Vampire squished?
压扁吸血鬼？
What is bad for Goldman is bad for Wall Street, but good for regulatory reformers
凡对高盛不利的事，同样不利于华尔街，但却有利于监管改革者。
Apr 22nd 2010 | NEW YORK | From The Economist print edition
WHEN he was a child, Warren Buffett had an awe-inspiring encounter with Sidney Weinberg, Goldman Sachs's legendary leader, sparking a lifelong affection for the bank. These days the super-investor's admiration for Wall Street's most powerful firm, cemented by an investment during the recent crisis, puts him in a minority—and one that shrank further when, on April 16th, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused Goldman and one of its employees of fraudulently misrepresenting structured instruments tied to subprime mortgages. The civil charges have dented the firm's aura of invincibility, sent shivers across Wall Street and possibly (and perhaps not coincidentally) changed the calculus of regulatory reform.
在沃伦•巴菲特还是个孩子的时候，他便与西德尼•温伯格有了一次令他心生敬畏的相遇（温伯格是高盛历史上的传奇领袖），这一相遇激起了巴菲特对高盛一生的钟爱。现在，这位超级投资客在本次经济危机中对高盛的一项投资更充分表明了他对高盛的喜爱，而这也使得他成了少数仍支持高盛的投资者之一。在证券交易委员会于4月16日指控高盛及其一名雇员在与次贷有关的结构性金融工具问题上向投资者提供欺诈性的虚假陈述以后，这样的少数派投资者更是进一步减少了。这场民事诉讼削弱了笼罩在高盛头上的无敌的光环，令整个华尔街也跟着颤抖，并可能（也许并不是巧合）改变本轮规制改革的考量标准。
The case centres on a synthetic collateralised debt obligation that Goldman structured and marketed. It told investors that the securities bundled together to form the CDO, known as ABACUS, had been selected by an independent "collateral manager", ACA. The SEC alleges that Goldman failed to disclose that Paulson & Co, a hedge fund that also had a hand in choosing what went in, had bet that the CDO would perform poorly. This gave it an incentive to select securities that would bomb—and bomb they did, costing investors, including IKB, a German bank , and ACA itself, $1 billion. The employee, Fabrice Tourre, is alleged to have misled ACA into believing the hedge fund was a long investor.
这一诉讼围绕着高盛构建和营销的一种合成担保债务凭证（CDO）而展开。高盛告诉投资者组成这一名为阿巴卡斯（译注：ABACUS，也有媒体称其为算盘）的CDO的证券是由独立的"抵押品管理人"ACA公司挑选的。证交会指控高盛未能揭露一个事实，那就是，对冲基金鲍尔森公司也参与了证券的选择，并押注这一CDO证券会表现不佳，这就激励了鲍尔森公司选择会崩跌的证券——结果也真的崩跌，使得投资者（包括德国工业银行IKB和ACA）损失了10亿美元。而高盛的雇员法布里斯•图尔（Fabrice Tourre）则被指控误导了ACA相信鲍尔森基金做多该CDO证券。
Such charges are usually announced along with a settlement. But Goldman's determination to fight—with help from a former White House counsel—is not surprising, given what is at stake. The charges are sharply at odds with the firm's jealously guarded self-image as a paragon of integrity. Goldman sees itself as "long-term greedy", preferring to forgo profit today rather than to alienate a client.
这样的指控通常是同和解的结果一起公示的。然而考虑到这一事件的利害关系，高盛此番表现出的坚决应战到底的决心（还有一位前白宫法律顾问的帮助）也就不足为奇了：这一指控将严重地损害到高盛一直小心维护的诚实楷模的自我形象。高盛将自己定义为渴望长期利益者，宁肯放弃一时利益，也不愿疏远一个客户。
Many outsiders think the crisis exposed this characterisation as bogus. The popular narrative is that Goldman uses its privileged trading position in capital markets to double-deal, favouring some clients more than others, but above all favouring itself; that it sneakily sought to profit from the crash; that its alumni in high places helped it manipulate the bail-out; that it contributed to the global fiscal crisis by helping Greece and other countries mask their debt; and so on. The media have heaped on the pressure, comparing Goldman to a vampire squid and mocking its boss, Lloyd Blankfein, for suggesting, albeit tongue-in-cheek, that it was doing "God's work". An insider admits that the fraud charges will "fan the flames".
