看美经济衰退几率
2008年01月28日 08:11:18  来源:中国证券报
【字号  我要打印 我要纠错 

    最近,关于美国经济是否会出现衰退,经济学家之间出现了明显不同的看法。一种观点认为美国经济将出现明显减速但不会出现衰退。诺贝尔经济学奖获得者、宾西法尼亚大学教授克莱因(Lawrence R. Klein)领导的预测小组,在2008年1月21日发布的预测报告中提出,美国2007年4季度和2008年1季度GDP环比折年增长率都为1.04%

,明显低于2、3季度GDP增长率,但不会出现衰退。另一种观点认为美国经济将会出现衰退。在2007年12月初,哈佛大学经济学教授、美国国民经济研究局主席、曾任里根总统经济顾问委员会主席的费尔德斯坦(Martin Feldstein)在《华尔街日报》发表的文章中提出:2008年美国经济发生衰退的可能性达到50%,如果美国经济真的出现了衰退,那么这次的衰退将会比上次的衰退延续时间更长,下降幅度更大。

    判断经济走向的参考指标有很多种,本文主要从长短期利差这一指标的变化情况来判断美国经济的走向。

    长短期利差是有效的预测指标

    1980年代中后期,一些经济学家注意到,1950年代以来美国历次经济衰退之前,美国长期国债利率与短期国债利率之间的差距都迅速收窄,并出现短期利率高于长期利率的所谓倒置现象。此后,长短期利率之间的差距被许多经济学家作为一个重要的经济先行指标。根据美国一些经济学家的研究,长短期利率差距在预测经济衰退方面,较其它金融类先行指标具有更好的稳定性和准确性。从经验角度看,美国10年期国债利率与3月期国债利率之间的差距在预测方面的效果最好。

    从历史经验来看,在美国,国债长短期利率差距是一个良好的经济预测指标。在德国、日本和加拿大等国家,此指标对经济衰退的预测纪录也不错。

    从美国1953年以来的情况来看,美国10年期与三月期国债收益率之间的差距对美国经济衰退具有良好的预测功效,除了一次例外情况之外,只要出现美国10年期国债利率低于三月期国债收益率,即长期收益率和短期利率倒置的情况,美国经济都出现了经济衰退。1953年以来,到本世纪初,美国共出现了6次长短期利率倒置的情况,分别是1966年3季度、1969年3-4季度、1973年3季度-1974年3季度、1979年1季度-1980年1季度、1980年4季度-1981年3季度、2000年3-4季度。从1966年9月至1967年1月,美国长短期利率倒置,在此之后,虽然美国1967年2季度GDP环比折年率为0,但并没有出现GDP负增长的情况,不过,工业生产在该季度出现持续下降的情况。究其原因,一方面是在此期间长短期利率倒置的程度比较小,除了1966年10月长期利率低于短期利率0.34个百分点之外,其他月份的倒置程度都比较小;另一方面就是持续的时间较短,按照季度平均值来看,只有1966年3季度出现了负值。此后;到本世纪初,共出现了5次长短期利率倒置的情形,每次出现长短期利率出现倒置后,美国经济都出现了衰退。

    利差为何成为经济预测指标

    对于国债长短期收益率倒置为什么能够成为经济衰退的一个先行指标,经济学家进行了大量的研究,其中包括现任美联储理事会成员米什金(Frederic S. Mishkin)。有的经济学家认为,一般而言,货币政策收紧之后,短期利率往往上升,如果人们认为短期利率在较高水平上将维持较长时间,那么长期利率也将会上升;但是,如果人们认为短期利率的上升不会持续很长时间,长期利率就不会随之上升,长短期利率之间的差距就会缩小甚至倒置。由于货币政策紧缩的一个后果是经济活动的下降,因此,长短期利率之间的倒置就会对经济衰退有预测作用。

    有的学者注意到,当长短期利差拉大时,有可能是由于长期利率提高造成的,这可能意味着居民和企业对长期资金的需求较为旺盛,也就意味着居民和企业的固定资产投资活动较为旺盛,因此,固定资产投资投资对社会总需求的拉动作用较强,从而使得经济活动较为高涨。反之,当长短期利差缩小时,有可能是由于长期利率降低造成的,这可能意味着居民和企业对长期资金的需求较为疲软,也就意味着居民和企业的固定资产投资活动较为低迷,因此,固定资产投资投资对社会总需求的拉动作用较弱,从而使得经济活动较为低落。

    但是,到目前为止,关于国债长短期利率倒置为什么能够对经济衰退具有预测作用,解释得还不够充分。

    近期长短期利率再次倒置

    2007年美国次贷危机暴露之前,在2006年8月份到2007年3月份这段时间,美国长短期国债利率再次出现了倒置的情况。观察季度数据,在2006年3季度到2007年1季度这段时间长短期利率差出现了倒置的情况。

    如果按照以往的经验,那么这次美国经济出现衰退的可能性也比较大。从长短期利率出现倒置的时间来看,这次出现倒置的时间要比2000年长短期利率出现倒置的时间要长,当时长短期利率出现倒置的时间只有5个月,这次持续的时间达到了8个月,从这样的角度来看,如果美国经济出现衰退,也许持续的时间和下跌的幅度要超过2001年的美国。

    上面我们根据美国长短期利率差的变化情况,对美国经济出现衰退的可能性进行了推断,最终情况究竟如何?让我们拭目以待。反过来,美国经济是否真的会出现衰退,也成为再次检验长短期利差预测能力的较好时机。

    历史经验表明,1950年代以来美国历次经济衰退之前,美国长期国债利率与短期国债利率之间的差距都迅速收窄,并出现短期利率高于长期利率的所谓倒置现象。而在去年美国次贷危机暴露之前,在2006年8月到2007年3月这段时间,美国国债长短期利率差再次出现了倒置,且这次出现倒置的时间要比2000年长短期利率出现倒置的时间要长。从这个角度来看,是否预示着如果此次美国经济出现衰退,也许持续的时间比2001年那次要长,而下跌的幅度也要大?(张永军)

