2011年2月28日
The canon of economics经济学经典
Economics focus
经济聚焦
The canon of economics
经济学经典
The best journal in the discipline picks its best papers
最佳学术期刊选出最佳论文
Feb 24th 2011 | from the print edition
ONE hundred years ago, in March 1911, the American Economic Review (AER) published its first article—on irrigation in the “sun-blistered” deserts of the western United States. The article described how the “fervid suns of May and June” melted “vast beds of snow and ice”, so that “springs and torrents rush down to the lowlands” and “the rivers overflow their banks”.
一百年前的1911年3月，《美国经济评论》（American Economic Review）登出了第一篇文章，内容是关于美国西部被太阳晒到起泡的沙漠的灌溉的。文章描绘了“五六月的骄阳”如何融化了“巨大的冰雪床”，以至于“泉水和溪流朝低地奔腾而下”，“河水漫过了堤岸”。
It is fair to say that the journal’s prose style has rushed downhill since those first lyrical pages. But if the AER’s opening article ranks among the best-written in the review’s history, it does not rank among the best. To mark its centenary issue, the journal asked six eminent economists to trawl through the thousands of papers that followed and pick the top 20. The results, with links to all 20 papers, are available online.*
平心而论，除了开头几页的抒情文字，《美国经济评论》的文风就乏善可陈了。但开山之文尽管文采斐然，可列《美国经济评论》百年翘楚，其质量却称不上出类拔萃。在标志其跨越百年的最新一期中，《美国经济评论》邀请了六位著名经济学家从数千篇文章中遴选出最好的20篇。遴选结果与所有20篇文章的链接已公布在网上。
The links are worth clicking on. Many of these papers are more cited than read. They are known not by their full titles, but by the author-and-date shorthand (Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Friedman, 1968; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971) used in references. Reading them in the original yields some pleasing rediscoveries.
这些链接值得点击。其中许多篇被引用的次数甚至比阅读的次数还要多。它们的作者-日期简称（Modigliani and Miller, 1958; Friedman, 1968; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971，用于参考文献中）比标题更出名。阅读原始文献能重新发现一些颇有兴味的东西。
Unsurprisingly, the list includes the 1955 paper by Simon Kuznets explaining why inequality might first rise then fall in the course of economic development. Surprisingly, nowhere in the paper did he actually draw the “Kuznets curve” that is now inseparable from his name. (He described the arc of inequality as a “long swing” instead.) Robert Mundell’s 1961 theory of “optimum currency areas”, which lays out the conditions for a workable currency union, is now often cited by the euro’s critics. Ironic, therefore, to note that Mr Mundell wrote the paper to show why flexible exchange rates were impractical because many nations are not optimal currency areas either. Should every local “pocket of unemployment” have a “separate currency”, he snorted.
西蒙•库兹涅茨1955年解释为何不平等程度会随着经济发展先上升后下降的论文也在20佳之列，这毫不令人意外。令人意外的是，已与作者密不可分的“库兹涅茨曲线”其实并没有出现在这篇论文中。（他将不平等程度曲线描述为“长波”。）罗伯特•蒙代尔1961年提出的“最优货币区”理论给出了货币联盟可能成立的情形，如今经常被欧元批评者引用。这显得有些滑稽，因为他的这篇论文本是论证在许多国家根本不是最优货币区的情况下，灵活的汇率是如何不切实际的。蒙代尔不屑的哼道，每个“失业率不同”的地方都应该有“单独的货币”。
With one or two exceptions, the chosen papers convey an impression of economics as a tidy, coherent discipline. The subjects covered are traditional: consumption, tax, currencies, inflation, that sort of thing. There are no excursions into sumo相扑 or intestinal worms. The furthest off-piste they go is Anne Krueger’s 1974 article on rent-seeking, explaining why people may lobby for governments to distort the economy.
除了一两个例外，入选的文章让人们感觉经济学是一门井然有序、讲究逻辑的学科。20佳论文的主题均是诸如消费、税收、货币、通胀之类的传统领域。没有一篇论文是关于相扑、蛔虫之类与经济学风马牛不相及的东西的。离题最远的一篇论文是安妮•克鲁格1974年关于寻租的文章。在这篇文章解释了为何人们会游说政府去干扭曲经济的事。
The papers are not bereft of whimsy, but it is confined to footnotes and asides. A 1972 paper by Armen Alchian and Harold Demsetz, for example, describes how the firm evolved as an organisational form to prevent shirking in team production. A footnote explains why sportsmen do not shirk enough, overinvesting in their skills. (Teams care about coming top, as much as they care about being good, so if teams collectively agreed to lower their standards, they could achieve the same league rankings with less effort.) The two economists also explain why professors get away with “turpitudinal peccadillos” like stealing office stationery.
入选论文中不乏奇思怪想，但只限于脚注和旁白。比如，阿曼•阿尔钦和哈罗德•登姆塞茨在1972年的一篇论文中描述了企业是如何作为一种防止团队生产中的偷懒现象的组织形式演化的。其中的一个脚注解释了为什么运动员不会偷懒，而是孜孜不倦地提升技艺。（对一支运动队来说，优秀程度并不比名次更重要，因此如果运动队集体决定降低标准的话，他们是可以以更少的付出获得相同的联赛名次的。）阿尔钦和登姆塞茨还解释了教授偷取办公文具之类的“卑劣小伎俩”为何可以逍遥法外。
This consensus on the proper subject of economics also extends to method. The chosen economists mostly go about their business in a consistent way, refining, extending or occasionally bending a shared framework of analysis. Some of them make their colleagues’ lives easier by suggesting convenient tricks and techniques to make a theory testable (such as the consumer-demand equations set out in 1980 by Angus Deaton and John Muellbauer), to make a notion easy to model (see the 1977 paper by Avinash Dixit and Joseph Stiglitz on differentiated products and increasing returns to scale) or both (the production function pioneered in 1928 by Charles Cobb and the inimitable Paul Douglas).
入选论文不仅主题集中于传统经济学领域，使用的方法也是如此。入选的经济学家绝大多数以一以贯之的方式做学问，在常规的分析框架下进行改进和扩展，偶尔也会另辟蹊径。其中一些人发展出了方便的技巧和方法，或是使理论变得可验证（比如安格斯•迪顿和约翰•米尔鲍尔1980年给出的消费者需求方程组），或是让概念更容易被建模（见阿维纳什•迪克西特和约瑟夫•斯蒂格利茨1977年关于差异产品和规模报酬递增的论文），或是两者皆是（查尔斯•柯布和无与伦比的保罗•道格拉斯1928年在生产函数上所做的先驱性工作），从而为同侪提供了极大的便利。
Several papers spot a real-world phenomenon that sits uneasily with the discipline’s ruling assumptions. Why do people in developing countries leave undermanned farms to languish in urban unemployment, for example? The papers then show that one or two tweaks to the assumptions can bring the problem to heel—in this instance, the artificially high wages paid by city jobs offset the smaller chance of landing one.
不少论文直指经济学基本假设难以处理的真实世界。比如，为何发展中国家的人民要离开人手不足的农村，到城市里去经受失业的折磨？有几篇论文显示，只要假设稍作改动，就能轻松解决问题。刚才这个问题答案是城市工作岗位的工资被人为限定在较高水平，补偿了在城市立足的高难度。
Thirty-somethings
三十余年来……
The most recent entry to the top 20 is Robert Shiller’s 1981 paper documenting the excessive volatility of stock prices. Nothing else in the past 30 years made the cut—even though submissions to the AER have swelled in that time and its acceptance rate has plunged. Douglas Bernheim, one of the six pop-pickers, says that each of them would probably have included “at least a couple of more recent papers” on their list. “But as we move from older to younger papers, assessments vary more from person to person.”
在20佳论文中，最为晚近的一篇是罗伯特•希勒1981年关于股价过度波动的论文。过去30年来，《美国经济评论》的投稿数量有了很大增长，退稿率也大大提高了，但却没有一篇论文能够入围20佳。六名遴选者之一的道格拉斯•伯恩海姆（Douglas Bernheim）说，也许他们六个人每人都“至少选了两三篇近期论文”，“但随着我们的目光从老论文转向新论文，我们彼此之间的判断出现了越来越大的差异。”
Why is this? Mr Bernheim points out that younger papers are less time-tested. Economists can only forecast their worth, and these forecasts are rarely convincing enough to supplant one of the proven classics on the list. According to this view, some recent papers will eventually earn broad admiration. It is simply a question of time.
这是为什么呢？伯恩海姆指出，新论文所经受的时间检验不够充分。经济学家们只能预测它们的价值，但光凭预测很难令人信服地取代榜单中已被证明了的经典论文。根据这一观点，一些新文章最终会赢得广泛赞誉。这只是时间问题。
But perhaps it is also a question of the times. Economics has fragmented in the past 15-20 years, both in subject and technique. No aspect of human behaviour is off-limits and a miscellany of methods are in vogue, adding laboratory experiments, randomised trials and computer simulations to the traditionalist’s blackboard and chalk. Many of the brightest stars in economics parade their scepticism, insisting on how little economists really know (or indeed how little real economics they know). The discipline is more exciting, ingenious and intrepid as a result. But it is also unruly and untidy. Some economists are still patiently adding to a cairn of knowledge. Many are throwing rocks.
但这很有可能也是时代问题。过去15~20年来，经济学从主题到方法都出现了越来越细的分化。经济学已经涉及到人类行为的方方面面，多种方法混用也在风靡一时，不再局限于传统的黑板+粉笔，实验室实验、随机试验和计算机模拟都被用到了经济学研究中。不少明星经济学家喜欢标榜怀疑精神，大谈经济学家事实上是如何无知（或者对真正的经济学实在是所知甚少）。结果，经济学变得比以前更令人振奋、更灵光闪现、更勇往直前，也变得凌乱无序、缺乏章法。有些经济学家仍在循规蹈矩稳步向前，不少人则是在信马由缰。
It is harder than ever to keep abreast of progress. After running four issues a year for the past 100 years, the AER will this year publish six. The journal has already produced four specialised offshoots. Economics is producing a torrent of research, coursing in all directions. The rivers have overflowed their banks.
如今，时刻保持在最前沿已经相当困难了。过去100年来，《美国经济评论》每年只出版四期，但今年将增加至六期。《美国经济评论》已经创造了四大专业分支。经济学正在创造无孔不入的研究洪流。河水已经漫过了堤岸。
* http://pubs.aeaweb.org/doi/pdfplus/10.1257/aer.101.1.1
from the print edition | Finance and Economics
Going underground
A project to reveal more about all the carbon on Earth
旨在向人们揭示更多地球碳信息的项目
The Deep Carbon Observatory
深碳观测站
Feb 24th 2011 | from the print edition
A world still full of secrets
一个依然充满秘密的世界
THE carbon cycle is the stuff of school books. It is a familiar tale of photosynthesis, forests, farming and fossils fuels. Understanding this cycle is important, both because it sustains life on Earth and because it is bound up with the rate of global warming. But are the outlines of the carbon cycle really that familiar?
碳循环是学校书本上的东西。这是个关于光合作用、森林、耕作以及化石燃料的熟识的故事。理解这种循环很重要，不仅因为碳循环维持地球上的生命，而且因为它对于全球变暖的速度有密切关系。不过关于碳循环的概要，我们真的那么熟悉吗？
At the AAAS meeting in Washington, DC, Robert Hazen of the Carnegie Institution for Science, which is based in the same town, gave a lecture intended to show that this view of the carbon cycle only scratches the surface. Dr Hazen is one of the moving spirits behind a project called the Deep Carbon Observatory, which will be paid for by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation. Over the course of the next decade it will attempt to understand all the carbon in the Earth, not just the stuff that cycles through the atmosphere, the oceans and living things.
在华盛顿的AAAS会议，来自卡内基科学学院（Carnegie Institution for Science）（同样位于华盛顿）的Robert Hazen发表演讲。该演讲旨在展示上述对碳循环的的看法仅仅触及表面。Hazen博士是被称作深碳观测站项目的幕后策划者，该项目由Alfred P. Sloan基金出资。接下来的十年中，该项目将试着去了解地球上所有的碳，而不仅仅是通过大气、海洋和生物循环的东西。
As Dr Hazen pointed out, carbon is the fourth-most-abundant element in the universe, after hydrogen, helium and oxygen. In the Earth, though less common than that, it is reckoned to make up between 0.07% and 3.2% of the planet. But the uncertainty of this range is itself a comment on how little carbon's role in the Earth's overall physics and chemistry is understood. Also uncertain is how much interchange there is between the carbon in the Earth's mantle and core, and the more familiar stuff in the crust, atmosphere and oceans.
正如Hazen博士指出的那样，在氢、氦、氧之后，碳是宇宙中第四充足的元素。在地球上，尽管没有宇宙那么常见，据估计有0.07%到3.2%是由碳构成的。这种范围不确定本身就解释了关于碳在地球总体物理、化学中的作用，人们了解的是那么的少。在地球的地幔和地核之间、或者地壳中更为我们熟知的大气和海洋之间有多少碳交换也是不确定的。
Some carbon comes from the mantle to the surface in the form of diamonds. These crystals, which can form only under the intense pressure of the Earth's deep interior, must have been erupted at unbelievable speed (about 100kph) to have survived the journey to the surface intact. At slower speeds they would have turned into graphite, much to the chagrin of brides-to-be everywhere.
一些从地幔到地球表面的碳以钻石的形式存在着。这些晶体只有在地球深处的集中压力下才能形成，必然是以不可思议的速度（100千米/小时）喷发，在通往地球表面的过程中完好无损地幸存下来。与随处可见的准新娘的懊恼一样，稍微慢一点它们就会变成石墨。
How, exactly, diamond forms is an important question. Diamonds are useful as an industrial material as well as gem stones, and they would have many more applications if they could be made cheaply. And another, even more important industrial material, petroleum, may also come from the mantle.
钻石究竟是如何形成的？这是一个重要的问题。和宝石一样，作为工业原料的钻石很有用，而且如果他们价格便宜一些的话会有更多的用处。另外一种更重要的工业原料石油也是来自地幔。
Among petroleum geologists in Western countries, the consensus is that crude oil and natural gas are formed near the Earth's surface from the fossilised bodies of living organisms. Many Russians, though, disagree. They support the 130-year-old idea of their countryman Dmitri Mendeleev (who created the first version of the periodic table of elements). He thought the temperatures and pressures of the mantle would convert carbonates and water into hydrocarbons.
在西方国家的石油地质学家中，原油和天然气是在靠近地表处由生物有机体的硬化部分而来。然而许多俄国人不同意这点。他们支持他们同胞门捷列夫（他创造了元素周期表的第一版）有130年历史的观点。门捷列夫相信，地幔的温度和压力会把碳和水转变成碳氢化合物。
That has, indeed, been done experimentally in the past. And one role of the Deep Carbon Observatory will be to try to do it again in more sophisticated ways. If it turns out that fossil fuels are abiogenic, that probably means they are more abundant than Western geologists think, and may be found in places hitherto thought unpromising.
实际上，在过去的试验中见证了这点。而深碳观测站的一个作用就是用更加复杂的方式来尝试重新做这种试验。如果试验证明化石燃料并非由生物体产生，那可能意味着它们比西方地质学家想象的还要多，而且可能会在迄今为止被认为没有希望的地方发现。
Abiogenic petroleum could also provide food for one of the most intriguing targets of all for the Deep Carbon Observatory: the bacteria that live in the Earth's depths. Current estimates suggest that half of all the living matter on Earth lives underground, at depths of up to 5km. Some people think the share may be bigger than that. Indeed, there is loose talk of life having originated more than once in the distant past, and of there being entire shadow biospheres of organisms completely unrelated to anything on the surface.
并非由生物体产生的石油也许可以为深碳观测站最令人感兴趣的目标提供食物：在地球深处生活的细菌。最近估计表明，地球上的半数生物在深达5千米的地下生活。一些人认为这一比例数字可能还可以再大一些。实际上，关于在遥远的过去生命起源不止一次，以及完全与地表任何东西无关联的少量有机体生物圈的存在，这都是胡说八道。
Intriguingly, a few diamonds bear signs that their carbon was once part of living organisms. The ratio between the heavy and light isotopes of the element in their crystals is not quite right for stuff that has come out of the ground. Instead, it matches the ratio found when organic molecules have been through a few rounds of biochemical processing. Clearly there is a lot going on deep in the Earth that is completely unknown to science. With a bit of luck, over the ten years of Dr Hazen's project, the veil of ignorance will be lifted a little.