很多局外人认为这次危机将高盛这一自我标榜的形象之虚假暴露无遗。普遍的说法是高盛利用自己在资本市场上的特权交易地位搞两面派，帮助一些客户受益更多，但首要的是帮助自己；它曾秘密地从大崩盘中获益；它的身居高位的幕僚帮助它成功地操纵了救助资金；他帮助了希腊和其他一些国家掩饰他们的债务，促成了全球性的债务危机•••媒体也在一旁煽风点火，将高盛比作吸血鬼乌贼；高盛的老板劳埃德•布兰克费恩也因曾半开玩笑地说高盛做的是"上帝的工作"而受到媒体的嘲笑。一位局内人事坦陈，这一欺诈指控将无异于火上浇油。
Still, the SEC must prove its case. The regulator has helped itself by boiling it down to a fairly straightforward failure of disclosure. But lawyers say it is a gamble, reflected in the commission's three-to-two split on whether to proceed. The investors were sophisticated (on paper, at least) and the securities unregistered, reducing underwriter liability. Much of structured finance is uncharted territory for litigation. Only months ago, America's Department of Justice lost a high-profile legal battle against two hedge-fund managers from Bear Stearns (although criminal cases have to clear a higher bar than civil cases).
不过，证交会仍须在法庭上证明其控诉。该监管机构将这一事件归结为非常简单明了的"未尽告知义务"对其胜算确实有利，但律师们称从证交会在诉讼开始前决定是否将采取诉讼程序的内部投票仅以3:2险胜的分歧中可以反映出，这其实是一场赌博。投资者是老练的（至少名义上是这样）与证券不属于监管范围，都减轻了承销商的责任。很多结构性融资都位于诉讼的盲区。仅数月前，美国司法部还在一场高调的官司中败给了贝尔斯登的两名对冲基金经理（尽管刑事案件比民事案件有着更高的要求杠杆）。
Whether or not Goldman settles—if it doesn't, the case could drag on for years—the monetary damage will be manageable. With $73 billion in shareholder equity, it could survive penalties of several times investors' losses. More worrying is the possibility that its deep base of clients will begin to lose faith. So far they have remained loyal. Goldman posted stellar first-quarter net profits of $3.5 billion this week, driven by strong trading income. It even announced a share buy-back.
无论高盛是否和解——如果不和解，这案子可能会拖很多年——金钱上的损失都是可以弥补的。有着730亿美元股东权益的高盛，即使被罚几倍于投资者的损失，仍然可以存活下来。高盛更担心的是庞大的客户群会对它失去信心，虽然迄今为止他们仍保持着忠诚。高盛本周公布了亮丽的一季度财报，在强劲的经营所得的驱动下，公司当季净利润为35亿美元。它甚至还宣布了一笔股权回购。
At a minimum, though, Goldman faces "headline risk", likely further probes and distractions from running the business, says Mike Mayo, an analyst with CLSA. The board is firmly behind Mr Blankfein, but a top-level sacrifice may eventually be needed, especially if the firm's legal troubles escalate. Britain's Financial Services Authority has launched an investigation. Frank Partnoy of the University of San Diego's law school expects class-action and other private suits over, among other things, Goldman's failure to inform markets last year that it had received notification of a probe. IKB is considering its options, as is AIG, which lost a fortune selling Goldman credit protection on duff CDOs.