2011年6月20日

参加青岛啤酒2010年度股东大会纪实

参加青岛啤酒2010年度股东大会纪实

(2011-06-17 20:09:11)
标签:

青岛啤酒

股东大会

纪实

分类: 行业与公司

     刘祖悦  2011年6月17日

  青岛啤酒始建于1903年,已拥有108年的历史。青岛啤酒是目前消费行业中少数具有全球知名度的品牌之一,在我国啤酒行业里拥有最悠久的历史、最高的知名度,其在啤酒行业的地位相当于茅台在白酒行业的地位,张裕在葡萄酒行业的地位。2006年以来,青岛啤酒主营收入增长了2倍,净利润增长了5倍,青岛啤酒股价上涨了6倍。

    为了能按时参加青岛啤酒6月16日上午9点的度股东大会,我提前于6月15日到了青岛。6月15日晚饭后,散步到了所住宾馆附近的一家超市,在这个超市的啤酒区看到陈列的啤酒中80%是青岛啤酒,其它的品牌只有哈尔滨啤酒及一些外国品牌啤酒。这个超市的状况与青岛啤酒在青岛的市场占有率达到了90%的状况相吻合。青岛是青岛啤酒的基地市场,青岛啤酒基本垄断这个市场,正如燕京啤酒垄断了北京啤酒市场85%的份额一样。这个超市的青啤啤酒品种非常多,有不少品种是我在内地超市没有见过的,特地选购了几款以前没有喝过的青岛啤酒回宾馆品尝。回到宾馆,喝着青岛啤酒,看阅着青岛啤酒相关资料,感觉非常好。我相信要真正理解一个公司,就要尽量亲自体验它的产品或服务。

    青岛啤酒的股东大会于6月16日上午按时召开,公司几个大股东都派出了自己的代表与会,一些基金投资经理、券商研究员、私募人士及个人投资者等也来到了会场,在这里遇到了几个做投资的老朋友。青啤啤酒的股东大会程序规范而严密,特别是看到负责公司财务审计的普华永道审计师也来到了会场,并负责了股东大会议案表决投票的监票并公布投票结果,这是我第一次看到审计师也参加股东会,可能是青啤啤酒在香港上市的缘故。

    在股东会工作人员进行股东会议案表决结果统计的期间,是参会股东提问的时间。参会股东就青岛啤酒的成本压力及对策、国际化、毛利率及净利率变化趋势、新推出的奥古特及逸品纯生等高端产品的战略、啤酒行业价格变化趋势等提出了问题,我也就自己关心的高管二级市场购买股票的资金来源、与雪花啤酒的市场份额差距及提升市场占有率的战略安排等提出了问题。金志国董事长对股东所提的问题都进行了回答。

    这是我第一次见到青啤啤酒的管理层,第一次近距离地观察他们。在我的印象中,青岛啤酒的董事长都是战略家,前任董事长彭作义在1998年率行业之先在全国进行并购扩张,现任董事长金志国在2001年上任后进行内部整合、改革,并对啤酒行业的产业链进行布局,都展示了他们的战略能力。这次当面聆听了金志国董事长回答股东的问题,感觉其回答得非常有深度、有高度,其对行业的现状和趋势有着非常深刻的认识和把握,对青岛啤酒的未来战略了然于胸。金董事长可能是我见多的上市公司董事长中,最具战略远见和战略思维的人之一。

    对于啤酒行业未来的格局,金董事长认为将逐步进入寡头垄断时代,最后由3家到4家啤酒寡头够公司瓜分中国啤酒市场,而参与瓜分中国啤酒市场的啤酒公司门槛将提高到1000万千升。青岛啤酒未来在啤酒行业中的战略定位是:定量方面,在量上尽快做大,未来三年的在量上要突破1000万吨;定性方面,要成为参与瓜分中国啤酒市场的寡头垄断型决策者之一,青岛啤酒通过战略和战术,通过千万吨级的规模来实现公司在行业的领先地位。金董事长人认为,啤酒行业未来的规模将在5000万千升左右,1000万千升将可以获得20%左右的市场份额。   

    对于通货膨胀带来的成本压力,金董事长的见解非常深刻。他认为:宏观上来说,中国已进入了一个通胀期,甚至是出现了通胀危机,通胀将会持续,这种的通胀通过原料、人工等成本上升对青岛啤酒带来影响和击。公司在2010年预算的时候,已经依据预测数据,对各种成本行了测算,相对来说新增成本可能超过4亿元(未与青岛啤酒进行确认的数据)为了应对这样的通胀危机,公司努力在寻求将危机转为机会,并提出了相应的措施。鉴于从品牌溢价能力到基地市场的应对能力,青岛啤酒有一定的定价权,因此,应对措施主要是:调结构,首先调品牌结构,加大青岛啤酒主品牌的销量和增长速度;通过增加增量,来摊薄固定费用,今年以来量的增长速度变快;公司还研究出了精确制造系统,同时对公司的营销费用的控制,在增加营销费用的同时,提高费用的精准度,实现了销量增长超过了费用增长;推出新产品,新上市一些高端的产品(如奥古特、逸品纯生等),过提供一些新产品来提价。以上四个措施,保障了销量和利润的增长。创新措施都是在压力下出现,在通胀危机压力下,公司一会想出更多的应对办法。青岛啤酒在今年的通胀危机中抓住了些机会,因为这个通胀危机会把一些小啤酒企业整死了,让大企业的增长提速,提高了行业整合的速度。龙头企业通过将自身的资本力和危机带来的整合机会,释放通胀对大企业的压力。战略分析上,公司已经对历史上的通胀危机进行了研究,对通胀的规律进行了研究,公司无论从战略上还是运营上,都能够顺应这种大势,能够引领行业的成长,能够源源不断的创新和发展。