有趣的是，一些钻石具有这样的迹象：它们的碳曾经是生物有机体的部分。它们晶体内元素的轻重同位素的比例与那些来自地表的东西不完全吻合。相反，与经历几轮生物化学过程的有机体分子中的比例匹配。显然，地球深处发生了许多科学完全未知的事儿。Hazen博士今后10年多的项目研究，加上一些运气，无知的面纱将会揭开一点点。
水平有限，请多多指教。
2011年2月21日
浅析存款货币创造
浅析存款货币创造
段莹
（山东大学，山东 济南 250100）
[摘要]目前理论界对存款货币创造问题存在两种不同的观点，本文对于其中一种观点即认为存款货币都是具体的某一单个银行用贷款创造的提出了几点质疑，并提出了对存款货币创造的几点认识。
[关键词]存款货币创造 存款 贷款 原始存款 派生存款
存款货币创造问题对于我们理解商业银行的运行机制及货币供给、货币政策具有非常重要的意义。目前理论界的主流观点认为“整个银行系统能够把最初增加的准备金变成多倍的新存款或银行货币”(《经济学》，萨缪尔森著)。“要明确的是,当存在多家银行的时候,不可能由某单个银行创造出多倍存款”(《经济学》，斯蒂格利茨著)。
理论界另一种观点则认为“货币创造就是银行的贷款行为本身，货币创造的功能是属于银行个体的而不是整个银行体系的,区别原始存款和派生存款的概念是无意义的” “存款货币都是具体的某一单个银行用贷款(或投资)创造的”
笔者对这种观点提出以下几点质疑。
一、 质疑“银行贷款产生存款”
孙国峰提出“银行贷款产生存款”这种观点是通过分析银行进行贷款时的会计分录得出的。中央银行主要通过贷款向社会提供基础货币，商业银行的存款最终是由中央银行的资产业务创造的。而且当一个企业接受贷款时,银行是直接把这笔贷款记在企业在该贷款银行的存款账户上,这时的存款货币就已经创造出来。从这个角度看,贷款创造存款有一定的道理。
但是这种观点所立足的角度是片面的、有局限性的。
首先，孙国峰的该篇文章中的会计分录与传统的存款创造理论中的资产负债表并不矛盾。银行向客户发放贷款同时将该项贷款计入客户在该银行的活期存款账户，与作为存款存入另一家银行从抽象来看意义是相同的，都是银行的存款增加，银行就可以继续放款，由此产生派生存款。问题的根本在于商业银行必须有存款作为保障才能进行贷款。
其次，在信用货币制度下，货币供给是通过中央银行和商业银行两级货币创造机制来完成的。从这两个方面来看，都不能说明是贷款创造了存款。
1. 中央银行
中央银行向商业银行提供的货币是一种特殊的货币——基础货币。基础货币是由中央银行通过其资产业务提供的，并不是只通过向商业银行再贷款一种途径。中央银行通过其资产业务提供基础货币的途径有：（1）向商业银行再贷款、再贴现；（2）向财政借款或透支；（3）开展公开市场业务，购买外汇、黄金和国债等。因此说贷款创造存款是片面的。
2. 商业银行
商业银行通过不断办理活期存款、发放贷款的信贷活动，在整个银行体系内
创造并形成区别于原始存款的存款货币，这就是商业银行派生存款的信用创造过程。在不考虑中央银行提供信用的情况下，商业银行只有吸收客户的现金存款才能使超额准备金增加，超额准备金是商业银行发放贷款进行存款创造的基础。
二、质疑“货币创造的功能是属于银行个体的”
美国著名经济学家托马斯•梅耶等著的《货币、银行与经济》一书中,在谈到存款货币由谁创造的问题时写到:“在这个过程中,该系列的每一个存款机构都在创造存款。”由此看来,存款货币的创造是由贷款银行与存款银行共同完成的,两者缺一不可。
单一银行仅能创造等于其超额储备的存款，所以它并不能引起多倍存款创造。单一银行发放的贷款之所以无法超过其超额储备量，是因为当这笔由贷款创造的存款存入其他银行时，该银行将不再拥有这笔储备。但是，作为整体的银行体系却可以进行多倍存款扩张，因为当一家银行失去了它的超额储备，即使这一单个银行不再拥有，这些储备并没有离开银行体系。所以，当各个银行发放贷款并创造存款时，这些储备就转移到另外的银行，而后者通过发放新的贷款来创造新的存款。这一过程将继续，直到初始的储备增加量引起存款的多倍增加。
三、质疑“否定在理论和现实中都没有意义的“原始存款”和“派生存款”的区分”
1921年，美国经济学家C•A•菲力浦斯出版了《银行信用》一书，最先使用了“原始存款”和“派生存款”者对概念。他定义，原始存款是现金同伙或其他银行容易兑换现金的支票和票据等价物存入银行的存款。原始存款将贷款形成的存款(信用货币)排除在外,因而原始存款是能形成储备的存款。他注意到了原始存款和派生存款的区别，也就把握了货币供给理论的核心问题。这对概念的出现意味着现代货币供给理论出行的形成。
在信用货币体制下，客户以现金形式存入银行的存款，成为原始存款。在不考虑中央银行提供信用的情况下，商业银行只有吸收客户的现金存款才能使超额准备金增加，各个银行的存贷、贷存无论多么频繁，但各银行在中央银行的准备存款总额却始终丝毫末变，所以，要从商业银行系统这个整体来考察存款货币创造的初始点，那就在于它们准备金的增减变化。更准确地说，原始存款就是能增加商业银行准备金的存款。因此原始存款和派生存款的概念对于货币供给理论具有重要意义。
四、对存款货币创造的几点认识
在关于银行信用的功能上，有两种对立的理论，即信用中介说和信用创造说。
信用中介说创始于18世纪，其代表人物是亚当•斯密、大卫•李嘉图和约翰•穆勒。他们认为，银行的根本功能在于：通过信用把现有资本从一个人转移给他人使用。银行必须在收受存款的基础上，才能发放贷款。信用不能创造资本，银行的资产业务只不过是负债业务的结果，存款规模决定货款规模。该理论指出了信用不能创造出任何物质的正确—面，但没有看到银行能够通过支票流通和转帐结算创造派生存款，满足企业追加资本的需要，促进社会经济的发展。该理论仅适合于金币流通。随着信用制度的发展、银行功能的完备，在信用理论方面，又兴起了信用创造说。
信用创造说的先驱者是18世纪的约翰•劳，代表人物是19世纪的麦克鲁德及20世纪的熊彼特等人。他们认为，银行的功能在于为社会创造信用，银行能超过其所吸收的存款发放贷款，且能先行发放贷款，藉以创造出派生存款。银行通过信用的创造，能为社会创造出新的资本，以推动国民经济的发展。信用创造说过分夸大了银行创造信用的功能，它忽视了信用的客观基础，即在企业据环中分离出来的闲置资金以存款方式存入银行。它同时也忽视了银行创造信用的客观界限，银行不可能无限制地扩大信用。
在二级银行制度下，中央银行通过资产业务使商业银行存款准备增加。具体包括以下几条主要渠道:1.中央银行通过收购金银外汇,增加外汇储备,使商业银行准备存款增加。2.财政净借款以及通过公开市场业务而持有的国债券资产的增加,都是中央银行对财政—的资产业务。即中央银行对财政的资产业务成为商业银行准备存款增加的来源。3.中央银行对商业银行的资产业务。如对商业银行的再贷款和再贴现。
商业银行通过不断办理活期存款、发放贷款的信贷活动，在整个银行体系内创造并形成数倍于原始存款的存款货币，这就是商业银行派生存款的信用创造过程。在商业银行，主要依靠负债来开拓资产业务，必须有存款作为保障才能进行贷款。
总之，银行的负债业务和资产业务客观上存在着相互的关系。一方面，银行的负债业务对资产业务是首要的，银行要提供信用就应该具有自有资本和吸收存款，存款的规模决定货款的规模；另一方面，在信用业务的发展过程中，银行又能创造信用，资产业务并不完全受负债业务的制约。
财政稳健是货币稳健的条件
财政稳健是货币稳健的条件
在政府对待非政府拥有经济的范围内，下道行政命令就回笼票子的老法子，早晚去如黄鹤，没有用武之地的
【财新网】（专栏作家 周其仁）话说上世纪60年代初期，为了应对那时的通胀，主政者选了若干收入弹性较高的食品，既不限价、也不限量，放手高价出售，"一下子收回60亿元，市场物价就稳定了"。这条历史经验，看在80后读者的眼里，差不多是陈年老黄历了，难道还有值得今天借鉴之处吗？我的看法，还是有的。不过，我们先要把时代的特征分清楚。
是的，今非昔比。当年中国的经济叫计划经济。其体制特征，按列宁在十月革命前的构想，就是把整个国民经济作为一个超级大公司来对待。反正资本主义高度发达的地方，大公司内部从来讲行政权、讲集中、讲命令、讲计划，只是在公司之间还是"无政府主义的"市场关系。布尔什维克夺取了国家政权，把整个苏俄当做一个超级国家公司来运营，岂不就一下子建立起全社会范围的计划经济了吗？列宁掌权后，执行这套构想遇到挫折，向后退却搞了一段"新经济政策"。后来斯大林接手，推行全盘国有化和高度集权的中央计划体制，框架还是那个超级国家公司。
超级国家公司政企合一、权力高度集中。就算什么人一时心血来潮，权力下放捅出了娄子，也常常靠重新集权来解决问题。以我们关心的历史经验为例，就是大跃进捅出了财政亏空的娄子，又向人民银行透支多发票子引发通胀，迫不得已才请陈云出来收拾局面。历史的结论，从货币着眼，也要从货币下手，才是处理通胀问题的明白人做法，重点是收回市场里过多的货币。
关键的问题是，"一下子收回"来的钱，是不是又花出去了？要注意，那是可以花出去的。因为不管卖蜜枣还是卖高价糖果形成了收入，天经地义就可以花费。想当年那些销售高价蜜枣的商家店铺，大把收钱再大手花钱，进更多的货、发更多的奖金、翻修更新的门面，应该没有什么不可以的。问题是，倘若由它高来高走，回笼的票子重新出笼，抑制通胀就无从谈起了。
"伊拉克蜜枣"的真正秘诀在于，政府高价销售的几十亿所得，自己一分钱也不能再花出去！反正那时的商店都是国家的，无论卖了多少高价商品，收回来的钱，国营商店不可以自己花，要上缴的。这样，国营商铺卖高价的所得就进入财政库房。那么，库房有了银子，政府能不能再大手花出去？也不允许。因为那一波通胀祸起财政亏空。要治理通胀，不收缩财政开支，那是南辕北辙。看那个时期的财经文献，大方针叫"调整、充实、巩固、提高"，核心还是收紧政府支出。例如当时最著名的"2000万人回农村"，实质就是超级国家公司裁减雇员，以省开支。还有大批国家建设项目下马，也是紧缩财政的投资性开支。至于政府自己的消费，楼堂馆所之类，更要从严控制，谁建办谁。
这里的关键环节，是政府经由国营商店卖出高价商品，财政增收，但同时又要财经减支。这就等于借助财政的收支通道，对货币流通完成了一次"截留"。否则，政府一只手卖出高价伊拉克蜜枣，另一只手将销售所得又大把花了出去，流通中的货币毫不见少，收不住货币，就不可能取得"市场物价稳定"之效。这说明，在计划经济体制下，把超级国家公司的"超用"管住了，才管得住货币和物价。
今天中国经济改成了市场经济。既然叫市场经济，其运行的基础就是不同的经济主体各讲各的权利，协调关系要靠利益交换，不能靠行政命令。虽然法定货币还由政府发行，但进入市场之后覆水难收，不是谁下一道命令说收就可以立马儿收回来的。列在央行报表上的广义货币，数目大得惊人，但走进现实里看，哪一块钱也都早就 "名花有主"，谁也不能随便想动就动。这就是为什么标准教科书上的"货币政策"，来来回回就是央行买进卖出债券、调高调低利率那一套。连"法定储备金率"这样看似央行行长可以言出法随，令行禁止的事儿，受严格程序的约束不算，还要记在央行负债栏目下，提醒各位当事人那是央行欠着商业银行的钱。
搞市场经济就是这般婆婆妈妈的，干脆利落不得。在这种环境里，计划时代"一下子收回"大量流通中的货币、从而很快平稳市场物价的老经验，还有用武之地吗？我的回答，政府对待非政府的经济主体，无论居民家庭还是各类企业，不应该、也不可能靠直接下行政命令。举凡消费、储蓄、投资，是民间财产权利范畴内的行为，政府要保护，才能给经济增长添加源源不断的动力。乱发行政命令横加干预，有侵权之嫌，会破坏市场中人的预期，引发行为紊乱，对经济不利。像现在这样，政府开个会发个文件，说限价就限价，说限购就限购，恐怕还都是转型时期的急就章。再过些时日，居民和企业会不会还如此给面子买账，有待观察就是了。所以在政府对待非政府拥有经济的范围内，下道行政命令就回笼票子的老法子，早晚去如黄鹤，没有用武之地的。
但是，在政府对政府的场合，直接的行政指令和严明的财政纪律，可以、也应该派上大用场。这倒不是说不要人民约束政府，或者不要人民经由各级人民代表大会来约束各级政府。都要的，只不过一下子还做不到。靠市场竞争能约束政府吗？论者不少，我尚存疑，因为看不到可靠的证据。于是，麻烦就来了：民主和市场都不能有效管束政府，谁来管束？看来看去，比较现实的还只好靠政府管政府。春节后铁道部长刘志军被撤职调查的新闻，就不是铁道部几百万员工和几亿铁路乘客管得了的。能管住中国铁老大一把手的，非比他还大的官不可。
货币问题是一样的。当今流淌在财政预算内和预算外的银子，数目巨大；在形形色色政企不分、政资不分机构里滚动的银子，数目也巨大。对这类性质资金的实际用途和来往流向，老百姓管不了，人代会管不了，市场管不了，舆论管不了，怕也不能指望货币政策就完全管得了。还可以指望的，就是对政府行为做出政治决定和下达行政命令，以财政纪律硬性削减政府开支，特别要把那些老百姓早就民意滔滔的公车公差之类的费用，以及那些"豪华建设项目"，着实砍下一块来。历史经验说，那样才能有效实现货币回笼，从速抑制通胀。■
（本文首先发表于经济观察报）
2011年2月19日
比尔・普瑞斯 现在买入派息股
- 比尔・普瑞斯 现在买入派息股
- 2011-1-29 文章来源于《证券市场周刊》证券市场周刊订阅
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【《证券市场周刊》记者 王存迎】我们刚刚走完新十年的第一年，当告别2010年时，我们希望2011年不要有太多的变故。在新的一年中，美国人应该在期待美联储动作减少。美联储在危机后一直购买国债，试图压低短期利率，但其刺激借贷和恢复经济的愿望仍然没有实现。在经历了自大萧条以来最大的金融危机和最长时间的衰退后，美国当前的经济复苏速度非常缓慢，失业率依然居高不下。
过去的一年，投资者将投资从股票转移到债券和其他所谓安全的避险资产。在美国，黄金和国债明显具有吸引力，即使它们收益率已经达到创纪录的新低，它们依旧战胜了具有增长潜力但历史上波动明显的股票。
作为一位资深的华尔街投资者，比尔・普瑞斯认为现在是投资股票的时候了，特别是跨国公司的股票。普瑞斯认为，股市将再次证明其相对于长期债券更优秀的长期投资价值。在访谈中，他不认同很多人所说的股票收益将出现"新常态"情况，相反他说我们正在返回一个"老常态"。最近他接受了采访，解释了为什么他会如此自信。
普瑞斯：如果你回顾60年的历史，股票市场的回报一般都在8%-9％的范围内。上世纪80年代和90年代每年收益为17.5％，不过这样的日子已经一去不复返了。从历史上看，那段时间是不正常的。
现在我们又回到了老常态的情形下，旧常态是每年收益为7%-9%。在我看来，如果你可以在低通货膨胀的环境中得到这样的预期收益，低收益率没有什么大不了。诚然，未来的经济增长可能会比以前缓慢，但投资者不仅要投资于发达国家，更要从全球的角度来寻找机会。
毫无疑问，在发达国家，像欧洲、日本、美国，以及所谓的七国集团国家，未来的增长将低于以前的水平。其中部分原因是其人口结构问题，另外更重要的是在全球金融危机后，他们将个人债务和银行体系的债务转移到了主权资产负债表上。他们别无选择，个人的生命是有限的，企业也不能永远存活，但坦率地说，国家可以永远存在下去。所以他们采取将短期债务转变，使其持续时间更长。通过这样做，他们也给自己留下时间来处理金融危机中出现的棘手债务问题。近期有一本优秀的书提供了思考这个问题的方法，这本书是肯罗格夫和卡门・莱因哈特写的《这次与众不同》（This Time Is Different）。那本书的内容重点是：危机从来没有什么不同，每一次金融危机都遵循一定的模式。当一个国家的国家债务达到其国内生产总值的90%时，其未来增长率将减少1-1.5个百分点。这也是为什么G7国家未来增长速度比以前更慢的原因。另外债务问题的改善不会很快到来，这将需要五－六年的时间，但投资者不必悲观，你可以投资于全球市场。
这也正是我们现在所做的。资产无须只投资于单纯的美国公司，它也可以是一家美国企业，但其业务遍及世界各地。坦率地说，未来18个月超过一半全球国内生产总值将来自于新兴国家，特别是中国。如果你是一个全球投资者，那么在新的环境中你可以得到相当不错的股票投资回报。
问：如果你是在全球充分多元化投资，那么，你的选股模式是什么？
普瑞斯：这个模式本身也不是那么新鲜。现在相比上世纪80年代和90年代，我们更加关注的重点是股利。如果你坐下来仔细研究一家公司，你需要看看公司是如何分配其自身资金的。当和管理层见面时，我问的第一个问题也是，"你们是如何管理分配现金的？"你应该知道，任何公司对资金的处理有五种方式：支付股息，回购股票，偿还债务，进行收购或再投资。
历史上股息占股票总回报的比例在40%左右。而在上世纪80年代和90年代，股息贡献率很少，因为公司的收入增长较快，因此市盈率的增长速度非常快，但是如果现在你认为市盈率将不会像以前一样快速增长了，那么你就要关注股息了。股息来自于公司收益，因此，股利成长很难超过公司收入的增长，但这也不是没有可能性。
因为股息是从保留盈余中支付的，而大部分时间保留盈余都大于当年收益，在理论上，公司可以从留存收益中按照自身意愿支付股息，但实际上，大多数派息都是以年度收入一定比例划定，这是大多数公司的派息方式。因此，我们将寻找派息率增加的公司，尤其是在发达国家、七国集团国家。所以我们会寻找一个具有派息率增长的成熟公司。
问：所以你的时代投资将关注未来股息现金流，你还有其他什么要特别留意的吗？