里昂证券（CLSA）的一位分析师称，高盛至少面临着"头条风险"，可能受到进一步调查并影响到其业务运营。尽管董事会坚决地支持布兰克费恩，但是最终可能还是需要一个高层的牺牲，尤其是如若公司遭遇的法律问题进一步升级。英国金融服务管理局也展开了一项调查。圣地亚哥大学法学院的弗兰克•帕特洛伊认为高盛会因为去年收到证交会的调查通知后一直没有告知市场，以及别的原因，遭受集体诉讼和其他的私人诉讼。IKB在思忖着它的选择；而因卖给高盛关于垃圾证券的信用担保而损失严重的AIG，也同样如此。
Goldman is not alone. It was far from the biggest CDO underwriter in the go-go years (see chart). A number of banks worked with hedge funds that wanted to short housing. The newly muscular SEC is scrutinising other deals. The rating agencies that gave CDOs such absurdly high ratings, though not named in the ABACUS case, should also worry.
这样做的并不仅仅是高盛一家。在这沸腾的岁月里，高盛离最大的CDO承销商还有很长一段距离。很多银行都在与做空房市的对冲基金合作。新近发力的证交会也有仔细检视其他交易。那些给CDO的评级高得如此荒谬的信誉评级机构，尽管不在阿巴卡斯诉案里同列为被告，也应当坐立不安了。
Some question the SEC's timing. The decision to attack Wall Street's bogeyman-in-chief just as the White House makes a big push to get its financial-reform bill through the Senate is certainly striking. It raises "serious questions about the commission's independence and impartiality," said Darrell Issa, the top Republican on the House Oversight Committee.
一些人质疑证交会的时机选择。证交会打击华尔街的妖魔总司令的决定恰好发生在白宫作出大力推进，希望金融改革议案能在参议院通过的时候，如此巧合，自然就吸引了众多的眼球。众议院监管委员会的共和党头目达雷尔•伊萨说，这一事件加重了人们对证交会的独立性与公平性的严重质疑。
Whatever the motive, the charges will increase pressure on Republican senators, already wary of being cast as Wall Street's buddies, to compromise, reckons Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank. For many Americans, clamping down on banks is almost as big a concern as jobs, says Ted Kaufman, a Democratic senator. As The Economist went to press, Democratic leaders were hoping to bring the bill to the Senate floor within days.
来自智库布鲁金斯学会（Brookings Institution）的道格拉斯•埃利奥特认为，无论这一指控的动机是什么，它都将增加原本就已在谨慎地避开华尔街密友形象的共和党议员妥协的压力。民主党议员特德•考夫曼说，在很多美国人看来，对银行的加强监管同解决就业问题一样重要。本期经济学人付印的时候，民主党领导人正期望着几天内将这一议案提交到参议院。
The Goldman case could make it harder to see off draconian legislative proposals, such as a plan to force banks to divest their swaps-trading units. Combined with higher capital charges for trading and with the Volcker rule, which would ban banks from proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity, these would hit capital-markets businesses hard. Goldman is arguably the most exposed: 80% of its first-quarter net revenue came from trading and principal investments.
高盛的案子使得阻挠严厉的立法提案变得更为困难，例如一个强迫银行成立独立的部门将其掉期交易业务分离出去的提案。这些严厉的立法提案同更高的交易资本金要求和沃尔克法则——该法则禁止银行进行自营交易和投资对冲基金、私募股权基金——结合起来，将给资本市场造成严重的冲击。高盛是受到这些政策和法规冲击最大的一个：它的一季度净利润中80%的利润来自交易和委托投资业务。
Writing the firm off would be foolhardy. It has recovered from adversity many times. Its risk management is top-notch, its people super-smart (and don't they know it). For all its ham-fisted PR, it has, so far, been able to ride out its image problems. But now it must defend itself, both in the court of public opinion and also, quite possibly, in courts of law. And where Goldman goes, much of Wall Street could be dragged.