     在青岛啤酒的国际化方面,金董事长认为中国已经是国际化市场重要组成部分,青岛啤酒的竞争对手都是国际化一流的,市场在哪里不重要,国际化是一个高度,国际化的关键是不是进入了全球的产业链。在市场全球化方面,青岛啤酒一直在考虑和酝酿。公司以前就考虑在与中国文化相近的东南亚进行试点,实现地产地销,但由于泰国的政局动荡,事情没有进展而作罢,但新一届董事会会在这方面取得突破,将在东南亚做几个试点。

    对于啤酒行业价格战,金董事长认为:啤酒行业的竞争与其它行业相似,中国人擅长的竞争利器是价格战,青岛啤努力避免价格战,但回避不了价格战。青岛啤酒通过推出高端产品和新产品来避开价格竞争,新推出的奥古特和逸品纯生是比较独特的产品。奥古特是采用了比较经典的发酵工艺,是纯正的德国啤酒配方,这个工艺对成本的影响比较大,很多消费者喝了以后,有喝到纯正啤酒的感觉。啤酒的价更多是在品质保证下的精神价值,是消费者的体验。逸品纯生是在原有啤酒基础上进行创新,通过和纯生啤酒的发明者――朝日啤酒合作生产的。目前市场上大部分的纯生不是真正的纯生。青岛啤酒在短短10年里,成为了国际化、时尚化、年轻化的代表品牌,某种程度上,青岛啤酒成为了纯生的代名词,在这个过程中,青岛的国际合作合伙提供了很大的帮助。另外,行业集中度越高,价格战越少,当啤酒行业达到高度垄断的时候,就达到了良性和默契,啤酒企业之间的竞争就是对消费者服务的竞争,而不再是惨烈的价格战。

    关于青岛啤酒管理层从二级市场购买股票的资金来源问题,金董事长也作了说明。青岛啤酒高管通过二级市场购买青岛啤酒股票的资金都是高管个人的收入,不是某种激励制度安排的结果。关于激励制度安排的持股还在计划和研究的过程中。高管购买公司股票表示了对公司未来的信心,公司的高管努力在为公司创造价值的过程中,为自己带来小的回报,是对公司未来的投票。同时也希望股东及相关方面尊重和认同管理层的贡献,认同管理层的智力成本,作出适当的激励安排,以激励管理层更好地为股东创造价值。

    青岛啤酒股东大会于11点结束,由于这次股东会进行了董事会换届选举,因此,股东会结束后,公司管理层及董事们就急冲冲赶到另外一个地方召开新一届董事会,没有安排更多的时间与投资者进行交流。

    参加完青岛啤酒股东会后,我赶到了青岛啤酒博物馆,了解青岛啤酒的历史,了解啤酒的生产工艺,真切地感受到了百年青啤的历史底蕴和魅力。正如金志国董事长所说的那样,啤酒是在品质基础上的精神产品,青岛啤酒的百年历史,使其具有非常深厚的历史底蕴,具有浓厚的文化内涵。

    通过这次参加青岛啤酒股东大会,提升了对啤酒行业及青岛啤酒的认识。

    2010年,中国啤酒行业前四强的市场份额达到了60%左右,到青岛啤酒目前在销售收入及利润处于行业第一,市场占有率为14%左右,低于雪花啤酒的20%,但青岛啤酒的利润是雪花啤酒的一倍左右。目前,啤酒行业的集中度已经非常高,未来的竞争格局基本形成,青岛啤酒的行业领先地位非常明显,虽然在产量及产能上暂时落后于雪花啤酒,但在品牌、历史底蕴、产品结构、战略管理、运营、创造现金能力等方面处于行业领先地位。随着行业集中度的进一步的进一步提高,竞争的激烈程度将会下降,行业的毛利率会进一步提升,青岛啤酒的盈利能力将持续提升。

    同时,青岛啤酒创造现金的能力非常强,2011年1季报显示,青岛啤酒拥有现金81亿元,而负债非常少,这与也在A股上市的燕京啤酒形成的鲜明对比。强大的盈利能力和大量的现金,既能给地位股东创造价值,也能把握更多的行业机会。

    青岛啤酒面临的挑战主要是:如何应对雪花、燕京、百威等行业对手的竞争,特别是化解市场占有率方面被雪花啤酒超越所带来的压力,如何克服啤酒市场具有区域性的特点等。

    总体来说,青岛啤酒未来的确定性非常高,将在较长的时间内保持稳定、持续的增长,但增长的速度不会非常快。成长的驱动力主要来自于产量的不断增长、产品结构的不断优化、高端产品的提价能力等。

  因此青岛啤酒是一个值得长期关和跟踪的品牌消费公司,是一个非常好的长期投资标的。

2011年6月19日

Fǎ Kè Yóu, River Crab

Chinese censorship

Fǎ Kè Yóu, River Crab

Jun 7th 2011, 16:54 by R.L.G. | NEW YORK

"THE Travelogue of Dr Brain Damages", a show of  Kenneth "Tin-Kin" Hung's artwork, opened recently in Manhattan. Mr Hung's garish and busy large paintings feature images of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping and other Chinese leaders juxtaposed with icons of Western culture, such as Marilyn Monroe and the Mario Brothers (of Nintendo fame). These pieces are arresting, and I wish Mr Hung success, but most Western viewers will fail to understand some of the games the artist is playing. His work depends heavily on Chinese puns about internet censorship.