普瑞斯：我们要看看企业如何分配资金，也就是我所说的五种配置方式。他们是否进行收购？如果他们进行收购，该收购的回报是否等于或超过其资本成本？如果他们进行再投资，是否行得通？并且我们想看看，公司内部收益率是上升了还是下降了。不幸的是，大多数公司都不会做出非常出色的内部资本配置。他们尽力做到最好，但往往很多项目会出差错，他们永远达不到其开始的期望。
我们也要看看他们的分红政策。研究发现，过去50年支付股息的公司的增长速度比不支付股息的公司要快。这违反直觉，因为你会觉得，如果公司没有支付股息，它就会拥有更多的资金再投资于自身的业务，那么它应该比支付股息的公司成长得更快。但是研究证明，很多时候如果你没有一个关于资本分配的纪律和一个股息支付的分配方法，公司盈余的钱很多会被浪费掉。因此，有股息分配政策的公司增长速度比不支付股息的公司快。
问：你的时代投资旗下有一只全球股息基金，给我们讲讲你是如何运用你的选股模型进行选股的，给我们举一个你所投资的例子。
普瑞斯：全球股息基金的策略重点是关注那些大的、成熟的和一般会将其现金流收益以分红的方式返还投资者的公司。所以在这一策略里有相当多的知名公司。
比如微软公司。微软最近提高了其红利分配，不过其股息率还是比较少的3%，但他们将回购100亿美元的股票。因此，将分红加上股票回购的效应，投资者会有一个7％的收益率。微软正在进入一个相当不错的时期，Windows 7将成为他们有史以来最成功的产品，Xbox是当今市场上处于第一位的游戏服务商，微软很可能在云计算领域成为领先者。他们至少未来两年时间内的增长率会达到两位数。买入一家有着增长股息率，股票回购和未来10%至12%增长率的公司是非常正确的选择，你不知道自己什么时候会赢，但你知道自己终将获胜。
问：苹果公司怎么样？
普瑞斯：我们拥有苹果公司股票，但是它不是我们股息策略的选股，因为其股息收益率是很低的。苹果公司的资产负债表上有非常多的现金。华尔街认为，苹果可以很容易地在支付4％现金股息的同时，保持一个很好的增长速度，但这取决于管理层的决定。到目前为止，基于其取得的卓越业绩，投资者都信任其管理层的选择。
问：时代投资关注股东收益率的做法肯定是非同寻常的。在你的投资中，有没有一只股票是推荐给我们，可以让我们在自己的长期多元化组合进行投资配置的？
普瑞斯：我想你需要一个长期财富的储存器，人们会说："这样的方法我过去试过，在过去的10年我持有股票，但最终结果是收益为零。"实际上，如果你认识到资本是如何增长的，如果你能够把钱收回同时再投资于高资本回报的公司，你就会赚钱。在我的投资中，我推荐雀巢公司。
如果你观察雀巢公司，会发现它每年产生约180亿美元的自由现金流收益，其中三分之一到40％将用于新兴市场的再投资，他们看到了新兴市场的增长机会。同时，他们会将其中100亿到120亿美元用于现金分红和股票回购。现在这家公司大约有着3%的现金股利，并将回购4%的公司股票，所以，这将让你拥有一个7％的股东收益率，另外它有一个介于5%和7％的增长率。因此该公司将在长期周期中战胜市场。
比尔・普瑞斯（Bill Priest），著名的长期股票投资者，时代投资（Epoch Investment Partners）CEO兼CIO，时代投资是一家公开上市的全球资产管理公司。他拥有超过40年的投资经验，2004年创办自己的公司时代投资。巴伦周刊描述他是一个为个人和机构投资者提供选股典范的人。普瑞斯的时代环球股票收益基金在2009年荣获理柏"过去三年最佳基金"的名誉。
2011年巴伦圆桌会议 注意了，个股投资者
- 2011年巴伦圆桌会议 注意了，个股投资者
- 2011-1-29 文章来源于《证券市场周刊》证券市场周刊订阅
- 美国私人住宅将持续去杠杆化，但公共房产领域将杠杆化，并将成为经济的支点之一。中国上调利率会引致美国市场的抛售。
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【《证券市场周刊》记者 徐怡丹】巴伦圆桌会议的成员们近日在纽约的哈佛俱乐部召开了年度会议并预测：美国的结构性问题包括巨大的财政赤字以及延续财政赤字的政策，在不久以后会将国家带入毁灭的漩涡――当然之前发生的事可能是股市攀升另一个5％、10％甚至20％。因为短循环周期内的结构性力量，包括复苏的工业经济和上升的公司利润，将会在未来的一年或更长时间内影响股价的走势。
《巴伦周刊》：大家对新的一年有什么看法？
维特玛：美国经济正在扶摇直上。根据ISI Group的数据表明，州所得税和营业税收入都有所增加，表明人们找到了工作、开始花钱了。公司也又一次乐意花钱了，某些行业甚至在扩大生产力。但这并不意味着股票价格低廉，实际上股票已经上浮了一大截。现在的市场似乎完全反映了其价值，而且从现在开始的短期内可能会再上浮一点。
布莱克：我看到了一个难题。一方面，由于议会通过了8,580亿美元刺激方案，经济形势会有所好转。今年GDP将会增长3.5%左右。企业利润构成GDP的比率一直很高，根据标准普尔500指数的收入衡量，今年可能还会增加另一个8.8%。我担心政府对赤字已经失去了控制。而为了保持经济增长，我们需要更多的财政刺激。累计财政赤字已经相当于GDP的95%，达到了自1946年以来的最高水平。用一个当下越来越流行的说法描述就是，我们一直在沿着时间维度把破易拉罐向前踢了又踢，把麻烦无限期地留给明天。
《巴伦周刊》：我们正在踢的东西是什么？
布莱克：社会安全、医疗保障、医疗补助――看看我们对这些公众权利又是如何处理的。我们应当把美国这座"房子"的结构整理得有条不紊才行。当今负债占GDP的比率让美国看起来像个香蕉共和国（政局不稳、依赖特定农业资源出口、被少数、富裕而腐败的政客统治的权贵政权）。但今年经济会健康一些。失业率仍然是个问题，没有工作的人们将会削弱消费。但是工业经济势头不错。无论是产能利用率、旋转钻井平台数量还是工厂船运数量，与工业相关的数字都会上升5%，10%，甚至15%。
《巴伦周刊》：你同意这个观点吗？谢夫？
谢夫：我同意我们在时间维度上把破易拉罐向前踢的说法，尽管总统奥巴马很有可能出台特定的细则来减少财政赤字。我认为摆脱困境的唯一方法是靠自身的发展破茧成蝶。白宫需要采纳建设性的方法对待赤字问题，并且需要工商业界的援助。我们刚才说到公司的表现良好。在股市方面，和2008-2009年形成鲜明对比的是，今年股市不再需要勇气和大量资本投入，今年将会是个股投资者的天下。
《巴伦周刊》：朱洛夫，你怎么认为？
朱洛夫：在我们面前的是两个世界――已完成工业化的世界和正在崛起的世界。已经完成工业化的世界继续活在自己编造的故事里：要想维持现有的生活方式只能依靠在债务的泥潭里越陷越深。在某种程度上，债券市场将为故事的延续制造麻烦。不仅对美国，对其它工业化国家也是。私人住宅领域的融资战线依然拉得很长，并且将会继续去杠杆化。公共房地产领域将会杠杆化，也会成为经济发展的一个支撑点。美国经济将会波澜不惊地发展，年内可能会增长2.5%至3%。通货膨胀在工业化世界里还不足为虑。
崛起的世界经历了大幅度经济增长，现在正进入日益严重的通货膨胀时期。这些国家如何处理通货膨胀对工业化国家有着决定性影响。如果他们下决心采取切实严格的货币政策，我们就有麻烦了。如果他们只是稍微提高利率来抑制经济过热，以往的经济循环还将被延续。这就意味着过后，也许一至两年之后，他们将不得不面对比现在高很多的通货膨胀率，那时候紧缩货币会变成不得已的措施。必须在短期大幅度经济增长而后遭受经济危机和现在就遭受更严重的熊市之间做出选择。
《巴伦周刊》：他们会如何选择？
朱洛夫：崛起的经济体会选择比较缓和的方式。他们不想现在就面对经济危机。
辛基：但是我们可以看到印度和俄罗斯的通货膨胀率达到了8%，中国达到了5%，他们还能坚持那么久吗？
朱洛夫：决定性因素在于中国，他们今年报道的通货膨胀率是5%，但实际数字很可能高出一倍。中国人非常不希望现在就陷入经济危机，国内有创造工作机会的需求。但可能出现的情况是随着中国上调两次或三次利率，美国股市会发生10%或者更多的抛售。
《巴伦周刊》：让我们听听格罗斯的意见吧。
格罗斯：发达国家正在应对过去二三十年生产、投资和消费过度的恶果。去杠杆化的过程不是一两年就能实现的。生产、投资和消费在经济结构中的比例过高以及应对它的努力都会引发一系列后果。其中之一就是经济增长放缓、通货膨胀减低。我们目睹了美国不可接受的高失业率――不是政府公布的9.4%，实际情况高达16%至17%。问题在于增加债务是不是解决债务危机的有效途径。
对葡萄牙、希腊、爱尔兰和西班牙这些无法让货币贬值的国家来说，债务危机无法被新的债务解决。目前为止，日本表现良好，相比美国他们的债务已经达到了GDP的200%到250%。美国的优势是货币储备，也就是说，美国可以通过开动印钞机来摆脱困境。但条件是债权人一方必须心甘情愿地认可美元的价值。当前的利率，包括只有0.25%的联邦基金利率都低得令人难以接受。低利率的后果之一就是实际利率已经降为负值。即使依靠印钞票来解决问题或者把破罐子继续踢下去对有些国家来说是行得通的，解决方法也绝对不是依靠纯粹制造纸张，而是创造世界其他地区切实需要的商品和服务。
《巴伦周刊》：那现在的情形是什么？
格罗斯：很不幸奥巴马政权在这一点上没有做到。政府关注的重点是消费，财政刺激会给2011年带来4%的GDP增长，但也仅限于此。这种毫无根基的甜头在2012年会迅速消失。
我们必须把重点放在就业和以制造商品和增进服务为目标的投资上。用减免税收和加速贬值的方式来激励商业行为不能实现我们的目的，因为它们无法帮助我们认清什么是商品的终极需求，以及我们自身赚取理想回报的能力。资产负债表上的现金应该被用作投资大规模的基础设施项目，比如建设高速铁路。中国就有好几百个这样的项目。美国的基础设施也需要修缮，但是截至当前，当权者似乎并不想做这方面的努力。他们更希望用税收优惠和税后利润的增长来安抚商业界。
《巴伦周刊》：不光是当权者，这种思想贯穿了整个政治领域。
朱洛夫：所有其他的发达国家毫无例外地把重点放在了减少赤字上，唯独美国还没觉得这是个问题。公共赤字在过去的10年里支撑着美国的经济。整个国家正在遭受储蓄不足和投资不足的困扰。如果政府决定用债务投资大型项目，市场将会很乐意配合，而且也会给未来创造收益并且提供工作机会。
《巴伦周刊》：可是那样赤字会更大。
朱洛夫：但债务的性质就不同了。
辛基：不再是为消费融资的债务了。
加百利：奥巴马的第一要务是如何再次当选总统。失业率对他来说非常重要，但是在一个美国出口工作机会的时代，美国人自己的竞争力又何在呢？我们的受教育程度似乎已经排到全球前二十名以外了？我们理应在研发上投入更多资金，但是未来的20年里我们应该把重点放在哪里呢？电动汽车吗？还是替代性能源？那些是中国人正在做的事。
北京正在策划软着陆，否则中国的结构性失业和经济衰退会引起政治灾难。欧洲会自我化解危机，继续向欧盟较弱的成员提供援助。美国的量化宽松计划激励了股市，但当计划终结，又会发生什么呢？奥巴马在获取商业头目和投资者信任之后向政权中心又迈进了一步。美国经济平稳，欧洲得过且过，中国将会增长7%，8%或者9%，然后就到了2012年，一切看起来不错。
我们将迎来房地产市场的复苏。因为我们去年大约建造了50万套新房，而需求量在120万上下。2011年美国的新车销量会增加100万―115万辆，全球制造量将会增长2000万辆。其中，700万辆新车将会由中国生产，500万辆在美国。在发达世界，货币宽松政策会创造强大的需求。
《巴伦周刊》：当然这一切的猜想还没有实现，或许也不会成真。
科恩：我们展开了两种讨论。一种是短期的。普遍的理解是2011年对美国经济来说是形势较好的一年，也可能是自2004-2005年以来最好的一年。GDP将会增长3.5%，也可能出现短期内猛烈的增长势头，但如何收尾也同样重要。商业领域的优势甚至在经济衰退结束之前就显现了。设备仪器比如IT方面的商业投资变得强有力。我们目睹了美国出口的活力重现。
它们同时也是经济危机之前增速最快的经济板块，平均年增长可以达到8%至10%，现在它们又回来了。我们正在全世界范畴内出售商业设备以及其他高附加值的产品和服务。
加百利：还有玉米、面粉和豆类。
科恩：同时消费者也归队了，工薪阶层看到了收入的增加。储蓄率上升到5%-6%，消费增长率也比较乐观。但同时也存在第二种讨论，是关于结构性的长远问题。美国大部分失业问题是结构性的，并且在金融危机前就出现了。而教育赤字也已经持续了10年之久。
巴伦周刊》：但美国在科学领域获得了许多诺贝尔奖，你有没有把这个考虑在内？
科恩：我们拥有全世界顶尖的大学和研究生体系。但许多普通工人都没能参与进来。持有4年制大学学位的美国人口比率10年来成上升态势。美国人的受教育程度曾经位列全球第一。但现在许多国家超越了我们。深入一点的调查告诉我们，年轻女性获取4年制大学学位的几率在过去的10年内有所上升，但是年轻男性的几率却有所下降。从10年前开始，许多年轻男人直接进入建筑和制造业工作。当经济衰退来临，我们看到的是男女之间失业率的显著差别。
在美国，不仅大学毕业的人群性别值得注意，人们所学专业也说明了问题。获取科学、技术、工程和数学相关专业学位的学生数量在过去的10到15年间显著地下降。同时，金融危机爆发之前的10年间，中产阶级家庭的收入下降了4%。而蓝领工人阶层下降了8%。但没人能强迫别人学数学。
麦卡拉斯特：可美国取得了巨大的科学进步。看看你们用的那些电子设备。
辛基：但是科技公司雇佣不到足够的合格美国人，学校没能培养出足够的科学和工程类人才。
科恩：美国的科学、应用科学、数学和工程学博士项目全球拔尖，然而70％攻读此类学位的学生都不是美国公民。长期以来，这种形式体现了美国援助国外学子和联络国际友谊的精神，现今这些学生在印度、中国和其他地方找到了就业机会。
谢夫: 美国本土的制造业就业机会日益朝着僧多粥少的趋势发展。原因是在中国和印度制造东西比在美国本土要便宜得多。这是现实，不会改变了。
格罗斯：公司法人可能正处于掌握统治权力的巅峰。他们对劳动力的统治体现在他们有向海外出口工作和生产力的能力。他们对华盛顿的掌控体现在共和党人的选举胜利。
他们的势力甚至蔓延到了最高法院。证据就是最高法院最近取消的公司向选举阵营捐赠的限制。这对市场来说是好消息，但对商业领域的长远发展来说却不是。
朱洛夫：美国也存在严重的社会分层。20%的人口拥有93%的金融资产。这告诉我们普通人的生活结构较差。他们消费自己创造的财富，到了月底他就所剩无几了。
麦卡拉斯特：我不认为普通人的生活有那么糟糕，政府在帮助他们。而且股市也会表现良好，投资股票并不需要太多钱。
布莱克：我们应该担心的另一个问题是去年140亿美元的财政赤字仅仅净增加了50万个工作机会。财政政策没能让我们的投入得到同等的回报。同时，有1050万人的家庭资产为负。
《巴伦周刊》：马克，你一直保持沉默，你对经济形势有什么顾虑吗？
法伯：难道没人认为应该让市场自我更正吗？美国金融危机的爆发很大程度上是因为25年前开始的政府干预。政府接连不断地抛出促进消费的政策，但人人心里都明白只有推行那些有助于形成资本的政策，即投资基础设施、研发中心、教育以及建造工厂和设备制造，经济才能平稳地发展。资助棒球比赛，电视节目，或者谈话节目对塑造活跃的、欣欣向荣的经济体没有帮助。
《巴伦周刊》：但是政府并没有主观上增加棒球比赛的数量。
法伯：但政府让借钱变得容易了。通过推行低利率，政府行为造成了巨大的信用泡沫。
《巴伦周刊》：当真是美联储错了？
法伯：美联储在1913年成立，之前十九世纪的主题是强有力的人均收入增长和通货紧缩的大环境。
《巴伦周刊》：但也存在巨大的金融恐慌。
法伯：金融恐慌激励了经济体系。同时历史显示，大国濒临衰弱时往往是非常危险的，因为它们陷入了绝望的情绪里。但是今年美国经济将会趋于稳定，增长平缓。
还有，美联储珍妮特.耶伦一年前表示声明如果有可能，她将支持实际利率为负。她的表述十分重要，因为这暗示着美联储会继续让实际利率为负，正如我们见到的一样。负利率意味着剥削以及破坏货币的某些功能：储存价值和计数单位的功能。如果你用金子而不是美元来衡量股市，它从1999年开始下跌了80%。我不再认为美元是有效的计数单位。人们不应该用美元来评估他们的财富，因为总有一天每个人都是亿万富翁
格罗斯：我在许多问题上和麦克意见一致，但也不是所有问题。我无从判断美国是否已经濒临绝望，但是用人单位、汽车行业和政策制定都散发着绝望的气息。我们的讨论还没有涉及债务拖欠，但是可以肯定的是，年复一年通货膨胀率的加速增长剥削了投资者和劳动者的实际薪酬和收入。我们面对的是一种相对于其他债务程度更低、增长潜力更大的新兴国家的强大货币终将贬值的货币。在可预见的收益曲线的末端，我们可以看到债权人将不得不承受负利率给他们带来的损失。这本质上来说是一种债务拖欠。最终，债权人将不得不任由中央银行和决策人的摆布，遭受财产上的抢夺。
法伯：和站出来宣布"我们连债务的一半也不会付给你"相比，印更多的钞票和拖欠债务对政府来说更容易办到，正如比尔提到的那样。同时，通货紧缩和通货膨胀的倡导者正在进行着一场辩论。通货紧缩者宣称，道琼斯指数将会下跌1000点，和实际经济形势形成鲜明对比，因此人们应该持有政府债券而不是商品、资产和不动产。但是如果中国和印度保持经济增长，汽车市场表现更好，那么正如马里奥提到的，商品市场走势将会乐观。
即使是在通货紧缩的大环境下，税收下降，财政政策继续扩张。赤字不断增加。政府债券利率升高，债务质量降低。在这种灾难性的环境里，我更愿意持有的也是资产而不是政府债券。站在激进的熊市立场，我认为资产和硬资产：房地产、商品、贵金属和收藏品更值得持有。
辛基：去年8月，事情开始向坏的方向发展。随后伯南克在杰克逊霍尔发表演说，宣称美联储将推行定量宽松的货币政策，随后道琼斯指数上升了1400点；汽油价格从每加仑2.65美元上升到3美元以上，这意味着消费者要为此多支付500亿美元；食品价格也飙升至新高点。导致了经济的极大不平衡。拥有金融资产的人会安然度过，否则高昂的食品价格、保险价格以及其他消费品都将给人重重一击。储蓄得不到任何收益。塔吉特(平价连锁店)的销售在圣诞期间并不理想，而萨克斯（高端商场）的销售却非常好。这是一个很大的问题。