现在就认定高盛无可救药是过度鲁莽。高盛曾多次绝处逢生；它的风险管理顶尖，它的人员异常聪明（他们自己当然知道）。尽管它的公关很拙劣，但到目前为止，高盛算是安然的挺过了一波波关乎其形象的考验。然而现在，它必须既在舆论庭上为自己辩护，且很可能也必须在法律庭上为自己辩护。如果高盛倒了霉，华尔街也将难逃厄运。
压扁吸血鬼？
What is bad for Goldman is bad for Wall Street, but good for regulatory reformers
凡对高盛不利的事，同样不利于华尔街，但却有利于监管改革者。
Apr 22nd 2010 | NEW YORK | From The Economist print edition
WHEN he was a child, Warren Buffett had an awe-inspiring encounter with Sidney Weinberg, Goldman Sachs's legendary leader, sparking a lifelong affection for the bank. These days the super-investor's admiration for Wall Street's most powerful firm, cemented by an investment during the recent crisis, puts him in a minority—and one that shrank further when, on April 16th, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) accused Goldman and one of its employees of fraudulently misrepresenting structured instruments tied to subprime mortgages. The civil charges have dented the firm's aura of invincibility, sent shivers across Wall Street and possibly (and perhaps not coincidentally) changed the calculus of regulatory reform.
在沃伦•巴菲特还是个孩子的时候，他便与西德尼•温伯格有了一次令他心生敬畏的相遇（温伯格是高盛历史上的传奇领袖），这一相遇激起了巴菲特对高盛一生的钟爱。现在，这位超级投资客在本次经济危机中对高盛的一项投资更充分表明了他对高盛的喜爱，而这也使得他成了少数仍支持高盛的投资者之一。在证券交易委员会于4月16日指控高盛及其一名雇员在与次贷有关的结构性金融工具问题上向投资者提供欺诈性的虚假陈述以后，这样的少数派投资者更是进一步减少了。这场民事诉讼削弱了笼罩在高盛头上的无敌的光环，令整个华尔街也跟着颤抖，并可能（也许并不是巧合）改变本轮规制改革的考量标准。
The case centres on a synthetic collateralised debt obligation that Goldman structured and marketed. It told investors that the securities bundled together to form the CDO, known as ABACUS, had been selected by an independent "collateral manager", ACA. The SEC alleges that Goldman failed to disclose that Paulson & Co, a hedge fund that also had a hand in choosing what went in, had bet that the CDO would perform poorly. This gave it an incentive to select securities that would bomb—and bomb they did, costing investors, including IKB, a German bank , and ACA itself, $1 billion. The employee, Fabrice Tourre, is alleged to have misled ACA into believing the hedge fund was a long investor.
这一诉讼围绕着高盛构建和营销的一种合成担保债务凭证（CDO）而展开。高盛告诉投资者组成这一名为阿巴卡斯（译注：ABACUS，也有媒体称其为算盘）的CDO的证券是由独立的"抵押品管理人"ACA公司挑选的。证交会指控高盛未能揭露一个事实，那就是，对冲基金鲍尔森公司也参与了证券的选择，并押注这一CDO证券会表现不佳，这就激励了鲍尔森公司选择会崩跌的证券——结果也真的崩跌，使得投资者（包括德国工业银行IKB和ACA）损失了10亿美元。而高盛的雇员法布里斯•图尔（Fabrice Tourre）则被指控误导了ACA相信鲍尔森基金做多该CDO证券。
Such charges are usually announced along with a settlement. But Goldman's determination to fight—with help from a former White House counsel—is not surprising, given what is at stake. The charges are sharply at odds with the firm's jealously guarded self-image as a paragon of integrity. Goldman sees itself as "long-term greedy", preferring to forgo profit today rather than to alienate a client.
这样的指控通常是同和解的结果一起公示的。然而考虑到这一事件的利害关系，高盛此番表现出的坚决应战到底的决心（还有一位前白宫法律顾问的帮助）也就不足为奇了：这一指控将严重地损害到高盛一直小心维护的诚实楷模的自我形象。高盛将自己定义为渴望长期利益者，宁肯放弃一时利益，也不愿疏远一个客户。
Many outsiders think the crisis exposed this characterisation as bogus. The popular narrative is that Goldman uses its privileged trading position in capital markets to double-deal, favouring some clients more than others, but above all favouring itself; that it sneakily sought to profit from the crash; that its alumni in high places helped it manipulate the bail-out; that it contributed to the global fiscal crisis by helping Greece and other countries mask their debt; and so on. The media have heaped on the pressure, comparing Goldman to a vampire squid and mocking its boss, Lloyd Blankfein, for suggesting, albeit tongue-in-cheek, that it was doing "God's work". An insider admits that the fraud charges will "fan the flames".