The Chinese have played with homophones and near homophones (usually differing only by a tone) for a long time. (They're a staple at the Chinese New Year.) More recently, this feature of Chinese has been particularly useful for evading the censors. When the authorities banned the phrase cào nǐ mā, or "fuck your mother", from the Chinese internet, in the name of combating vulgarity, the Chinese were quick to coin an internet hero, the  Grass Mud Horse, whose name is a near homophone: Cǎo Ní Mǎ. Maorilyn Maoroe can be seen with him above. He is an opponent of the  River Crab, a pun on "harmonious", the official description of the society censorship is meant to promote.

The Grass Mud Horse is just one of  ten mythical creatures all designed to talk about naughty stuff through puns. Mr Hung includes a painting of another of them, the great French-Croatian Squid, whose Chinese name requires a little English to get the pun. He is Fǎ Kè Yóu, and wears a Mao jacket while blowing an inflationary bubble with chewing gum. (The vowel in ke is a sort of "uh" sound, so this sounds roughly like "fah-kuh you".) Perhaps my favourite character, for the absurdity of his English name, is Intelligent Fragrant Chicken, which is one tone off from dǎ fēi jī, slang for masturbation.

The Chinese writing system is hugely difficult, so much so that Chinese natives struggle to write even common words. It is also so difficult for foreigners to learn that it probably constrains its spread as a world language. Defenders of Chinese writing say that the characters are needed to disentangle the many homophones in the language, but of course Chinese people speak (homophones and all) without too much trouble, and without the aid of characters. The real reason to keep the Chinese characters is the cultural and aesthetic value they store for China.

Typically this has meant a very traditional kind of "value"―connection with the past, and with the nation. But Mr Hung's work shows the plasticity of all symbols. He notes that for China's ageing one-child children, the internet has become an essential part of life―more central, in fact, than for your average Western member of Generation Y. It's going to take more than an imposing River Crab to keep them from enjoying Intelligent Fragrant Chicken, or from exclaiming the odd Grass Mud Horse out of frustration.

"The Travelogue of Dr Brain Damages" is on view at Postmasters Gallery in New York until July 2nd

 

The withering away of the party

China
The withering away of the party
大势已去

Economically, but not politically
在经济上,但不是在政治上

May 30th 2002 | BEIJING | from the print edition
IN URBAN China, the Communist Party's roots are weakening fast. In the late 1990s, the number of city dwellers employed by state-owned enterprises dropped to fewer than half the workforce. As the state sector crumbles, so too do the party branches that once controlled the lives of urban Chinese. Party officials talk of the urgency of setting up branches in non-state enterprises, but they are making little progress.
在中国的城市里,共产党的根基正在迅速削弱。九十年代末期,城市居民被国有企业雇用的数量降到不足工人总数的一半。当国有部门崩溃时,曾经控制着中国城市居民人生的党组织也亦步亦趋。党员干部谈论着在非国有企业里成立党支部的紧迫性,但他们几乎没取得任何进展。

The party itself is still expanding. It now has 64m members compared with 50m in 1990. But this is no reflection of the party's popularity among those who work in the most dynamic and productive area of urban China's economy. Take Wuhan, for example, a city of 4.4m people on the banks of the Yangtze. In 1993, a mere 0.9% of its party members worked in private or foreign-invested enterprises. Six years later, the proportion remained virtually the same. Or take similar-sized Shenyang, north-east China's biggest city. In 1999, some 640,000 people worked in non-state enterprises there. That year, the party managed to recruit only 29 of them as new members. Data on party membership are patchy. But according to one party journal, only 17% of private firms employed party members in 1999 and just 3% had any kind of party organisation. Foreign-funded enterprises are often formed in partnership with state-owned firms. Yet only 35% of them employed party members that year and a mere 17% had party cells.
党本身还在继续扩张。从1990年的5000万增加到现在的6400万。但是这不能说明党在中国城市经济最有活力和效率的那些地区工作的人们中间受到欢迎。以一个44万人口的长江沿岸城市武汉为例:在1993年只有0.9%的党员在私企或外企工作,六年以后该比例基本上维持不变。再来看类似规模的沈阳,它是中国东北部最大的城市。在1999年这里约有64万人在非国有企业里工作。那一年党在他们当中只吸收了29个新党员。尽管关于党员的数据并不完整,但根据一份党报,只有17%的私企在1999年雇佣了党员,3%设有某种党组织。外资企业通常和国有企业合伙,但那年它们当中只有35%雇佣了党员,只有17%有党小组。

Officials sometimes boast of successes. One example they cite is the party organisation in Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd, a factory complex in the port city of Tianjin owned by one of the biggest American investors in China. It produces mobile telephones and other electronic equipment. According to party publications, a branch was established in the company in 1990, even before its official founding. But the organisation remained clandestine, not wanting to alarm the foreign bosses.
干部们有时候夸耀他们的成就。他们引用的一个例子是设在摩托罗拉(中国)电子公司的党组织。该公司是位于港口城市天津的一个工厂复合体,一个由中国最大的美国投资者持有的公司。公司生产手机和其他的电子设备。根据党的出版物,一个党分支于1990在这个公司成立,当时该公司甚至还未正式成立。但是党组织保守秘密,不想惊动了外国老板。

Four years later, party leaders of the development zone where the Motorola plant is located decided to tell the company what was going on. A party journal said the foreigners were "pleasantly surprised" to find that members included most of the company's top technicians and managers. The journal said the company not only agreed to the establishment of a bigger party branch, but also offered a place for it to meet (Motorola itself refuses to comment on its dealings with the party). Now the company's party organisation boasts 300 members, though this is still only 3% of the workforce.
四年以后,党位于摩托罗拉工厂开发区的领导决定告诉这家公司发生了什么事。一份党报说外国人"惊喜"地发现公司的大部分高级技术人员和高层经理都是党员。这份党报还说公司不仅同意建立更大的党支部,还提供了一个场所供他们开会(摩托罗拉拒绝评论它和党的交易)。现在公司的党组织夸口有300会员,尽管仍只占总劳动人口的3%。