我们接着继续开动了印钞机。宽松的货币政策在2000年导致经济发展不均。2005年前后，低至1%的利率导致了房产泡沫和次贷危机，而现在的利率则更低。为了刺激经济，美联储不得不继续印钞。虽然截至目前事情发展顺利，但是一旦到了6月，每月1100亿美元的印钞量不再持续，事情可能就没这么乐观了。一年前，人们热火朝天地讨论如何脱困，然而正确的策略并没有出现，我们并没有着手解决结构性的经济问题。如果在6月后美联储继续印钞，我们将迎来更高的汽油价格食品价格和更大的经济不平衡，直到停止大量印钞。如果我们不关掉印钞机，美元将会彻底崩溃。我们的政策看起来让经济形势变好，但长期看来却具有毁灭性的后果。
科恩：除了马克，我们所有人都将注意力放在了成熟市场上。但是对发达经济体奏效的政策也许该与发展中经济体背道而驰。中国正在收缩信贷，印度也正在讨论这个问题。政策上的分歧模糊了不同市场和货币的前景。美元相对于某些货币会上升，而相对于另一些货币则也许会下跌。
格罗斯：美国人在面对货币问题表现出令人惊讶的简单思维。欧洲人在这个问题上一直更加成熟，因为他们必须不断地应付各种国际问题。在2011年汇率将成为选择投资区域的关键考虑因素。就像艾比说的，也许对于某些人来说美元没有问题，但是货币是衡量未来收益能力的工具。巴西的实际利率是5%到6%，其他新兴市场平均为2%、3%、4%。以货币为立足点，投资者必须寻找实际收益率较高的市场。如果单纯的美国投资者希望在全球范畴内增加竞争力，他们必须考虑得更加周全。
《巴伦周刊》：到目前为止，没人提到黄金。
辛基: 过去7年中我的一半以上的资产都投资在了黄金上。机构的黄金持有率是如此之低，甚至不足1%。
1980年的黄金价格达到了每盎司850美元的高点，黄金代表了全球包含股市、债券和货币市场的资本市场3%的价值，而现在仅有0.6%。可见黄金的价格还有很大的上升空间。
辛基: 根据《投资者才华》和其他市场情绪指标，人们对股市有强烈的期许。但是黄金则不同，赫伯特黄金类投资情绪指数在下降。但是黄金股票的回暖已经处于酝酿阶段。去年，小型金矿股指数基金的成长是黄金矿业的两倍。矿业股票被低估了。
高铁为谁捍卫高票价
- 2011-1-29 文章来源于《证券市场周刊》证券市场周刊订阅
- 2009年末，铁道部负债总额已达13033.86亿元，要支付的利息达400亿元以上，未来有可能超过1000亿元。中国高铁建设债务不同于财政负债，不同于国企贷款，是变成了财政负担的企业负债。中国高铁显然希望占据政治和经济的双边利益。
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【《证券市场周刊》特约作者 赵岩】中国铁路进入了高铁时代，而这个新时代，显然没能成为老春运的福音。
一边是一如既往的一票难求，一边是雷打不动的分毫不减。当高票价成为运输需求跨不过去的高门槛，高铁到底是为谁捍卫高票价？为政治？为经济？
不得不说的是，只要高铁仍在空驶，从任何一个角度讲，都将不合逻辑，都会成为高铁的败笔。
中国高铁是投资人眼中绝对的明星，因为它具备政治、经济双重特殊地位。它是中国少数通过引进吸收与创新、全面掌握核心技术的产业；也号称是中国少数能系统向国际市场出口、并拥有相对竞争优势的制造业领域。
因此，似乎可以堂而皇之地说，谈高铁不要谈经济。但高铁却是以企业模式管理运营。何谓企业？企业是长着经济大脑的社会运行单元，顺着这个大脑的逻辑思维，航空公司才甘愿在飞机出发前以"出奇"低的票价售票，因为他们知道：空载一分不赚，降价则是能赚一分是一分，赚一分就少亏一分。
既然在商言商，借用网络流行语，高铁建出来了，运还是不运都在那里，是宁愿空驶还是降价合乎逻辑呢？不能赚钱，至少要减亏，而中国企业怎么如此特立独行？高铁在为谁的利益捍卫高票价？
从高铁收益来看无一盈利。石太客运专线第一年就亏损8亿元，2010年亏损估计接近9亿元。郑西高铁2010年2月开通全年收入预计约为6亿元，但银行贷款利息就达每年11亿元。中国第一条高速铁路客运专线京津城际铁路，2008年8月开通一年多时间内就亏损逾7亿元。有铁路研究人士预测，现存高铁收益期至少在20年以后；20年后能否盈利，还是未知。
中国高铁具有深远的政治军事意义，而政治军事从来都不是空架子，否则主权债务危机也不会成为2011年各国政府头号心头之患。既然谈政治，现代社会政治的名义是公共福祉，兼及公共福利而承受亏损也无可厚非。尤其当铁路运力不足是中国长期短板，而服务对象又恰恰是社会偏低收入人群时。而目前的亏损，却没能成就公共福利，还留下一个大窟窿，未来由谁填补？
国家审计署国外贷援款项目审计服务中心出具的《审计报告》显示，2009年末，铁道部负债总额已达惊人的13033.86亿元。而民生银行报告则显示，快速增长的债务融资规模使得铁道部门2009年支付的利息高达400亿元以上，未来有可能超过1000亿元。
中国高铁建设债务不同于财政负债，不同于国企贷款，而是显然成了财政负担的企业负债。
中国官方舆论质疑，2014年铁道部将迎来还债高峰。"偿债钱从哪来，主要从铁路建设基金，估计每年税后在500亿元左右，但2009年铁道部还本付息的资金就为733亿元，今后几年的还债规模还会继续增加。据铁路系统人士透露，铁道部有意将高铁建设的债务和股权装入一个新的资产管理公司中，通过资产抵押或者行政剥离方式，使铁道部实现自身无负债运行。这种手法与过去国有银行剥离不良资产的做法异曲同工。铁道部的负债到底是什么性质？"
高铁的企业身份于是成了要向国民牟利的同义语，政治意义则成了国民出资的代名词。"你要出钱，让我赚你的钱"，这实在是不可想象、绝无仅有的单边美妙买卖。
你到底想靠上市，圈投资人的钱？还是要靠征税，套纳税人的钱？如果是前者，你当生意做，如果是后者，就当"政治"做，而中国高铁，显然希望占据双边利益。无论政治还是经济的底线，用谁的钱，要让谁享受福利。如果对于出资者，既不算经济账，又不算政治账，只提供这样一本糊涂账，就成为一种特殊体制的怪胎。
作者毕业于北京大学国际关系学院及北京大学中国经济研究中心，现旅居美国旧金山
2011年2月18日
The honeycomb of corruption
The honeycomb of corruption
腐败之蜂巢
A little reform in the state sector has proved a dangerous thing
国营企业改革，牵一发而祸及全身
Apr 6th 2000 | from PRINT EDITION
"AT LEAST under Mao there was no corruption," sighed this correspondent's Beijing neighbour as he griped about the local police. Not because man lived in prelapsarian bliss, but because Mao's egalitarian state enforced poverty on all, so there was little wealth to steal. Even if someone managed to get hold of public assets, he would find it well-nigh impossible to turn them into cash. During the Cultural Revolution, it was often for possession of things like cigarettes and liquor that Red Guards persecuted "corrupt" high party officials.
"至少在毛泽东时代没有腐败现象，"本报记者的一位北京邻居在指摘当地警察时慨叹到。这并非由于那个时代的人纯洁无邪，而应归因于毛泽东建立的平等国度，人人贫穷，没有什么可偷的。即使有人可以掌控公共财产，但也无法将其转换成现金收入囊中。文化大革命期间，党的高级官员有香烟和酒都会被红卫兵纳入"腐败"之列。
Today, a puritanical drive against official corruption recalls those earlier days. Central leaders rail against the cancer of corruption and promise to excise it. Their indignation is echoed in the official media. An audit of embezzlement in the first half of 1999 which the central government published last August showed that some 20 billion yuan ($2.4 billion) had been diverted from the state into personal bank accounts. Another 1 billion yuan had been bilked from the pension funds of the state railways, post and telecommunications. About 6 billion yuan of pension funds from the state coal bureau had been misused. And so it goes on. Moreover, this is merely what the central government says it knows about, which is less than it should. The party's official mouthpiece, the People's Daily, says that 120 billion yuan of state funds were misused (on a wider definition) in the first half of last year—equivalent to one-fifth of the central government's tax revenues.
如今，对官员腐败的强烈愤慨让我们回想起过去。中央领导人严厉指责腐败风气，誓言一举铲除。他们的义愤填膺在官方媒体中广泛回响。中央政府于去年八月份公布的1999年上半年贪污审计显示，约200亿元（24亿美元）国家资产非法转入个人银行账户。另有约10亿元资金从国家铁路、邮政及电信企业的退休金中非法盗取。此外，国家煤炭局约60亿元退休金被滥用。腐败风气继续蔓延。而这仅是中央政府掌握的情况，相比实际，仅是冰山一角。据共产党官方喉舌《人民日报》报道，去年上半年国有资产约1200亿元被滥用（广义）——约达政府税收总额的五分之一。
Leaders promise to crack down on corrupt officials, but they face an impossible task. Very occasionally, a high official is executed to set an example. Coinciding with the annual meeting of the National People's Congress in early March, a former deputy governor of Jiangxi province, Hu Changqing, was tried for taking $650,000 in bribes, and shot for his crimes. He was the most senior official to be executed in half a century of Communist rule.
领导官员对打击腐败官员信誓旦旦，但同时也面临着一个难以逾越的艰巨任务。有时，高官被判处死刑，意欲杀鸡儆猴。今年三月初时值每年举行一次的全国人民代表大会，前江西省副省长胡长清被控受贿65万美元，并予以枪决。胡长清是共产党执政近半个世纪以来被判处死刑的最高级别官员。
"No matter what unit or person is involved in the case, we must investigate to the end. Our hand will not falter," said China's top judge at the time. Fine words, but are they true? The central leadership often publicises the misdeeds of low-ranking officials, who are described as "morally corrupt", as though they were suffering from a personality disorder, when the real problem is systemic rot. Yet corruption in high places is more difficult to tackle: if too much attention is drawn to it, the political system itself might be called into question.
"不管是哪个单位还是哪个人，只要牵扯其中，我们就一定调查到底。我们绝不会手软，"中国最高法官说。如此巧言可信以为真吗？中央领导常将低级官员的恶行公诸天下，把他们描述为"道德败坏"，好像这些人患有人格障碍一样，而实际上真正的问题是体制混乱。但是，解决高级别官员的腐败问题愈加困难：深究起来的话，要从政治体系自身寻找问题了。
The help-yourself economy
自助型经济
Take the giant smuggling racket in the coastal province of Fujian discovered last year, involving hundreds of government officials and goods worth perhaps $15 billion. Mr Zhu, the prime minister, is rumoured to have offered President Jiang Zemin his resignation last summer, furious that the case was not being pursued with sufficient zeal. News of the racket began to be aired in the foreign media. High officials in Beijing with Fujian connections were implicated. Yet when unsanctioned reports of the racket began to appear on the websites of some of the more adventurous mainland newspapers early this year, they were quickly slapped down.
去年，沿海省份福建省一起巨大走私活动被揭发，数百名政府官员牵连其中，走私物品价值约150亿美元。有传闻称，朱镕基总理已于去年夏天向江泽民主席提交辞呈，怒称该起案件未得到深入全面的调查。该起走私案件的相关新闻旋即在外国媒体中传扬开来。有些北京高级官员也卷入福建走私案中。然而今年年初，当有关该起走私案件的非官方报道见诸内地一些大胆的报刊时，却很快被压制。
The racket has the makings of China's biggest-ever corruption case. Some 400 investigators were dispatched to find out what was going on. Since then, silence. No doubt scores of local officials will be tried, and perhaps some of them executed. But because some high officials also had their snouts in the trough, this case needs to be handled with extreme delicacy. Business China, a sister publication of The Economist, forecasts that the party will eventually trundle out an official explanation, but in a way "least harmful to its interests".