很多局外人认为这次危机将高盛这一自我标榜的形象之虚假暴露无遗。普遍的说法是高盛利用自己在资本市场上的特权交易地位搞两面派，帮助一些客户受益更多，但首要的是帮助自己；它曾秘密地从大崩盘中获益；它的身居高位的幕僚帮助它成功地操纵了救助资金；他帮助了希腊和其他一些国家掩饰他们的债务，促成了全球性的债务危机•••媒体也在一旁煽风点火，将高盛比作吸血鬼乌贼；高盛的老板劳埃德•布兰克费恩也因曾半开玩笑地说高盛做的是"上帝的工作"而受到媒体的嘲笑。一位局内人事坦陈，这一欺诈指控将无异于火上浇油。
Still, the SEC must prove its case. The regulator has helped itself by boiling it down to a fairly straightforward failure of disclosure. But lawyers say it is a gamble, reflected in the commission's three-to-two split on whether to proceed. The investors were sophisticated (on paper, at least) and the securities unregistered, reducing underwriter liability. Much of structured finance is uncharted territory for litigation. Only months ago, America's Department of Justice lost a high-profile legal battle against two hedge-fund managers from Bear Stearns (although criminal cases have to clear a higher bar than civil cases).
不过，证交会仍须在法庭上证明其控诉。该监管机构将这一事件归结为非常简单明了的"未尽告知义务"对其胜算确实有利，但律师们称从证交会在诉讼开始前决定是否将采取诉讼程序的内部投票仅以3:2险胜的分歧中可以反映出，这其实是一场赌博。投资者是老练的（至少名义上是这样）与证券不属于监管范围，都减轻了承销商的责任。很多结构性融资都位于诉讼的盲区。仅数月前，美国司法部还在一场高调的官司中败给了贝尔斯登的两名对冲基金经理（尽管刑事案件比民事案件有着更高的要求杠杆）。
Whether or not Goldman settles—if it doesn't, the case could drag on for years—the monetary damage will be manageable. With $73 billion in shareholder equity, it could survive penalties of several times investors' losses. More worrying is the possibility that its deep base of clients will begin to lose faith. So far they have remained loyal. Goldman posted stellar first-quarter net profits of $3.5 billion this week, driven by strong trading income. It even announced a share buy-back.
无论高盛是否和解——如果不和解，这案子可能会拖很多年——金钱上的损失都是可以弥补的。有着730亿美元股东权益的高盛，即使被罚几倍于投资者的损失，仍然可以存活下来。高盛更担心的是庞大的客户群会对它失去信心，虽然迄今为止他们仍保持着忠诚。高盛本周公布了亮丽的一季度财报，在强劲的经营所得的驱动下，公司当季净利润为35亿美元。它甚至还宣布了一笔股权回购。
At a minimum, though, Goldman faces "headline risk", likely further probes and distractions from running the business, says Mike Mayo, an analyst with CLSA. The board is firmly behind Mr Blankfein, but a top-level sacrifice may eventually be needed, especially if the firm's legal troubles escalate. Britain's Financial Services Authority has launched an investigation. Frank Partnoy of the University of San Diego's law school expects class-action and other private suits over, among other things, Goldman's failure to inform markets last year that it had received notification of a probe. IKB is considering its options, as is AIG, which lost a fortune selling Goldman credit protection on duff CDOs.