But does even this rare success make any difference? In state-owned enterprises, the party committee usually runs the factory. Often the factory manager serves as the party branch leader. At least until the 1990s, when the collapse of the state sector began in earnest, workers aspired to be party members because membership gave them power. But even where the party has managed to gain a foothold in private and foreign-owned enterprises, its role is inevitably far less important.
但是这些少数成功案例能带来什么不同吗?在国有企业,通常由党委会管理工厂,厂长通常是党委书记至少直到90年代末期在国有部门的崩溃变得势不可挡的时候,工人们因为党员资格能带给他们权力而渴望成为党员。但是即使在那些党已经成功取得一块根据地的私企或外企,它在其中扮演的角色也将不可避免的非常之小。

Officials say that one function of party cells in the non-state sector is to help ensure that such enterprises uphold the law. But unlike in the state sector, employees are on short-term contracts if they have any contract at all, and are hardly likely to challenge bosses for violating regulations. This could be one reason why China's party chief, Jiang Zemin, decided last year to end the party's ban on admitting private-enterprise bosses as members. At least if an enterprise is led by a party member, the party might retain a modicum of influence. But as one official journal put it: "The party constitution requires party members to hold themselves responsible to the working class. The Company Law requires managers to hold themselves responsible to the board of directors."
干部们说在非国有企业的党小组的一个功能就是帮助确保这些企业维护法律。但是不像国有部门的职工,这些企业的员工要么就什么合约也没有,要么只有短期合同,几乎不可能对抗老板违反规章制度。这可能是中国党主席江泽民去年决定中止党对私人企业老板入党的禁令的一个原因。至少如果一个企业是由党员领导的,那么党也许能保持一部分影响力。但是就像一份官方日报说的那样:"党章要求党员对工人阶级负责。公司法要求管理者对董事局负责。"

Pan Wei, of Beijing University, says that even in stodgy state enterprises, the party is losing its grip. "Party organisations at the grassroots have been decaying. Regular party activities have virtually stopped," he says. In a few years' time, this could mean that in urban China at least, the party's grassroots activities will be confined mainly to government departments and institutions, in which party membership remains a prerequisite for advancement. "It will be pretty much a bureaucratic party," says Mr Pan.
北京大学的潘伟(音译)说就算在沉闷的国有企业,党也在失去掌控,他说:"党组织的群众基础在衰退。日常的党活动几乎停止了。",这可能意味着中国的城市至少在几年之内,党的基层活动将会主要局限在政府部门和机构之内,在那儿党员资格仍然是获得晋升的前提条件。潘先生说:"它将会变成一个非常官僚主义的政党。"
from the print edition | Asia
 

Plastic unfantastic

Food scandals in Taiwan
台湾爆发食品丑闻

Plastic unfantastic
塑化剂事件

Tainted products also poison the president's chances of re-election
食品受到污染给总统争取连任的前景蒙上阴影
Jun 16th 2011 | TAIPEI | from the print edition

TAIWAN'S biggest-ever food scare began when government inspectors testing sports drinks and soft drinks last month detected dangerous levels of industrial plasticisers. These are normally used to make everything from shoes to hosepipes more flexible. Since then, the plasticisers have been found in a range of foods and drinks. The crisis has also gone firmly international as China, Hong Kong, South Korea and the Philippines have withdrawn Taiwanese products from supermarket shelves. Taiwanese commentators are wondering how the government can live the scandal down.

上个月,台湾政府负责食品检验的工作人员在一些运动饮料及软饮料中检测出了含量足以对人体产生危害的工业塑化剂成分,由此引发了台湾最大的一次食品恐慌。通常情况下,塑化剂被广泛应用于鞋类、塑料软管等产品中,可起到增加柔韧度的作用。事件发生后,又相继在一系列食品和饮料中发现了塑化剂的身影。随着中国,香港,韩国和菲律宾纷纷将台湾产品从自己的超市中下架,这次危机毫无疑问已经造成了国际性的影响。台湾的评论家们都在琢磨政府将如何从这桩丑闻中脱身。

Some 900 products have been pulled from nearly 40,000 Taiwanese shops. Hospitals have been flooded with worried parents seeking check-ups for their children. Diets have swiftly changed. Out have gone processed drinks and even ice cream.

约有900中商品已在台湾近40000家店铺中撤柜,医院里也挤满了忧心忡忡的来给孩子做检查的父母。人们的饮食习惯顷刻间发生了改变,含添加剂的饮料,甚至是冰激凌都已在市面上消失。

The problems have been traced to two upstream suppliers of food additives, Yu Shen Chemical and Pin Han Perfumery. Among other things, plasticisers were substituted for palm oil as clouding agents in drinks. One plasticiser, known as DEHP, is a possible carcinogen, and thought capable of wreaking havoc with children's reproductive organs. The inspectors discovered levels far in excess of the daily allowed intake. Insiders have told investigators that products may have been doctored for decades.

引发这次塑化剂风波的源头被锁定在两家食品添加剂上游供货商身上:昱申化工和品汉香料。塑化剂用在饮料中可替代棕榈油起到混浊剂的作用。一种可能致癌的叫做DEHP的塑化剂,被认为会对儿童的生殖器官产生严重损害。食品安全检验人员在被检查的食品中发现了含量远超过每日允许摄入量的该种塑化剂。有内幕人士告诉调查人员,或许早在几十年前就存在向食品中掺入有害添加剂的行为。

Any hopes that the scare might end quickly were dashed when contamination fears spread to pharmaceuticals. Local pharmaceutical companies have recalled a dozen licensed drugs, and on June 11th GlaxoSmithKline, a multinational drug giant, was ordered to recall two antibiotics when traces of plasticiser were found―though, company and government insist, at way below maximum recommended levels.