此次走私大案成为有史以来中国最大的腐败案件。政府派出400名调查人员查清此案的来龙去脉。此后，腐败之风得到镇压。毫无疑问，大批地方官员将被提审，有些可能还会被判处死刑。但由于一些高官职位特殊，此案还需要谨慎处理。《经济学人》的姊妹报刊《商业中国》预测，共产党最终将给出一个官方解释，但会选择"对其利益伤害最小"的方式。
Deng Xiaoping once said it is inevitable that when you open the window, the flies come in. X.L. Ding, an economist writing in the excellent China Journal, published in Australia, prefers to take his analogies from bees. In pre-reform urban China, he says, the economy resembled a giant honeycomb of small, bounded cells of inward-looking activity. This structure had three main features. The first was state ownership, which kept things simple. The second was the supervision of state firms by the local government of wherever they were operating. In effect, local governments served as the guardians of national property. The third was that, in a command economy, there were few transactions between firms, and those few took the form of material allocations, rather than monetary exchange.
邓小平曾经说过，当你打开窗户时，不可能没有苍蝇趁机飞进来。经济学家丁学良（为在澳大利亚发行的著名刊物《中国期刊》撰稿）喜欢拿蜜蜂作类比。他说，改革前的中国经济好比一个巨大的蜂巢，一个个小蜂孔界限分明，秩序井然，经营各自的活动。这种结果有三大特点。第一个就是国家所有，这种方式处理事情最简单。第二个是当地政府对当地国有企业的监督。事实上，各地方政府充当守卫者的角色，保护国家财产。第三个是，在指令经济中，各企业之间的业务往来少之又少，有业务往来的也属于物质分配，而非货币交换。
All this changed with reforms that have brought great complexity to the state sector's relations, both internal and with the outside world. Once the boundaries between formerly separate cells of economic activity get blurred, the government's chain of control over its vast stock of national assets becomes paralysed. The result, says Mr Ding, is that "managers of Chinese state firms essentially have ended up capturing a sizeable portion of the widely scattered public property."
改革随即改变了一切，使国有企业的关系变得复杂起来，无论是对内还是对外。一旦这些之前各自独立的经济活动体之间的界限变得模糊，政府对国家巨额资产的控制链就会瘫痪。丁学良先生说，其结果就是"中国国有企业的管理层吞噬高度分散的巨额公共财产。"
That makes it hard to argue that 20 years of Chinese market-oriented "reforms" to the state sector have really succeeded. They started in the 1980s with the introduction of the "contract-responsibility" system that allowed enterprises to sell their goods for profit in the open market once they had fulfilled their quota under the plan. It was the cue for quantities of state goods to leave the factory by the back door, with the proceeds kept by the managers. For much of the 1990s, modern "scientific" management was praised, and managers were given more autonomy to generate profits. They were not, however, penalised for racking up losses, which remained the state's responsibility. Unscrupulous managers have been able to milk their companies' assets through shell companies and subsidiaries.
这一点很难让人信服中国20年的面向市场的"改革"对于国企而言算得上成功之举。面向市场的改革始于20世纪80年代，届时"承包责任制"也开始建立，允许企业在完成计划配额的前提下，向开放市场销售自己的产品，以获得利润。这正是大量国有产品通过后门流出工厂的祸根，整个过程都在管理层的掌控之中。到了90年代，现代"科学"管理方法得到赞扬，同时赋予管理层更多自主权创造利润。然而，他们却不必为造成的损失受责，这些损失都由国家一力承担。这样一来，寡廉鲜耻的管理者们就能通过空壳公司和附属公司榨取公司资产了。
New milking opportunities presented themselves with the Communist Party's endorsement in 1997 of a "shareholding system" that would allow small and medium-sized state firms to be turned into companies with mixed public and (sometimes majority) private ownership. Small state firms were soon being privatised at a frantic pace. Managers would often bully workers into buying shares, forming nominal "collectives" to disguise what was going on. When the central government tried to slow down the process, outside observers said China's leaders were backtracking on reform. More likely they realised, horror-struck, how easily state assets were being pilfered.
随着1997年共产党鼓励实施"股份制"，允许中小型国有企业转变成混合所有制公司（大多数为私有），新的榨取机会应运而生。小型国有企业迅速私有化。管理层常常勒令工人购买股份，形成名义上的"集体所有"，以此掩人耳目。当中央政府试图放缓改革进程时，外界观察家们又会指摘中国领导人无意将改革进行到底。可能是他们惊恐地意识到，偷窃国有资产是如此的轻而易举。
Reforms have not been as disastrous as in Russia, where the theft of state assets is an honoured pursuit; on the other hand, Russia launched a full-blown programme of privatisation, which China is wary of copying. So Chinese officials and managers have had to use more imaginative alchemy to turn state assets into private property. But whatever the method, says Mr Ding, what has been done to transform national assets into private wealth in China is little different from what Ferdinand Marcos did in the Philippines, or what ex-President Suharto's cronies did in Indonesia. That should be a warning to China's Communist rulers.
相比之下，中国的改革还没有像俄国的改革那样糟糕,在俄国,偷窃国有资产的行为是一件引以为荣的事情；另一方面，俄国全面展开私营化改革，这让中国万般谨慎，不敢轻易效仿。因此中国官员和管理者们只得绞尽脑针，充分发挥想象，将国有资产转换为私有财产。但是丁学良先生说，无论采取何种手段，这种将国有资产转换为私有财产的行径都无异于马可仕对菲律宾、甚或前总统苏哈托亲信在印度尼西亚的所作所为。这为中国共产党的执政敲响了警钟。
To be fair, it is not just because of corruption that China's shrinking state sector, now making up less than half of the economy and falling, contributes a disproportionately large and rising share of the country's problems. Even where there is no overt corruption, state ownership involves a wasteful allocation of resources. The reforms have left the state industrial sector with a mess of renegade government agencies and unco-ordinated, or unenforced, regulations. Edward Steinfeld*, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, describes it as "something of a Dodge City atmosphere. There are few rules, few responsibilities, strong preying on the weak, and a tremendous amount of waste."
中国国有企业不断缩水，如今只占了整个经济不到一半的份额，而且规模仍在下降。国有企业经营不利导致国家问题频频出现，愈演愈烈，但公平来说，这也不完全归罪于腐败。即使腐败气焰未见浓烈，国有制自身也存在资源分配不合理等问题。改革让国有工业企业惹祸上身，变节的政府机构大幅涌现，不协调或非强制的法规比肩继踵，迎头而来。麻省理工学院的爱德华▪斯坦菲尔德将其形容为"带有一丝道奇市的气氛。法规少、责任轻，压榨弱势群体，过度浪费"。
It would be nice to wave that magic wand, privatise everything overnight, and decree a market economy into existence. But would the change of ownership help? Or might it make matters worse in an economy with few rules? As Mr Steinfeld argues, there is little point in worrying too much about who owns an economic unit before the institution of ownership itself has been firmly established.
最好是挥舞魔法棒，一夜之间将一切都私有化，然后宣布市场经济正式建立。但改变所有制就真能力挽狂澜吗？或者说，在规定甚少的经济环境下，这样做会不会雪上加霜？正如斯坦菲尔德先生说的那样，在所有制自身的体制得以牢固建立以前，一切对经济体归谁所有的担忧都是无稽之谈。
腐败之蜂巢
A little reform in the state sector has proved a dangerous thing
国营企业改革，牵一发而祸及全身
Apr 6th 2000 | from PRINT EDITION
"AT LEAST under Mao there was no corruption," sighed this correspondent's Beijing neighbour as he griped about the local police. Not because man lived in prelapsarian bliss, but because Mao's egalitarian state enforced poverty on all, so there was little wealth to steal. Even if someone managed to get hold of public assets, he would find it well-nigh impossible to turn them into cash. During the Cultural Revolution, it was often for possession of things like cigarettes and liquor that Red Guards persecuted "corrupt" high party officials.
"至少在毛泽东时代没有腐败现象，"本报记者的一位北京邻居在指摘当地警察时慨叹到。这并非由于那个时代的人纯洁无邪，而应归因于毛泽东建立的平等国度，人人贫穷，没有什么可偷的。即使有人可以掌控公共财产，但也无法将其转换成现金收入囊中。文化大革命期间，党的高级官员有香烟和酒都会被红卫兵纳入"腐败"之列。
Today, a puritanical drive against official corruption recalls those earlier days. Central leaders rail against the cancer of corruption and promise to excise it. Their indignation is echoed in the official media. An audit of embezzlement in the first half of 1999 which the central government published last August showed that some 20 billion yuan ($2.4 billion) had been diverted from the state into personal bank accounts. Another 1 billion yuan had been bilked from the pension funds of the state railways, post and telecommunications. About 6 billion yuan of pension funds from the state coal bureau had been misused. And so it goes on. Moreover, this is merely what the central government says it knows about, which is less than it should. The party's official mouthpiece, the People's Daily, says that 120 billion yuan of state funds were misused (on a wider definition) in the first half of last year—equivalent to one-fifth of the central government's tax revenues.
如今，对官员腐败的强烈愤慨让我们回想起过去。中央领导人严厉指责腐败风气，誓言一举铲除。他们的义愤填膺在官方媒体中广泛回响。中央政府于去年八月份公布的1999年上半年贪污审计显示，约200亿元（24亿美元）国家资产非法转入个人银行账户。另有约10亿元资金从国家铁路、邮政及电信企业的退休金中非法盗取。此外，国家煤炭局约60亿元退休金被滥用。腐败风气继续蔓延。而这仅是中央政府掌握的情况，相比实际，仅是冰山一角。据共产党官方喉舌《人民日报》报道，去年上半年国有资产约1200亿元被滥用（广义）——约达政府税收总额的五分之一。
Leaders promise to crack down on corrupt officials, but they face an impossible task. Very occasionally, a high official is executed to set an example. Coinciding with the annual meeting of the National People's Congress in early March, a former deputy governor of Jiangxi province, Hu Changqing, was tried for taking $650,000 in bribes, and shot for his crimes. He was the most senior official to be executed in half a century of Communist rule.
领导官员对打击腐败官员信誓旦旦，但同时也面临着一个难以逾越的艰巨任务。有时，高官被判处死刑，意欲杀鸡儆猴。今年三月初时值每年举行一次的全国人民代表大会，前江西省副省长胡长清被控受贿65万美元，并予以枪决。胡长清是共产党执政近半个世纪以来被判处死刑的最高级别官员。
"No matter what unit or person is involved in the case, we must investigate to the end. Our hand will not falter," said China's top judge at the time. Fine words, but are they true? The central leadership often publicises the misdeeds of low-ranking officials, who are described as "morally corrupt", as though they were suffering from a personality disorder, when the real problem is systemic rot. Yet corruption in high places is more difficult to tackle: if too much attention is drawn to it, the political system itself might be called into question.
"不管是哪个单位还是哪个人，只要牵扯其中，我们就一定调查到底。我们绝不会手软，"中国最高法官说。如此巧言可信以为真吗？中央领导常将低级官员的恶行公诸天下，把他们描述为"道德败坏"，好像这些人患有人格障碍一样，而实际上真正的问题是体制混乱。但是，解决高级别官员的腐败问题愈加困难：深究起来的话，要从政治体系自身寻找问题了。
The help-yourself economy
自助型经济
Take the giant smuggling racket in the coastal province of Fujian discovered last year, involving hundreds of government officials and goods worth perhaps $15 billion. Mr Zhu, the prime minister, is rumoured to have offered President Jiang Zemin his resignation last summer, furious that the case was not being pursued with sufficient zeal. News of the racket began to be aired in the foreign media. High officials in Beijing with Fujian connections were implicated. Yet when unsanctioned reports of the racket began to appear on the websites of some of the more adventurous mainland newspapers early this year, they were quickly slapped down.
去年，沿海省份福建省一起巨大走私活动被揭发，数百名政府官员牵连其中，走私物品价值约150亿美元。有传闻称，朱镕基总理已于去年夏天向江泽民主席提交辞呈，怒称该起案件未得到深入全面的调查。该起走私案件的相关新闻旋即在外国媒体中传扬开来。有些北京高级官员也卷入福建走私案中。然而今年年初，当有关该起走私案件的非官方报道见诸内地一些大胆的报刊时，却很快被压制。
The racket has the makings of China's biggest-ever corruption case. Some 400 investigators were dispatched to find out what was going on. Since then, silence. No doubt scores of local officials will be tried, and perhaps some of them executed. But because some high officials also had their snouts in the trough, this case needs to be handled with extreme delicacy. Business China, a sister publication of The Economist, forecasts that the party will eventually trundle out an official explanation, but in a way "least harmful to its interests".
此次走私大案成为有史以来中国最大的腐败案件。政府派出400名调查人员查清此案的来龙去脉。此后，腐败之风得到镇压。毫无疑问，大批地方官员将被提审，有些可能还会被判处死刑。但由于一些高官职位特殊，此案还需要谨慎处理。《经济学人》的姊妹报刊《商业中国》预测，共产党最终将给出一个官方解释，但会选择"对其利益伤害最小"的方式。
Deng Xiaoping once said it is inevitable that when you open the window, the flies come in. X.L. Ding, an economist writing in the excellent China Journal, published in Australia, prefers to take his analogies from bees. In pre-reform urban China, he says, the economy resembled a giant honeycomb of small, bounded cells of inward-looking activity. This structure had three main features. The first was state ownership, which kept things simple. The second was the supervision of state firms by the local government of wherever they were operating. In effect, local governments served as the guardians of national property. The third was that, in a command economy, there were few transactions between firms, and those few took the form of material allocations, rather than monetary exchange.
邓小平曾经说过，当你打开窗户时，不可能没有苍蝇趁机飞进来。经济学家丁学良（为在澳大利亚发行的著名刊物《中国期刊》撰稿）喜欢拿蜜蜂作类比。他说，改革前的中国经济好比一个巨大的蜂巢，一个个小蜂孔界限分明，秩序井然，经营各自的活动。这种结果有三大特点。第一个就是国家所有，这种方式处理事情最简单。第二个是当地政府对当地国有企业的监督。事实上，各地方政府充当守卫者的角色，保护国家财产。第三个是，在指令经济中，各企业之间的业务往来少之又少，有业务往来的也属于物质分配，而非货币交换。
All this changed with reforms that have brought great complexity to the state sector's relations, both internal and with the outside world. Once the boundaries between formerly separate cells of economic activity get blurred, the government's chain of control over its vast stock of national assets becomes paralysed. The result, says Mr Ding, is that "managers of Chinese state firms essentially have ended up capturing a sizeable portion of the widely scattered public property."
改革随即改变了一切，使国有企业的关系变得复杂起来，无论是对内还是对外。一旦这些之前各自独立的经济活动体之间的界限变得模糊，政府对国家巨额资产的控制链就会瘫痪。丁学良先生说，其结果就是"中国国有企业的管理层吞噬高度分散的巨额公共财产。"
That makes it hard to argue that 20 years of Chinese market-oriented "reforms" to the state sector have really succeeded. They started in the 1980s with the introduction of the "contract-responsibility" system that allowed enterprises to sell their goods for profit in the open market once they had fulfilled their quota under the plan. It was the cue for quantities of state goods to leave the factory by the back door, with the proceeds kept by the managers. For much of the 1990s, modern "scientific" management was praised, and managers were given more autonomy to generate profits. They were not, however, penalised for racking up losses, which remained the state's responsibility. Unscrupulous managers have been able to milk their companies' assets through shell companies and subsidiaries.
这一点很难让人信服中国20年的面向市场的"改革"对于国企而言算得上成功之举。面向市场的改革始于20世纪80年代，届时"承包责任制"也开始建立，允许企业在完成计划配额的前提下，向开放市场销售自己的产品，以获得利润。这正是大量国有产品通过后门流出工厂的祸根，整个过程都在管理层的掌控之中。到了90年代，现代"科学"管理方法得到赞扬，同时赋予管理层更多自主权创造利润。然而，他们却不必为造成的损失受责，这些损失都由国家一力承担。这样一来，寡廉鲜耻的管理者们就能通过空壳公司和附属公司榨取公司资产了。
New milking opportunities presented themselves with the Communist Party's endorsement in 1997 of a "shareholding system" that would allow small and medium-sized state firms to be turned into companies with mixed public and (sometimes majority) private ownership. Small state firms were soon being privatised at a frantic pace. Managers would often bully workers into buying shares, forming nominal "collectives" to disguise what was going on. When the central government tried to slow down the process, outside observers said China's leaders were backtracking on reform. More likely they realised, horror-struck, how easily state assets were being pilfered.
随着1997年共产党鼓励实施"股份制"，允许中小型国有企业转变成混合所有制公司（大多数为私有），新的榨取机会应运而生。小型国有企业迅速私有化。管理层常常勒令工人购买股份，形成名义上的"集体所有"，以此掩人耳目。当中央政府试图放缓改革进程时，外界观察家们又会指摘中国领导人无意将改革进行到底。可能是他们惊恐地意识到，偷窃国有资产是如此的轻而易举。
Reforms have not been as disastrous as in Russia, where the theft of state assets is an honoured pursuit; on the other hand, Russia launched a full-blown programme of privatisation, which China is wary of copying. So Chinese officials and managers have had to use more imaginative alchemy to turn state assets into private property. But whatever the method, says Mr Ding, what has been done to transform national assets into private wealth in China is little different from what Ferdinand Marcos did in the Philippines, or what ex-President Suharto's cronies did in Indonesia. That should be a warning to China's Communist rulers.