里昂证券（CLSA）的一位分析师称，高盛至少面临着"头条风险"，可能受到进一步调查并影响到其业务运营。尽管董事会坚决地支持布兰克费恩，但是最终可能还是需要一个高层的牺牲，尤其是如若公司遭遇的法律问题进一步升级。英国金融服务管理局也展开了一项调查。圣地亚哥大学法学院的弗兰克•帕特洛伊认为高盛会因为去年收到证交会的调查通知后一直没有告知市场，以及别的原因，遭受集体诉讼和其他的私人诉讼。IKB在思忖着它的选择；而因卖给高盛关于垃圾证券的信用担保而损失严重的AIG，也同样如此。
Goldman is not alone. It was far from the biggest CDO underwriter in the go-go years (see chart). A number of banks worked with hedge funds that wanted to short housing. The newly muscular SEC is scrutinising other deals. The rating agencies that gave CDOs such absurdly high ratings, though not named in the ABACUS case, should also worry.
这样做的并不仅仅是高盛一家。在这沸腾的岁月里，高盛离最大的CDO承销商还有很长一段距离。很多银行都在与做空房市的对冲基金合作。新近发力的证交会也有仔细检视其他交易。那些给CDO的评级高得如此荒谬的信誉评级机构，尽管不在阿巴卡斯诉案里同列为被告，也应当坐立不安了。
Some question the SEC's timing. The decision to attack Wall Street's bogeyman-in-chief just as the White House makes a big push to get its financial-reform bill through the Senate is certainly striking. It raises "serious questions about the commission's independence and impartiality," said Darrell Issa, the top Republican on the House Oversight Committee.
一些人质疑证交会的时机选择。证交会打击华尔街的妖魔总司令的决定恰好发生在白宫作出大力推进，希望金融改革议案能在参议院通过的时候，如此巧合，自然就吸引了众多的眼球。众议院监管委员会的共和党头目达雷尔•伊萨说，这一事件加重了人们对证交会的独立性与公平性的严重质疑。
Whatever the motive, the charges will increase pressure on Republican senators, already wary of being cast as Wall Street's buddies, to compromise, reckons Douglas Elliott of the Brookings Institution, a think-tank. For many Americans, clamping down on banks is almost as big a concern as jobs, says Ted Kaufman, a Democratic senator. As The Economist went to press, Democratic leaders were hoping to bring the bill to the Senate floor within days.
来自智库布鲁金斯学会（Brookings Institution）的道格拉斯•埃利奥特认为，无论这一指控的动机是什么，它都将增加原本就已在谨慎地避开华尔街密友形象的共和党议员妥协的压力。民主党议员特德•考夫曼说，在很多美国人看来，对银行的加强监管同解决就业问题一样重要。本期经济学人付印的时候，民主党领导人正期望着几天内将这一议案提交到参议院。
The Goldman case could make it harder to see off draconian legislative proposals, such as a plan to force banks to divest their swaps-trading units. Combined with higher capital charges for trading and with the Volcker rule, which would ban banks from proprietary trading and investing in hedge funds and private equity, these would hit capital-markets businesses hard. Goldman is arguably the most exposed: 80% of its first-quarter net revenue came from trading and principal investments.
高盛的案子使得阻挠严厉的立法提案变得更为困难，例如一个强迫银行成立独立的部门将其掉期交易业务分离出去的提案。这些严厉的立法提案同更高的交易资本金要求和沃尔克法则——该法则禁止银行进行自营交易和投资对冲基金、私募股权基金——结合起来，将给资本市场造成严重的冲击。高盛是受到这些政策和法规冲击最大的一个：它的一季度净利润中80%的利润来自交易和委托投资业务。
Writing the firm off would be foolhardy. It has recovered from adversity many times. Its risk management is top-notch, its people super-smart (and don't they know it). For all its ham-fisted PR, it has, so far, been able to ride out its image problems. But now it must defend itself, both in the court of public opinion and also, quite possibly, in courts of law. And where Goldman goes, much of Wall Street could be dragged.
现在就认定高盛无可救药是过度鲁莽。高盛曾多次绝处逢生；它的风险管理顶尖，它的人员异常聪明（他们自己当然知道）。尽管它的公关很拙劣，但到目前为止，高盛算是安然的挺过了一波波关乎其形象的考验。然而现在，它必须既在舆论庭上为自己辩护，且很可能也必须在法律庭上为自己辩护。如果高盛倒了霉，华尔街也将难逃厄运。
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