关于产品受到污染的担心已经蔓延到了制药业,指望着民众的恐慌情绪能够很快消失的想法一下子就被打消了。台湾本土制药企业已召回了十多种正规药品,而在6月11日,跨国制药业巨头葛兰素史克被勒令召回其生产的两种检测出含有塑化剂成分的抗生素药物-尽管公司和政府均坚称其中的塑化剂含量并未超过规定的上限水平。

Taiwan's president, Ma Ying-jeou, describes government raids on shops and suppliers as Taiwan's biggest-ever effort in fighting food contamination. Executives from the offending companies have been arrested. Mr Ma himself, along with prime minister Wu Den-yih and other ministers, donned workmen's helmets and fireproof jackets and ceremonially burned contaminated goods in Changhua county. Mr Ma described their operations as "mopping up the battlefield". Government officials in eight other counties also staged incinerations. It is anyone's guess whether this propaganda show, worthy of China's Communists across the Taiwan Strait, instilled confidence.

台湾总统马英九将政府突击检查商店和供货商的行动形容为台湾在打击有害食品方面最不遗余力的一次,相关涉案的公司高管已被逮捕。马英九和行政院院长吴敦义及其他各部门首长头戴安全帽,身披消防外衣,参加了在彰化县举行的受污染食品焚毁仪式。马英九称他们这一举动是"清理战场"。在其他八个县,官员们也在当地的焚毁现场亮相。大家都在猜想,台湾政府这种丝毫不亚于海峡对面的共产党的宣传作秀手法是否会让民众重拾信心。

Taiwan's once robust reputation as a reliable and safe exporter of food has been dented. Mr Ma's own reputation for competence has also been damaged by his government's slow and muddled response to the crisis. Mr Ma is seeking re-election early next year. At the least, argues Hsu Yung-ming at Taipei's Soochow University, the scandals may affect Mr Ma's choice of running mate. His favourite was assumed to have been Mr Wu. But with the prime minister now a possible lightning rod for dissatisfaction over the tainted products, Mr Ma may have to think again. Other potential candidates are hardly inspiring. But Mr Ma will be keen to distance himself from any more cabinet embarrassments.

台湾作为安全可靠的食品出口商曾经有着非常好的口碑,但现在它的声誉已经大打折扣。以能力出色被人称道的马英九也因为其领导的政府应对此次危机时行动迟缓、毫无章法而声望受损。马英九正在谋求在明年年初的选举中获得连任的资格。台北东吴大学的徐永明认为,食品丑闻至少会影响马英九对竞选搭档的选择。本来他最中意的人选被认为是吴敦义,但这位行政院院长目前极有可能成为不满食品污染事件的公众的出气筒,所以马英九不得不重新考虑自己的选择,不过其他可能的人选又实在拿不出手。无论怎样,马英九将竭力让自己远离任何可能出现的牵涉到内阁的丑闻。

from the print edition | Asia
 

China’s bubbly property markets have not burst. Yet

Chinese property
中国的房地产

Popping the question
问题突现


China's bubbly property markets have not burst. Yet
中国房地产市场的泡沫仍未爆破,但迟早会的

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Jun 16th 2011 | HONG KONG | from the print edition

BUBBLES are supposed to burst with an audible pop. But in the snap and crackle of the Chinese housing market, it is hard to hear anything clearly. On June 9th the Wall Street Journal put its ear to the ground and declared that "the great property bubble of China may be popping". It pointed out that prices had fallen by 4.9% in the year to April in nine big cities tracked by Rosealea Yao of GaveKal Dragonomics, a consultancy. Ms Yao herself thinks a "correction" in the next six months is inevitable. But she argues that it is still "a bit early to say the bubble is bursting".

泡沫爆破时本应是有声的。中国房地产市场虽是噼里啪啦地好不喧闹,却很难听清个中详况。6月9日,华尔街日报侧耳倾听了一番后发表说"中国巨大的房产泡沫也许正在爆破"。该报指出,今年截至4月九大城市的房产价格下降了4.9%,这是一家咨询机构GaveKal Dragonomics的Rosealea Yao所掌握到的信息。Ms Yao认为在未来6个月内房产市场必将迎来一段调整期。但她也认为,现在说泡沫会爆破还为时过早。

Official figures released on June 14th added more noise. They suggested that builders started work on 19% more residential floorspace in May, compared with a year earlier, and sold 18% more. But the sales figures were flattered by comparison with May 2010, an unusually slow month following a government clampdown on speculative homebuying a few weeks before. And the starts figures may have picked up the government's drive to build more affordable housing.

6月14日发布的官方数据让喧闹之声更起。这些数据表明,承建商在5月开始动工的住宅建筑比起一年前的多出19%,售出的也增加了18%。但销售数据与2010年5月时比起来算是比较可喜的了,那个月正逢政府打压房产买卖投资的几个星期后,销售形势出奇地滞慢。而此段开头的那个数字也许会让中国政府重拾建造更多经济适用房的劲头。

In other countries, such as America, economists can rely on clear signals from credible price indices. In China the National Bureau of Statistics used to publish a price index spanning 70 cities. But that measure muted both the highs and lows of China's housing market. It suggested that prices for new and existing homes never fell by more than 1.3% during the financial crisis, and never rose by more than 12.8% a year in the boom that followed. That was hard to square with the head-splitting prices homebuyers were paying in the big cities. People stopped paying attention to the national index. In December the government ceased publishing it.

在别的国家,比如在美国,可信的物价指数可以给出明确的信号,经济学家可以借此加以分析。在中国,国家统计局过去通常发表的是包括70个城市在内的物价指数。但那种方法并无法说明中国房地产市场的起起落落。它只是表明,即便是在经济危机时期新建和现有住宅的销售量在一年内跌幅也从未超过1.3%,且在随之而来的繁荣期里其涨幅也从未超过12.8%。那可和大城市里购房者面临的令人头疼的房价是不相符的。人们已不再关注国家发布的指数。在12月政府也不再发布此指数。



The bureau does, however, still track prices in the 70 individual cities that made up the index. Weighting the cities by population, and weighting the mix of new and existing properties by floorspace, The Economist has tried to rebuild China's abandoned house-price index (see chart) from its constituent parts. Our calculations suggest nationwide prices are still rising―by 4% in the year to April―but only slowly. The pace of increase has eased steadily for 12 months in a row.