相比之下，中国的改革还没有像俄国的改革那样糟糕,在俄国,偷窃国有资产的行为是一件引以为荣的事情；另一方面，俄国全面展开私营化改革，这让中国万般谨慎，不敢轻易效仿。因此中国官员和管理者们只得绞尽脑针，充分发挥想象，将国有资产转换为私有财产。但是丁学良先生说，无论采取何种手段，这种将国有资产转换为私有财产的行径都无异于马可仕对菲律宾、甚或前总统苏哈托亲信在印度尼西亚的所作所为。这为中国共产党的执政敲响了警钟。
To be fair, it is not just because of corruption that China's shrinking state sector, now making up less than half of the economy and falling, contributes a disproportionately large and rising share of the country's problems. Even where there is no overt corruption, state ownership involves a wasteful allocation of resources. The reforms have left the state industrial sector with a mess of renegade government agencies and unco-ordinated, or unenforced, regulations. Edward Steinfeld*, of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, describes it as "something of a Dodge City atmosphere. There are few rules, few responsibilities, strong preying on the weak, and a tremendous amount of waste."
中国国有企业不断缩水，如今只占了整个经济不到一半的份额，而且规模仍在下降。国有企业经营不利导致国家问题频频出现，愈演愈烈，但公平来说，这也不完全归罪于腐败。即使腐败气焰未见浓烈，国有制自身也存在资源分配不合理等问题。改革让国有工业企业惹祸上身，变节的政府机构大幅涌现，不协调或非强制的法规比肩继踵，迎头而来。麻省理工学院的爱德华▪斯坦菲尔德将其形容为"带有一丝道奇市的气氛。法规少、责任轻，压榨弱势群体，过度浪费"。
It would be nice to wave that magic wand, privatise everything overnight, and decree a market economy into existence. But would the change of ownership help? Or might it make matters worse in an economy with few rules? As Mr Steinfeld argues, there is little point in worrying too much about who owns an economic unit before the institution of ownership itself has been firmly established.
最好是挥舞魔法棒，一夜之间将一切都私有化，然后宣布市场经济正式建立。但改变所有制就真能力挽狂澜吗？或者说，在规定甚少的经济环境下，这样做会不会雪上加霜？正如斯坦菲尔德先生说的那样，在所有制自身的体制得以牢固建立以前，一切对经济体归谁所有的担忧都是无稽之谈。
Wordplay for the Chinese New Year
Wordplay for the Chinese New Year
中国新年的文字游戏
Punnest weekend ever
一个双关至极的周末
Feb 11th 2011, 13:26 by A.T. | HONG KONG
UNMERCIFULLY, The Economist works straight through the Chinese New Year. Most of Hong Kong however, including the office tower in which we keep our bureau, closes for a four-day weekend. So for a change of pace, I worked from home, in a decidedly traditional village, 45 minutes from the main business district. As I had learned a year ago, soon after I moved to greater China, this village is a noisy place to spend the New Year—think gongs and firecrackers, day and night—but also festive, friendly and colourful.
真不厚道，经济学人在中国农历新年期间要照常工作。香港的大部分地区，包括我们局所在的办公大楼全都停业放一个四天长周末。于是，我调剂了一下生活节奏，从家里上班。我住在一个显然还保留着传统乡俗的村庄里，离主要商业区45分钟路程。一年前刚到中国香港不久，我便尝到了在这个村里过年的那份喧闹非常的滋味：锣鼓声和爆竹声，不分昼夜此起彼落；同时，这里也缤纷多彩，洋溢着节庆祥和的气氛。
And a punny place too? The punniest place I'd ever imagined? What a difference a year of studying Chinese makes. As it turns out, corny visual puns are the order of the day, or the entire first month, of chūnjié, the spring festival. Nearly every bit of decoration, food and gesture seems to be infected in some way with punnery. I had long thought of myself as being tolerant, when it comes to puns anyway. But this particular form, the heterographic homophone, can quickly turn into something like Chinese water torture [sic].
它还是一个双关语之地？ 甚至是我想象中的双关语最高境地？一年的中文学习让我眼界大开，结果我领教了落套的视觉双关语游戏，它们成了每天以至整个正月的特色大餐，全部围着chūnjié（春节）打转。几乎每一种装饰、食品和手势都多少传染了类似的玩法。我一直以为自己的忍受力已经够强韧了，尤其在牵涉到双关语的时候，但频遇这种谐音异形字的形式，能很快让你像遭遇中国水刑一样。
Start with the orange trees, which are everywhere. Really they're tangerines (or "mandarins", but let's set that word aside) which is important. They're pretty, standing at nearly every door's threshold and on village corners, short or tall, with straight trunks, waxy green leaves and bursting with bright fruit. I bought one last year, thinking it was in season. I was disappointed at how quickly it died. But I had missed the point. The joke goes like this: tangerines are are 橘, pronounced jú or júzi in Mandarin Chinese. (That accent mark means that the syllable is pronounced with a rising tone.) So it sounds something like jí, which is how you pronounce 吉, which means "good luck". The sounds are different in Cantonese, the local tongue, but the pun works the same way.
先从橘子树说起吧。触目所及，四处皆是橘子树。它们实际上是柑子（或者是"桔子"，且别管它了），关键是橘。橘树很好看，放在几乎每家每户的门槛旁边和街边村角之处，有矮有高，挺直的树干上满是油亮的绿叶和累累果实。去年我也买了一株，以为正值旺季时期，没想它很快就枯死了，我还为此闷闷不乐。其实，是我未领略其中的奥妙。它的双关是这么解读的：tangerines就是橘，发音为jú 或者 júzi（字母上的符号表示音节发音为升调）。听起来好像jí，就跟你说"吉"的声音一样。吉的意思是"好运气"，用粤语发音不一样，但即使按照本地的粤语口音，所表示的双关意思是相同的。
This formula can be applied ad infinitum to explain nearly every visible or edible emblem of this holiday. Chrysanthemums are everywhere and they look fine. That's not the point. They are 菊花, júhuā. Get it? My secret Santa at the office new year party gave me a pair of embroidered fish ornaments, which would've looked cute on a Christmas tree. But their purpose is to be "double fish" or double 魚, shuāngyú, which sounds like 雙餘, which means "double bounty". This goes on and on.
这一公式可以被拿来重复解释几乎所有可见可食的节日象征物品。满街满园的菊花十分赏心悦目，但这并不是重点。关键在于它们叫菊花，júhuā。明白了吗？我的神秘圣诞老人在办公室新年派对上送了我一对绣花鱼挂饰，把它们挂在圣诞树上一定很可爱。但它们的主要含义在"双鱼"上，shuāngyú与雙餘同音，取"双份余粮【年终奖金】"之意。诸如此类，不胜枚举。
Chinese is brimming with puns in part because it has so few sounds. There are only 400-some syllables in the first place, which can be intoned in four or five ways each, at a maximum. But that understates the potential for mischief. Most special about the Chinese language to the mind of this rank beginner is that every single syllable is susceptible to semantic interpretation. I believe that my colleague, who thinks that the Chinese could abandon their characters in favour of a phonetic writing system, is missing something important here, but I am happy to leave that heady debate to the experts. (See, for example, " Protocols of Designing Pun Rebuses: Revisiting the Triple Interface of Image, Morphology, and Phonology". I'm on holiday.)
中国话里充满了双关语，部分原因是它的发音非常有限。汉语原本只有400多个音节，每个音节有四种或至多五种声调。不过，可别低估了它足以让你崩溃的能力。以我这个彻头彻尾初学者的感受来看，汉语最特别的地方就是每个音节都可能有多种语义。我一同事认为中国人不如放弃汉字，另择语音文字系统来取代。我相信他错过了非常重要的东西。不过，我还是宁愿把这个头痛的问题留给专家们讨论，（比如在这本《设计双关字画的规程：再论图象、形态和音韵三学交叉接口》书中的论述。本人正度假呢）。
The lion dancers (pictured at the top of this post) sashay to loud musical accompaniment from house to house through the village, stopping to collect lai see, red envelopes with banknotes tucked inside, before devouring a head of romaine lettuce hanging from a bamboo stick. Why romaine? Because that's , or shēngcài, which sounds something like 生財, which means "making money".
舞狮队员（见文首插图）随着震耳欲聋的伴奏音乐踩着方步，在村里走东家串西家，遇到"利是"（夹着钞票的红包）便停下来收集，然后(让"狮子")吞掉挂在竹竿上的生菜头。为何生菜？因为shēngcài听起来与 "生财"同音，意思是"赚钱"。
Speaking of wealth there's a character that shows up everywhere, year round, but especially this week. It's 福, pronounced fú, meaning "wealth" or "good fortune". But now I'm seeing it turned upside down. There's a ramshackle gambling den on my street whose fú sign has always hung upside down; I thought it had slipped. But they're just playing with 福. Fúdàole, or 福倒了, means literally "fortune upside down". It also happens to sound just like 福到達, or "fortune has arrived." (Perversely, the gambling den has righted its sign, just this week, but I guess the same pun works in reverse.) Golden images of bats adorn older doorframes. These could be called 金蝠, jīnfú, which sounds like "golden fortune", though my Beijinger tutor denies it.
说到财富，还有一个字一年四季到处有得见，本周尤其多。这就是"福"字，音fú，意思是"财富"或 "好运气"。但现在它被倒了过来。在我住的这条街上有家简陋的赌坊，它家的福字一直倒挂着。我还以为它歪掉了。其实人家只是在戏弄"福"字。 Fúdàole或福倒了，字面意思就是"财富倒了"，也恰好与"福到达"、"财富已到" 同音。（就在本周，赌坊一反惯常，挂正了"福"字。我猜同样的双关语正过来也说得通）。在陈旧的门框上，人们用黄金蝙蝠图来装饰。它们被称作金蝠，jīnfú，听来像"金富"，虽然我的北京老师不同意。
No one offered me a dish of golden fried bat, and I have nothing against romaine lettuce, but it was at the special holiday menu that I had my fill of this wordplay. My local noodle shop had a special sheet of expensive New Year's delicacies to choose from, this week only. A couple of them were even good, but most were perplexing: lots of leafy greens, because "-vegetable" is always going to sound like "-money", but also the 髮菜, a moss that grows on grassroots and is not very edible at all but does sound like "make money", and oyster fermented in soya, not for flavour's sake but so that it can be háochĭ, which sounds like characters that mean "well being". There must have been 30 items on this menu, and only by dint of the crap shoot were any worth eating. (Local friends warned me.)
并没有人给我来一盘油炸金蝙蝠，我一向也不讨厌生菜。只是当看到一份节日特餐菜单时，我算被这种文字游戏彻底填腻了。我常去的一家本地面点小吃推出了新年特色菜供顾客挑选，时间仅限于本周。其中除了一两样口味还不错之外，多数却令人费解：大量的绿叶蔬菜也罢了，因为"蔬菜"永远听起来与"钱"相近。但是"发菜"？发菜是一种沿草根衍生的青苔，一点儿也不美味，可它的发音像"发财"。还有酱油腌牡蛎，这道菜不是吃它的口味，而是为了háochĭ，发音与"好时"的字音相似。这份菜单上起码开了30道菜，哪道好吃则全凭掷骰子来碰运气了（当地朋友如是警告说）。
The pomelo is a good-luck fruit, year round, and if that's because of a pun I don't want to know it. I was not displeased to learn that recent efforts to cross-breed the pomelo with the tangerine—so as to make a "big 橘", dàjú, or "big luck"—have resulted in such a tough and bland fruit that vendors don't bother selling it. Not even for New Year's.
柚子是带来"好运"的水果，此兆头是不分时令的。如果这也出自某种双关，我已经不想知道了。最近听说有人把柚子和橘子进行杂交，培育"大橘"，dàjú 表示"大运"，结果长出了又硬又没口味的水果，即使在新年节日期间也没有水果店愿意进货销售。对此，我并不感到惋惜。
中国新年的文字游戏
Punnest weekend ever
一个双关至极的周末
Feb 11th 2011, 13:26 by A.T. | HONG KONG
UNMERCIFULLY, The Economist works straight through the Chinese New Year. Most of Hong Kong however, including the office tower in which we keep our bureau, closes for a four-day weekend. So for a change of pace, I worked from home, in a decidedly traditional village, 45 minutes from the main business district. As I had learned a year ago, soon after I moved to greater China, this village is a noisy place to spend the New Year—think gongs and firecrackers, day and night—but also festive, friendly and colourful.
真不厚道，经济学人在中国农历新年期间要照常工作。香港的大部分地区，包括我们局所在的办公大楼全都停业放一个四天长周末。于是，我调剂了一下生活节奏，从家里上班。我住在一个显然还保留着传统乡俗的村庄里，离主要商业区45分钟路程。一年前刚到中国香港不久，我便尝到了在这个村里过年的那份喧闹非常的滋味：锣鼓声和爆竹声，不分昼夜此起彼落；同时，这里也缤纷多彩，洋溢着节庆祥和的气氛。
And a punny place too? The punniest place I'd ever imagined? What a difference a year of studying Chinese makes. As it turns out, corny visual puns are the order of the day, or the entire first month, of chūnjié, the spring festival. Nearly every bit of decoration, food and gesture seems to be infected in some way with punnery. I had long thought of myself as being tolerant, when it comes to puns anyway. But this particular form, the heterographic homophone, can quickly turn into something like Chinese water torture [sic].
它还是一个双关语之地？ 甚至是我想象中的双关语最高境地？一年的中文学习让我眼界大开，结果我领教了落套的视觉双关语游戏，它们成了每天以至整个正月的特色大餐，全部围着chūnjié（春节）打转。几乎每一种装饰、食品和手势都多少传染了类似的玩法。我一直以为自己的忍受力已经够强韧了，尤其在牵涉到双关语的时候，但频遇这种谐音异形字的形式，能很快让你像遭遇中国水刑一样。
Start with the orange trees, which are everywhere. Really they're tangerines (or "mandarins", but let's set that word aside) which is important. They're pretty, standing at nearly every door's threshold and on village corners, short or tall, with straight trunks, waxy green leaves and bursting with bright fruit. I bought one last year, thinking it was in season. I was disappointed at how quickly it died. But I had missed the point. The joke goes like this: tangerines are are 橘, pronounced jú or júzi in Mandarin Chinese. (That accent mark means that the syllable is pronounced with a rising tone.) So it sounds something like jí, which is how you pronounce 吉, which means "good luck". The sounds are different in Cantonese, the local tongue, but the pun works the same way.
先从橘子树说起吧。触目所及，四处皆是橘子树。它们实际上是柑子（或者是"桔子"，且别管它了），关键是橘。橘树很好看，放在几乎每家每户的门槛旁边和街边村角之处，有矮有高，挺直的树干上满是油亮的绿叶和累累果实。去年我也买了一株，以为正值旺季时期，没想它很快就枯死了，我还为此闷闷不乐。其实，是我未领略其中的奥妙。它的双关是这么解读的：tangerines就是橘，发音为jú 或者 júzi（字母上的符号表示音节发音为升调）。听起来好像jí，就跟你说"吉"的声音一样。吉的意思是"好运气"，用粤语发音不一样，但即使按照本地的粤语口音，所表示的双关意思是相同的。
This formula can be applied ad infinitum to explain nearly every visible or edible emblem of this holiday. Chrysanthemums are everywhere and they look fine. That's not the point. They are 菊花, júhuā. Get it? My secret Santa at the office new year party gave me a pair of embroidered fish ornaments, which would've looked cute on a Christmas tree. But their purpose is to be "double fish" or double 魚, shuāngyú, which sounds like 雙餘, which means "double bounty". This goes on and on.
这一公式可以被拿来重复解释几乎所有可见可食的节日象征物品。满街满园的菊花十分赏心悦目，但这并不是重点。关键在于它们叫菊花，júhuā。明白了吗？我的神秘圣诞老人在办公室新年派对上送了我一对绣花鱼挂饰，把它们挂在圣诞树上一定很可爱。但它们的主要含义在"双鱼"上，shuāngyú与雙餘同音，取"双份余粮【年终奖金】"之意。诸如此类，不胜枚举。
Chinese is brimming with puns in part because it has so few sounds. There are only 400-some syllables in the first place, which can be intoned in four or five ways each, at a maximum. But that understates the potential for mischief. Most special about the Chinese language to the mind of this rank beginner is that every single syllable is susceptible to semantic interpretation. I believe that my colleague, who thinks that the Chinese could abandon their characters in favour of a phonetic writing system, is missing something important here, but I am happy to leave that heady debate to the experts. (See, for example, " Protocols of Designing Pun Rebuses: Revisiting the Triple Interface of Image, Morphology, and Phonology". I'm on holiday.)