然而,统计局仍然关注着构成这个指数的70个城市的房价。按人口来定这个城市的权重,还按建筑面积来定新建和现有房产的权重,经济学人试图通过这种方法来重新得出已被弃用的房价指数(如图所示)。我们的估算表明,全国的价格仍在上升,今年截至4月上涨了4%,但增长速度是比较慢的。增长的步伐在12个月里已趋于平缓。

In the absence of credible government figures, many analysts have turned to private-sector alternatives. A 100-city index published by Soufun, a property consultancy, shows prices rising by 5.1% in the year to May. But in many of those cities its coverage is patchy, especially in smaller localities where developers may not have good, computerised records to share. That is one reason why Ms Yao, who draws on Soufun's figures, concentrates only on the nine cities it covers best.
由于缺乏可信的官方数据,许多分析家转而借助私营部门给出的数据。房产咨询机构搜房发布了100个城市的房价指数,表明今年截至5月房价上涨了5.1%。但在那些城市中有许多的覆盖范围是不完全的,特别是在一些小地方,开发商也许仍未备有完善的电脑记录。这就是为什么负责制作搜房的这个数据的Ms Yao只关注覆盖范围最完整的九个城市。

The first signs of a sharp reversal may not show up in prices anyway. The volume of sales tends to drop first, because optimistic developers will try to wait out a bad patch, hoping that better times will return. Despite the 18% rebound in May, most analysts believe sales are dropping sharply.

不管怎样,一旦会有强烈反弹,房产价格也许反映不出第一手信号。刚开始销售额往往会下降,因为乐观的开发商会试图死撑到控市政策不了了之,一心希望好景再返。尽管在5月出现了18%的反弹,许多分析家仍相信房产销售量正在急剧下跌。

Developers can stay out of the market only for as long as they can stay out of the red. As their cash pile dwindles and liabilities fall due, they will be forced to sell, whatever the market conditions. To give themselves more leeway, bigger developers have turned away from fickle onshore financing to international bond markets. The 30 developers rated by Standard & Poor's, a rating agency, raised about $8 billion of mostly five-year money in the first five months of this year, compared with $8.8 billion in the whole of 2010, itself a record year. Developers can bring this money back into the country, despite China's capital controls, provided they show a bit of patience and a commitment to build things in unfancied cities.

只有能摆脱亏损,开发商才会愿意撤出市场。随着现金减少,贷款到期,无论市场条件如何,他们也得被迫出售手中的房。为了给自己留有更大的余地,更有实力的开发商已从变数多端的境内融资转向国际债券市场。30家开发商由评级机构标准普尔给予评级,在今年的前5个月里便募集到了约80亿美元的5年期资金,而在2010年里则募集到了88亿美元(次数目被认为是创了纪录)。尽管中国对资本有控制,开发商也可以将这些资金带回国,只要他们对在一些不起眼的城市里建房表现出一点耐心和诚意。

Even so, the debts of many smaller developers will fall due next year. Standard & Poor's expects property prices to fall by about 10% over the next 12 months, but it does not rule out a "price war" if distressed selling by overstretched developers begins to feed on itself. If China's property market is a bubble, it may end with a squeal as well as a pop.

尽管如此,许多更小型开发商的债务将会在明年到期。标准普尔预计在未来12月内房产价格将会下跌10%,但如果资金已透支的开发商通过廉价出售房产可以填补得了这些债务,也不排除将会有一场"价格战"。如果中国的房地产市场是个泡沫,最后很可能会噼里啪啦般爆破掉。
 

Chinese takeaway kitchen

Myanmar

Chinese takeaway kitchen
中国的外卖厨房

Three articles look at China's influence in South-East Asia: first; resentment in Myanmar; second, Cambodian rivalries; third, Banyan on the strategic implications
有三篇文章关注中国在东南亚的影响:第一篇是关于缅甸对中国的怨恨,第二篇是柬埔寨的敌对,第三篇是印度的战略影响
Jun 9th 2011 | MYITKYINA, KACHIN STATE | from the print edition

WAIST-DEEP in the muddy water, hundreds of people swirl their pans, scouring the black sediment for the sparkle of gold dust. They have come from all over Myanmar to Kachin state, where the N'Mai and Mali rivers merge to form the mighty Irrawaddy, knowing that a good day may yield $1,000-worth of gold―and that time for gold-panning is running out.
在齐腰深的泥水中,成百上千的人晃动他们的淘金盆,冲刷黑色的杂质以获得闪耀的金沙。他们来自从缅甸到克钦邦(恩梅开江和迈立开江汇聚形成伟大的伊洛瓦底江的地方)的各个地方,他们知道收成好的话一天能得到价值1,000美元的金子――而淘金的日子也快结束了。

Across the river, the corrugated-iron roofs of a prefabricated barracks glint in the midday sun. They house hundreds of Chinese labourers working on the Myitsone hydropower project. This, according to Myanmar's government, will be the sixth highest dam in the world, and generate 6,000MW of electricity a year. On completion in 2019, the dam will flood the gold-prospecting area and displace more than 10,000 people. All the electricity will be exported to China. All the revenue will go to Myanmar's government. If an environmental and social impact study was conducted at all, it did not involve consulting the affected villagers.
在江对面,一个提前造好的工地宿舍的波状铁皮屋顶在中午的阳光照射下闪闪发光,里面居住着许多为莫冒水电站工作的中国工人。据缅甸政府称,莫冒大坝将是世界第六高,且发电量达6,000兆瓦每年。2019年大坝竣工时,将淹没金矿开采区,并转移一万多人。而所有的电将出口至中国,所有的收入将归于缅甸政府。如果政府真的会进行一个关于环境和社会影响的研究的话,也不会包括访问受影响的村民的。

A local Catholic priest who led prayers against the dam says his parishioners were moved to a "model" village, into tiny houses on plots too small for cultivation. The letters of concern he sent to Myanmar's leaders went unanswered. He says he will stay in his historic church "till the waters rise over the doorstep".
当地一位领导教徒反对建大坝的天主教牧师说,他所在教区的居民被迁移到一个"模范"村,住进建在一个小到无法耕种的地区的小房子里。他寄给缅甸领导人的重要信件都没有得到回复。他说自己会留守在这座有历史意义的教堂里,"直到洪水淹过门阶"。

Those displaced are not the only ones worrying about the project. The project abuts territory controlled by the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO), one of a plethora of ethnic insurgencies that have battled the central government for decades. Last year several bombs exploded at the dam site and in May the KIO warned that if the dam were not stopped it would lead to civil war. The KIO's armed wing recently engaged in skirmishes with government forces, despite a notional ceasefire.
被迁移的人们不是唯一担忧这项工程的人。大坝毗邻克钦政党控制区,克钦政党是一支和中央政府对抗几十年的大量少数民族武装之一。去年,大坝所在地发生数起爆炸事件,今年五月份,克钦政党警告说如果大坝不停工的话,将会引发缅甸内战。虽然名义上已经停火,但近期克钦政党的武装派别与政府军发生数次小规模战斗。

The KIO was banned from last year's election in Myanmar because it refused to let its fighters join the government's "border security force". Its threat came as Myanmar's newly installed "civilian" president, Thein Sein, a former general, embarked on a state visit to China.
克钦政党自去年缅甸的大选开始被取缔,因为他们拒绝自己的战士参加政府组织的"边防保卫队"。而当缅甸的前国防军司令、新任"平民化"总统吴登盛踏上对中国的国事访问之旅时,克钦政党的威胁随之而来。

China has a big stake in Myanmar. It is the country's leading foreign investor. Myitsone is one of many hydropower, mining and infrastructure projects there. China's most ambitious undertaking is a new deep-sea port for oil tankers. Due for completion in 2013, it will take gas from Myanmar's offshore Shwe field and will have the capacity to satisfy 10% of China's oil-import needs.
中国与缅甸利害攸关,它是缅甸最大的外来投资者。莫冒水电站是中国众多水电工程、采矿业和基础建设工程之一。中国最野心勃勃的事业是一个新建的油轮深海港口。这项工程2013年应该可以竣工,它将从缅甸近海的若开海上油气区采油,且有能力满足中国石油进口需求的10%。

These close ties are not entirely comfortable for either side. Between 1m and 2m Chinese citizens have moved into northern Myanmar. They dominate the jade-and-gem trade, push up land prices and flaunt their wealth in Mandalay and Myitkyina, where all the posh cars have Chinese number plates. Local resentment is growing. Church leaders in Myitkyina say Chinese people make up more than half the population. Many Burmese say their northern states are like a Chinese province.
中缅这些密切联系对双方来说不完全是令人舒心的。有一到两百万中国居民移民到缅甸北部,他们控制了玉石贸易,炒高低价并炫耀他们在曼德勒和密支那的财富,在这些地区,豪华车都装有中国车牌。当地人对中国的怨恨不断加深。密支那的教堂领袖说中国人占据当地人口的一半以上,很多缅甸人说他们的北部地区就像中国的一个省。

China, for its part, worries about the security of its investments and people. In the past it has leaned on Myanmar's leaders to prevent fighting between the army and the ethnic insurgencies. When conflict broke out in 2009 with the Kokang, an ethnic-Han-Chinese minority, 37,000 people fled to China, provoking sharp criticism of the Burmese junta.
中国方面担心他们的投资和人民的安全。过去,中国知道缅甸的领导人会阻止政府军和少数民族武装的战争。当2009年缅甸政府军和一个由中国汉族组成的果敢族武装发生战斗,37,000果敢人逃往中国,这引起了缅甸军政府的尖锐指责。

As its economic interests have grown, China has pressed for more access to Myanmar's harbours and territorial waters, to monitor the security of the new port and pipelines, and to keep an eye out for pirates. But this is a neuralgic issue for a country with a deep-seated suspicion of its powerful northern neighbour.
随着经济利益的增长,中国迫切需要更多进入缅甸港口和领海的入口,监控新港口和输油管的安全性,并且要留心海盗出没。但这对一个对其北方邻国有着根深蒂固的猜疑的国家来说,是个非常头痛的问题。

Myanmar's xenophobic leaders are trying to reduce their dependence on China by playing it off against India and the West. But India has been slow in trying to gain a toehold, while America and the European Union have recently extended sanctions on Myanmar. These include America's embargo on backing loans from the World Bank, which would impose higher environmental and other standards on big infrastructure projects such as Myitsone.
缅甸仇外的领导人试图通过让中国和印度、美国鹬蚌相争来降低其对中国的依赖。但是,印度对插足缅甸没有太大兴趣,而美国和欧盟最近延长了对缅甸的经济制裁,其中包括美国禁止缅甸从世界银行贷款,这将提高诸如莫冒水电站等基础设施工程的环境和其他标准。

So the regime is being drawn into China's orbit as much from necessity as choice. That does not make China any more popular. In the words of an old Burmese monk: "We are China's kitchen. They take what they like and leave us with the rubbish."
所以缅甸政府被带进中国的轨道不仅是个选择,也是种需要。这并未使中国更受欢迎。如一位年老的缅甸僧人所说:"我们是中国的厨房,他们拿走了他们想要的,留下一堆垃圾给我们