中国话里充满了双关语，部分原因是它的发音非常有限。汉语原本只有400多个音节，每个音节有四种或至多五种声调。不过，可别低估了它足以让你崩溃的能力。以我这个彻头彻尾初学者的感受来看，汉语最特别的地方就是每个音节都可能有多种语义。我一同事认为中国人不如放弃汉字，另择语音文字系统来取代。我相信他错过了非常重要的东西。不过，我还是宁愿把这个头痛的问题留给专家们讨论，（比如在这本《设计双关字画的规程：再论图象、形态和音韵三学交叉接口》书中的论述。本人正度假呢）。
The lion dancers (pictured at the top of this post) sashay to loud musical accompaniment from house to house through the village, stopping to collect lai see, red envelopes with banknotes tucked inside, before devouring a head of romaine lettuce hanging from a bamboo stick. Why romaine? Because that's , or shēngcài, which sounds something like 生財, which means "making money".
舞狮队员（见文首插图）随着震耳欲聋的伴奏音乐踩着方步，在村里走东家串西家，遇到"利是"（夹着钞票的红包）便停下来收集，然后(让"狮子")吞掉挂在竹竿上的生菜头。为何生菜？因为shēngcài听起来与 "生财"同音，意思是"赚钱"。
Speaking of wealth there's a character that shows up everywhere, year round, but especially this week. It's 福, pronounced fú, meaning "wealth" or "good fortune". But now I'm seeing it turned upside down. There's a ramshackle gambling den on my street whose fú sign has always hung upside down; I thought it had slipped. But they're just playing with 福. Fúdàole, or 福倒了, means literally "fortune upside down". It also happens to sound just like 福到達, or "fortune has arrived." (Perversely, the gambling den has righted its sign, just this week, but I guess the same pun works in reverse.) Golden images of bats adorn older doorframes. These could be called 金蝠, jīnfú, which sounds like "golden fortune", though my Beijinger tutor denies it.
说到财富，还有一个字一年四季到处有得见，本周尤其多。这就是"福"字，音fú，意思是"财富"或 "好运气"。但现在它被倒了过来。在我住的这条街上有家简陋的赌坊，它家的福字一直倒挂着。我还以为它歪掉了。其实人家只是在戏弄"福"字。 Fúdàole或福倒了，字面意思就是"财富倒了"，也恰好与"福到达"、"财富已到" 同音。（就在本周，赌坊一反惯常，挂正了"福"字。我猜同样的双关语正过来也说得通）。在陈旧的门框上，人们用黄金蝙蝠图来装饰。它们被称作金蝠，jīnfú，听来像"金富"，虽然我的北京老师不同意。
No one offered me a dish of golden fried bat, and I have nothing against romaine lettuce, but it was at the special holiday menu that I had my fill of this wordplay. My local noodle shop had a special sheet of expensive New Year's delicacies to choose from, this week only. A couple of them were even good, but most were perplexing: lots of leafy greens, because "-vegetable" is always going to sound like "-money", but also the 髮菜, a moss that grows on grassroots and is not very edible at all but does sound like "make money", and oyster fermented in soya, not for flavour's sake but so that it can be háochĭ, which sounds like characters that mean "well being". There must have been 30 items on this menu, and only by dint of the crap shoot were any worth eating. (Local friends warned me.)
并没有人给我来一盘油炸金蝙蝠，我一向也不讨厌生菜。只是当看到一份节日特餐菜单时，我算被这种文字游戏彻底填腻了。我常去的一家本地面点小吃推出了新年特色菜供顾客挑选，时间仅限于本周。其中除了一两样口味还不错之外，多数却令人费解：大量的绿叶蔬菜也罢了，因为"蔬菜"永远听起来与"钱"相近。但是"发菜"？发菜是一种沿草根衍生的青苔，一点儿也不美味，可它的发音像"发财"。还有酱油腌牡蛎，这道菜不是吃它的口味，而是为了háochĭ，发音与"好时"的字音相似。这份菜单上起码开了30道菜，哪道好吃则全凭掷骰子来碰运气了（当地朋友如是警告说）。
The pomelo is a good-luck fruit, year round, and if that's because of a pun I don't want to know it. I was not displeased to learn that recent efforts to cross-breed the pomelo with the tangerine—so as to make a "big 橘", dàjú, or "big luck"—have resulted in such a tough and bland fruit that vendors don't bother selling it. Not even for New Year's.
柚子是带来"好运"的水果，此兆头是不分时令的。如果这也出自某种双关，我已经不想知道了。最近听说有人把柚子和橘子进行杂交，培育"大橘"，dàjú 表示"大运"，结果长出了又硬又没口味的水果，即使在新年节日期间也没有水果店愿意进货销售。对此，我并不感到惋惜。
Hu's counting 胡主席的“小算盘
Hu's counting 胡主席的“小算盘”
DURING his state visit to America last week, President Hu Jintao of China offered some familiar banalities and worthy pieties, as this week’s Banyan remarks. But he also made a couple of hard, quantitative claims. In a speech on January 20th, President Hu said that cheap inexpensive imports from China had saved American consumers $600 billion over the past decade (2001-2010) and that exports to China had created over 14m jobs around the world.
正如本周经济学人亚洲专栏评价的那样，在上周的美国之行中，中国国家主席胡锦涛像往常一样做了一番充满仁义道德和陈词滥调的致辞。不过这次他还做了点为数不多的强硬声明。在1月20日的演讲中，胡主席宣称，在过去的十年里（2001-2010），从中国进口的廉价商品为美国消费者省下了6000亿美元，而对中国的出口则为世界创造了超过1400万份工作。
Those figures were probably provided by the Ministry of Commerce, but I’ve no idea how they were calculated. (The figure of 14m jobs made an earlier appearance in a 2009 piece in the People’s Daily.) In this blogpost and a sequel, I’ll see if I can make sense of President Hu’s arithmetic.
这些数据倒很可能是商务部提供的，但我真搞不懂他们是怎么算出来的。（1400万份工作的数据早先就在一份2009版的人民日报中刊登过）。在这篇博客专栏和另一份续集中，我倒想对胡主席的算术水平做点深入了解。
I’ve received great help in this endeavour from Raphael Auer of the Swiss National Bank and Princeton University. In a paper* last year with Andreas Fischer, also of the Swiss National Bank, Mr Auer estimated the impact of low-wage competition on 325 American manufacturing industries—everything from cat food to artificial funeral wreaths.
在这次困难重重的计算中，普林斯顿大学和瑞士国家银行的拉斐尔•奥尔给了我巨大的帮助。在奥尔先生去年与同样来自瑞士国家银行的安德里亚斯•菲舍尔共同完成的论文里，他估算出了低薪竞争对于美国325个制造业的影响——从猫粮到葬礼花圈，无所不包。
Isolating the effect of foreign competition on prices can be tricky. If American demand goes up, for example, it will drive up prices and suck in imports. One might therefore falsely conclude that more imports equals higher prices.
在计算中隔绝外来价格竞争的影响，则极易造成疏漏。比如，假设美国市场需求突然上升，将会导致价格上涨和对进口商品的依赖。有人或许就因此错误地做出“进口越多，价格越高”这种结论。
After dealing with this problem, Messrs Auer and Fischer estimate that whenever Chinese imports increase their market share by 1 percentage point, American producer prices fall by 2.5%, a more pronounced effect than many previous studies had found.
在意识到这一问题之后，奥尔和菲舍尔两位先生计算出了比之前的研究更加确切的结论——中国的进口商品在美国市场的份额每增加1个百分点，美国生产的商品就会降价2.5%
According to Mr Auer, China claimed a 3.7% share of the average market in 2001, rising to 8.6% in 2006, when their data end. Imports from the Middle Kingdom have grown by about 28% in the four years since, even as America’s total imports have grown by only 4%. So let’s assume that China has enlarged its share of America’s manufacturing markets to 10.6%.
中国宣称其平均市场份额从2001年的百分之3.7上升至2006年统计截止时的8.6%。来自中华大地的进口量在过去的四年中增长了28%，尽管美国的总进口量只增长了4%。根据奥尔先生的结论，让我们假设中国已经将他在美国制造业的市场份额扩展到了10.6%。
That would mean that China’s penetration of American markets has increased by 6.9 percentage points from 2001 to 2010 or 0.69 points a year. If each point reduces prices by 2.5%, then this expansion has cut prices by about 1.7% a year.
这就意味着中国对美国市场的渗透从2001到2010年间增加了6.9%，相当于年平均增长0.69个百分点。如果每个百分点将引起价格下降2.5%，那么中国的这些渗透将是美国商品价格每年下降1.7%。
What does that add up to in dollars and cents? American manufacturing sales averaged $4,512 billion a year in the last decade, according to the Annual Survey of Manufactures, including over $13 billion of cat and dog food in 2005. The calculations above suggest these shipments might have cost $4,590 billion if China had failed to encroach on these markets. This implies savings of about $78 billion a year, or $780 billion over the decade.
以上这些数据对于经济有什么作用？根据制造业年检报告，在最近的十年中，美国制造业的平均销售额为每年45120亿，其中包括2005年那些超过130亿美元的猫粮和狗食。以上计算已经表明，如果中国没有成功进入这些市场的话，这些货物或许应该价值45900亿美元。这意味着每年节省了780亿美元，十年就是7800亿。
This is all heroically back-of-the-envelope stuff. But by this reckoning, President Hu’s estimate looks quite plausible, even conservative. In my next post, I’ll look at his claim that exports to China have created more than 14m jobs around the world.
这些就是所有庞大但不需复杂计算的东西。但是以这份账目来说，胡主席的估算看起来差不多对了，甚至有一点保守。在我的下一篇专栏里，我将会把焦点转移到他所说的“对中国的出口创造了超过1400万份工作”这一论断。
* "The effect of low-wage import competition on U.S. inflationary pressure," Journal of Monetary Economics, May 2010
本文资料来自“低薪产业输出竞争力对美国通胀的影响”，货币经济日报，2010年5月刊。
DURING his state visit to America last week, President Hu Jintao of China offered some familiar banalities and worthy pieties, as this week’s Banyan remarks. But he also made a couple of hard, quantitative claims. In a speech on January 20th, President Hu said that cheap inexpensive imports from China had saved American consumers $600 billion over the past decade (2001-2010) and that exports to China had created over 14m jobs around the world.
正如本周经济学人亚洲专栏评价的那样，在上周的美国之行中，中国国家主席胡锦涛像往常一样做了一番充满仁义道德和陈词滥调的致辞。不过这次他还做了点为数不多的强硬声明。在1月20日的演讲中，胡主席宣称，在过去的十年里（2001-2010），从中国进口的廉价商品为美国消费者省下了6000亿美元，而对中国的出口则为世界创造了超过1400万份工作。
Those figures were probably provided by the Ministry of Commerce, but I’ve no idea how they were calculated. (The figure of 14m jobs made an earlier appearance in a 2009 piece in the People’s Daily.) In this blogpost and a sequel, I’ll see if I can make sense of President Hu’s arithmetic.
这些数据倒很可能是商务部提供的，但我真搞不懂他们是怎么算出来的。（1400万份工作的数据早先就在一份2009版的人民日报中刊登过）。在这篇博客专栏和另一份续集中，我倒想对胡主席的算术水平做点深入了解。
I’ve received great help in this endeavour from Raphael Auer of the Swiss National Bank and Princeton University. In a paper* last year with Andreas Fischer, also of the Swiss National Bank, Mr Auer estimated the impact of low-wage competition on 325 American manufacturing industries—everything from cat food to artificial funeral wreaths.
在这次困难重重的计算中，普林斯顿大学和瑞士国家银行的拉斐尔•奥尔给了我巨大的帮助。在奥尔先生去年与同样来自瑞士国家银行的安德里亚斯•菲舍尔共同完成的论文里，他估算出了低薪竞争对于美国325个制造业的影响——从猫粮到葬礼花圈，无所不包。
Isolating the effect of foreign competition on prices can be tricky. If American demand goes up, for example, it will drive up prices and suck in imports. One might therefore falsely conclude that more imports equals higher prices.
在计算中隔绝外来价格竞争的影响，则极易造成疏漏。比如，假设美国市场需求突然上升，将会导致价格上涨和对进口商品的依赖。有人或许就因此错误地做出“进口越多，价格越高”这种结论。
After dealing with this problem, Messrs Auer and Fischer estimate that whenever Chinese imports increase their market share by 1 percentage point, American producer prices fall by 2.5%, a more pronounced effect than many previous studies had found.
在意识到这一问题之后，奥尔和菲舍尔两位先生计算出了比之前的研究更加确切的结论——中国的进口商品在美国市场的份额每增加1个百分点，美国生产的商品就会降价2.5%
According to Mr Auer, China claimed a 3.7% share of the average market in 2001, rising to 8.6% in 2006, when their data end. Imports from the Middle Kingdom have grown by about 28% in the four years since, even as America’s total imports have grown by only 4%. So let’s assume that China has enlarged its share of America’s manufacturing markets to 10.6%.
中国宣称其平均市场份额从2001年的百分之3.7上升至2006年统计截止时的8.6%。来自中华大地的进口量在过去的四年中增长了28%，尽管美国的总进口量只增长了4%。根据奥尔先生的结论，让我们假设中国已经将他在美国制造业的市场份额扩展到了10.6%。
That would mean that China’s penetration of American markets has increased by 6.9 percentage points from 2001 to 2010 or 0.69 points a year. If each point reduces prices by 2.5%, then this expansion has cut prices by about 1.7% a year.
这就意味着中国对美国市场的渗透从2001到2010年间增加了6.9%，相当于年平均增长0.69个百分点。如果每个百分点将引起价格下降2.5%，那么中国的这些渗透将是美国商品价格每年下降1.7%。
What does that add up to in dollars and cents? American manufacturing sales averaged $4,512 billion a year in the last decade, according to the Annual Survey of Manufactures, including over $13 billion of cat and dog food in 2005. The calculations above suggest these shipments might have cost $4,590 billion if China had failed to encroach on these markets. This implies savings of about $78 billion a year, or $780 billion over the decade.
以上这些数据对于经济有什么作用？根据制造业年检报告，在最近的十年中，美国制造业的平均销售额为每年45120亿，其中包括2005年那些超过130亿美元的猫粮和狗食。以上计算已经表明，如果中国没有成功进入这些市场的话，这些货物或许应该价值45900亿美元。这意味着每年节省了780亿美元，十年就是7800亿。
This is all heroically back-of-the-envelope stuff. But by this reckoning, President Hu’s estimate looks quite plausible, even conservative. In my next post, I’ll look at his claim that exports to China have created more than 14m jobs around the world.
这些就是所有庞大但不需复杂计算的东西。但是以这份账目来说，胡主席的估算看起来差不多对了，甚至有一点保守。在我的下一篇专栏里，我将会把焦点转移到他所说的“对中国的出口创造了超过1400万份工作”这一论断。
* "The effect of low-wage import competition on U.S. inflationary pressure," Journal of Monetary Economics, May 2010
本文资料来自“低薪产业输出竞争力对美国通胀的影响”，货币经济日报，2010年5月刊。
The lion kings? 狮王时代即将来临？
The lion kings?
狮王时代即将来临？
Africa is now one of the world's fastest-growing regions
非洲现在是世界上经济增长最快的地区之一
Jan 6th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION
2011年1月6日|来自印刷版
MUCH has been written about the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the shift in economic power eastward as Asia outruns the rest of the world. But the surprising success story of the past decade lies elsewhere. An analysis by The Economist finds that over the ten years to 2010, no fewer than six of the world's ten fastest-growing economies were in sub-Saharan Africa (see table).
由于亚洲国家的经济发展已经将世界其他地区甩在了后面，关于金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）崛起和经济实力东移的话题是连篇累牍，不绝于耳。但过去十年间令人惊讶的成功故事却发生在其他地方。《经济学人》的一份分析报告指出，在新千年的头十年里，世界上增长最快的10个经济体中，至少有6个来自撒哈拉以南的非洲地区（见上表）。
The only BRIC country to make the top ten was China, in second place behind Angola. The other five African sprinters were Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda, all with annual growth rates of around 8% or more. During the two decades to 2000 only one African economy (Uganda) made the top ten, against nine from Asia. On IMF forecasts Africa will grab seven of the top ten places over the next five years (our ranking excludes countries with a population of less than 10m as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, which could both rebound strongly in the years ahead).
金砖四国中唯一居于前列的是中国，位居安哥拉之后排名第二。其他五个经济增长位居前10的非洲国家包括尼日利亚、埃塞俄比亚、乍得、莫桑比克和卢旺达，这些国家的年经济增长率都在8％左右或更高一些。在至2000年的二十年间，只有一个非洲经济体（乌干达）跻身于经济增长的前10名以内，而其他9个都来自亚洲地区。国际货币基金组织预测，五年后世界经济增长的前10位中非洲将占七席（我们的排名中不包括少于1千万人口的国家以及伊拉克和阿富汗，这两个国家在未来数年内可能会出现经济的强劲回升）。
Over the past decade sub-Saharan Africa's real GDP growth rate jumped to an annual average of 5.7%, up from only 2.4% over the previous two decades. That beat Latin America's 3.3%, but not emerging Asia's 7.9%. Asia's stunning performance largely reflects the vast weight of China and India; most economies saw much slower growth, such as 4% in South Korea and Taiwan. The simple unweighted average of countries' growth rates was virtually identical in Africa and Asia.
在过去十年间，撒哈拉以南的非洲国家实际国内生产总值年平均增长率从此前二十年的2.4％跃升至5.7％。这超过了拉美地区的3.3％，但不及新兴亚洲的7.9％。亚洲的惊人表现在很大程度上反映了中国和印度的巨大份量。亚洲大多数经济体的经济增长要比这个数字低得多，如韩国和台湾只有4％。如果以未加权的简单平均数来计算，非洲国家的经济增长率实际上与亚洲国家完全相同。
Over the next five years Africa's is likely to take the lead (see chart). In other words, the average African economy will outpace its Asian counterpart. Looking even farther ahead, Standard Chartered forecasts that Africa's economy will grow at an average annual rate of 7% over the next 20 years, slightly faster than China's.
今后五年非洲国家的经济增长很可能居于领先地位。（见图表）换言之，非洲国家的经济平均增长率将超过其亚洲对手。展望更远的未来，据渣打银行预测，5年后的20年内，非洲国家经济的年平均增长率将达到7％，这个数字略高于中国。
So it should, of course. Poorer economies have more potential for catch-up growth. The scandal was that Africa's real GDP per head fell for so many years. In 1980 Africans had an average income per head almost four times bigger than the Chinese. Today the Chinese are more than three times richer. Africa's rapidly rising population still dampens its growth in real income per head but that, too, has risen by an annual rate of 3% since 2000―almost twice as fast as the global average.
这样的结果理所当然。穷国往往具有更大的增长潜力和追赶的势头。但令人难堪的是，非洲国家的实际人均GDP这么多年来一直在下降。1980年，非洲的人均收入几乎是中国的五倍。而如今，中国的人均收入是非洲的四倍以上。非洲人口的迅速增长更是拖了其人均实际收入增长的后腿，但即使如此，2000年以来非洲的人均年收入增长率还是达到了3％，这几乎是全球平均数的两倍。
For Western firms Africa's economy still looks tiny, accounting for only 2% of world output. Emerging Asia's is ten times larger. But Africa's share is rising, not only because of brisker growth but because GDP has been seriously understated in many economies. In November the size of Ghana's economy was revised up by a massive 75% after government statisticians improved their data and added in industries such as telecoms. Other countries are likely to revise their GDP levels and growth rates upward over the coming years.
非洲国家的经济总量只占世界总量的2％，在西方企业看来仍然微不足道。亚洲新兴市场的经济总量是非洲的十倍。但非洲的份额正在上升，这不仅是因为非洲经济正在积极地增长，也是由于许多经济体的国内生产总值曾被严重低估了。在11月，加纳政府的统计部门改进了数据统计方式，将电信等行业计入统计之中，加纳的经济总量经修订后一下就提高了75％。未来几年其他国家也可能修订其国内生产总值的统计数据和经济的增长率。
Africa's changing fortunes have largely been driven by China's surging demand for raw materials and higher commodity prices, but other factors have also counted. Africa has benefited from big inflows of foreign direct investment, especially from China, as well as foreign aid and debt relief. Urbanisation and rising incomes have fuelled faster growth in domestic demand.
非洲国家命运的这种改变在很大程度上得益于中国对原材料急剧增加的需求和初级产品价格的上涨，但也存在其他因素。非洲受益于大量流入的外国，尤其是中国的直接投资，还受益于外国援助和债务减免。城市化和收入增加又刺激了国内需求的快速增长。
Economic management has improved, too. Government revenues have been bolstered in recent years by high commodity prices and rapid growth. But instead of going on a spending spree as in the past some governments, such as Tanzania's and Mozambique's, have put money aside, cushioning their economies in the recession.
非洲国家的经济管理能力也已得到改进。近几年来由于经济的快速增长和初级产品价格的提高，非洲国家的政府收入已经得到了改善。过去有些非洲国家的政府（如坦桑尼亚和莫桑比克等）一旦有了钱就大手大脚地挥霍掉，现在他们能将钱储存起来，在这场全球经济危机到来时由于有了资金储备而缓和了本国经济所受到的冲击。
Some ambled through the decade rather than sprinted. Africa's biggest economy by far, South Africa, is one of its laggards: it posted average annual growth of only 3.5% over the past decade. Indeed, it may be overtaken in size by Nigeria within ten to 15 years if Nigeria's bold banking reforms are extended to the power and the oil industries. But the big challenge for all mineral exporters will be providing jobs for a population expected to grow by 50% between 2010 and 2030.
有的非洲国家在最近的十年内经济增长缓慢，没有突飞猛进。现在南非依然是非洲最大的经济体，但它是非洲国家经济发展速度上的落伍者。据报告在过去十年间南非经济的年平均增长率只有3.5％。事实上，如果尼日利亚在银行业上的大胆改革能够扩大到电力和石油行业，在10到15年内，南非的经济总量就可能被尼日利亚超过。但所有这些以矿产出口为主的非洲国家预期在2010~2030年间人口增长将达到50％，如何为众多的人口提供工作岗位是这些国家面临的重大挑战。
Commodity-driven growth does not generate many jobs; and commodity prices could fall. So governments need to diversify their economies. There are some glimmers. Countries such as Uganda and Kenya that do not depend on mineral exports are also growing faster than before, partly because they have increased manufacturing exports. Standard Chartered thinks that Africa could become a significant manufacturing centre.
初级产品驱动型的经济增长模式无法产生大量的就业岗位，而且初级产品的价格也可能出现下跌。所以非洲国家的政府必须实现本国经济的多样化。在这方面已经出现了一些曙光。如乌干达和肯尼亚一类国家，其经济不依赖于矿产出口，但也比以前增长得更快，部分原因是这些国家的制造业产品出口增加了。渣打银行认为，非洲可能会成为一个重要的制造业中心。
Formidable obstacles to Africa's continued progress loom, among them political instability, the weak rule of law, chronic corruption, infrastructure bottlenecks, and poor health and education. Without reforms, Africa will not be able to sustain faster growth. But its lion economies are earning a place alongside Asia's tigers.
但阻碍非洲国家持续发展的巨大障碍也隐约可见，如政治动荡、法治欠缺、长期存在的腐败现象、基础设施的瓶颈、医疗卫生和教育落后等等。不改革，非洲就无法获得经济的持续快速增长。但现在这些经济快速增长的非洲国家正如昂首怒吼的雄狮，与经济蓬勃发展的亚洲虎们一道，在世界经济的大盘中正在占有自己的一席之地。
狮王时代即将来临？
Africa is now one of the world's fastest-growing regions
非洲现在是世界上经济增长最快的地区之一
Jan 6th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION
2011年1月6日|来自印刷版
MUCH has been written about the rise of the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the shift in economic power eastward as Asia outruns the rest of the world. But the surprising success story of the past decade lies elsewhere. An analysis by The Economist finds that over the ten years to 2010, no fewer than six of the world's ten fastest-growing economies were in sub-Saharan Africa (see table).
由于亚洲国家的经济发展已经将世界其他地区甩在了后面，关于金砖四国（巴西、俄罗斯、印度和中国）崛起和经济实力东移的话题是连篇累牍，不绝于耳。但过去十年间令人惊讶的成功故事却发生在其他地方。《经济学人》的一份分析报告指出，在新千年的头十年里，世界上增长最快的10个经济体中，至少有6个来自撒哈拉以南的非洲地区（见上表）。
The only BRIC country to make the top ten was China, in second place behind Angola. The other five African sprinters were Nigeria, Ethiopia, Chad, Mozambique and Rwanda, all with annual growth rates of around 8% or more. During the two decades to 2000 only one African economy (Uganda) made the top ten, against nine from Asia. On IMF forecasts Africa will grab seven of the top ten places over the next five years (our ranking excludes countries with a population of less than 10m as well as Iraq and Afghanistan, which could both rebound strongly in the years ahead).
金砖四国中唯一居于前列的是中国，位居安哥拉之后排名第二。其他五个经济增长位居前10的非洲国家包括尼日利亚、埃塞俄比亚、乍得、莫桑比克和卢旺达，这些国家的年经济增长率都在8％左右或更高一些。在至2000年的二十年间，只有一个非洲经济体（乌干达）跻身于经济增长的前10名以内，而其他9个都来自亚洲地区。国际货币基金组织预测，五年后世界经济增长的前10位中非洲将占七席（我们的排名中不包括少于1千万人口的国家以及伊拉克和阿富汗，这两个国家在未来数年内可能会出现经济的强劲回升）。
Over the past decade sub-Saharan Africa's real GDP growth rate jumped to an annual average of 5.7%, up from only 2.4% over the previous two decades. That beat Latin America's 3.3%, but not emerging Asia's 7.9%. Asia's stunning performance largely reflects the vast weight of China and India; most economies saw much slower growth, such as 4% in South Korea and Taiwan. The simple unweighted average of countries' growth rates was virtually identical in Africa and Asia.
在过去十年间，撒哈拉以南的非洲国家实际国内生产总值年平均增长率从此前二十年的2.4％跃升至5.7％。这超过了拉美地区的3.3％，但不及新兴亚洲的7.9％。亚洲的惊人表现在很大程度上反映了中国和印度的巨大份量。亚洲大多数经济体的经济增长要比这个数字低得多，如韩国和台湾只有4％。如果以未加权的简单平均数来计算，非洲国家的经济增长率实际上与亚洲国家完全相同。
Over the next five years Africa's is likely to take the lead (see chart). In other words, the average African economy will outpace its Asian counterpart. Looking even farther ahead, Standard Chartered forecasts that Africa's economy will grow at an average annual rate of 7% over the next 20 years, slightly faster than China's.
今后五年非洲国家的经济增长很可能居于领先地位。（见图表）换言之，非洲国家的经济平均增长率将超过其亚洲对手。展望更远的未来，据渣打银行预测，5年后的20年内，非洲国家经济的年平均增长率将达到7％，这个数字略高于中国。
So it should, of course. Poorer economies have more potential for catch-up growth. The scandal was that Africa's real GDP per head fell for so many years. In 1980 Africans had an average income per head almost four times bigger than the Chinese. Today the Chinese are more than three times richer. Africa's rapidly rising population still dampens its growth in real income per head but that, too, has risen by an annual rate of 3% since 2000―almost twice as fast as the global average.
这样的结果理所当然。穷国往往具有更大的增长潜力和追赶的势头。但令人难堪的是，非洲国家的实际人均GDP这么多年来一直在下降。1980年，非洲的人均收入几乎是中国的五倍。而如今，中国的人均收入是非洲的四倍以上。非洲人口的迅速增长更是拖了其人均实际收入增长的后腿，但即使如此，2000年以来非洲的人均年收入增长率还是达到了3％，这几乎是全球平均数的两倍。
For Western firms Africa's economy still looks tiny, accounting for only 2% of world output. Emerging Asia's is ten times larger. But Africa's share is rising, not only because of brisker growth but because GDP has been seriously understated in many economies. In November the size of Ghana's economy was revised up by a massive 75% after government statisticians improved their data and added in industries such as telecoms. Other countries are likely to revise their GDP levels and growth rates upward over the coming years.
非洲国家的经济总量只占世界总量的2％，在西方企业看来仍然微不足道。亚洲新兴市场的经济总量是非洲的十倍。但非洲的份额正在上升，这不仅是因为非洲经济正在积极地增长，也是由于许多经济体的国内生产总值曾被严重低估了。在11月，加纳政府的统计部门改进了数据统计方式，将电信等行业计入统计之中，加纳的经济总量经修订后一下就提高了75％。未来几年其他国家也可能修订其国内生产总值的统计数据和经济的增长率。
Africa's changing fortunes have largely been driven by China's surging demand for raw materials and higher commodity prices, but other factors have also counted. Africa has benefited from big inflows of foreign direct investment, especially from China, as well as foreign aid and debt relief. Urbanisation and rising incomes have fuelled faster growth in domestic demand.
非洲国家命运的这种改变在很大程度上得益于中国对原材料急剧增加的需求和初级产品价格的上涨，但也存在其他因素。非洲受益于大量流入的外国，尤其是中国的直接投资，还受益于外国援助和债务减免。城市化和收入增加又刺激了国内需求的快速增长。
Economic management has improved, too. Government revenues have been bolstered in recent years by high commodity prices and rapid growth. But instead of going on a spending spree as in the past some governments, such as Tanzania's and Mozambique's, have put money aside, cushioning their economies in the recession.
非洲国家的经济管理能力也已得到改进。近几年来由于经济的快速增长和初级产品价格的提高，非洲国家的政府收入已经得到了改善。过去有些非洲国家的政府（如坦桑尼亚和莫桑比克等）一旦有了钱就大手大脚地挥霍掉，现在他们能将钱储存起来，在这场全球经济危机到来时由于有了资金储备而缓和了本国经济所受到的冲击。
Some ambled through the decade rather than sprinted. Africa's biggest economy by far, South Africa, is one of its laggards: it posted average annual growth of only 3.5% over the past decade. Indeed, it may be overtaken in size by Nigeria within ten to 15 years if Nigeria's bold banking reforms are extended to the power and the oil industries. But the big challenge for all mineral exporters will be providing jobs for a population expected to grow by 50% between 2010 and 2030.
有的非洲国家在最近的十年内经济增长缓慢，没有突飞猛进。现在南非依然是非洲最大的经济体，但它是非洲国家经济发展速度上的落伍者。据报告在过去十年间南非经济的年平均增长率只有3.5％。事实上，如果尼日利亚在银行业上的大胆改革能够扩大到电力和石油行业，在10到15年内，南非的经济总量就可能被尼日利亚超过。但所有这些以矿产出口为主的非洲国家预期在2010~2030年间人口增长将达到50％，如何为众多的人口提供工作岗位是这些国家面临的重大挑战。
Commodity-driven growth does not generate many jobs; and commodity prices could fall. So governments need to diversify their economies. There are some glimmers. Countries such as Uganda and Kenya that do not depend on mineral exports are also growing faster than before, partly because they have increased manufacturing exports. Standard Chartered thinks that Africa could become a significant manufacturing centre.
初级产品驱动型的经济增长模式无法产生大量的就业岗位，而且初级产品的价格也可能出现下跌。所以非洲国家的政府必须实现本国经济的多样化。在这方面已经出现了一些曙光。如乌干达和肯尼亚一类国家，其经济不依赖于矿产出口，但也比以前增长得更快，部分原因是这些国家的制造业产品出口增加了。渣打银行认为，非洲可能会成为一个重要的制造业中心。
Formidable obstacles to Africa's continued progress loom, among them political instability, the weak rule of law, chronic corruption, infrastructure bottlenecks, and poor health and education. Without reforms, Africa will not be able to sustain faster growth. But its lion economies are earning a place alongside Asia's tigers.
但阻碍非洲国家持续发展的巨大障碍也隐约可见，如政治动荡、法治欠缺、长期存在的腐败现象、基础设施的瓶颈、医疗卫生和教育落后等等。不改革，非洲就无法获得经济的持续快速增长。但现在这些经济快速增长的非洲国家正如昂首怒吼的雄狮，与经济蓬勃发展的亚洲虎们一道，在世界经济的大盘中正在占有自己的一席之地。
Ending deflation in Japan An old problem结束日本的通货紧缩 一个老问题
| Ending deflation in Japan An old problem结束日本的通货紧缩 一个老问题 Will it take more than monetary policy to cure Japan's deflationary ills? 除了货币政策之外，日本政府能采取更多其他措施来根治通缩顽疾吗？ Feb 10th 2011 | TOKYO | from PRINT EDITION
（不要只观看，买下它！） JAPAN, one of the great exporting nations, usually runs a trade deficit with, of all places, Switzerland. Why? Ask Rolex. Japan also buys more from France and Italy than it sells there. Why? Bordeaux, Brie, mascarpone and Armani, to name a few expensive vices. In Japan such delicacies are mostly immune to deflation, while prices of everyday goods like cars, electronic goods and clothes tumble. Why then do Japanese firms continue to churn out the latter, even though margins are low? And could this help explain Japan's persistent deflation problem? 日本是一个出口大国，却经常在与瑞士的贸易中存在逆差，原因何在？这得问问劳力士。日本从法国和意大利买进商品远超过其出口，这又是为什么呢？这得问问波尔多、布里、马士卡彭和阿玛尼，这里仅例举几件奢侈品品牌。在日本，这样的大多数这样的奢侈商品并不会收到通货紧缩的影响，而日常消费品的价格，比如汽车、电子产品和服装业则在通货紧缩的影响下摇摇欲坠。尽管这些行业的边际利润持续走低，但日本企业仍然继续生产日常消费品，这是为什么呢？这点有助于我们解释日本持续通货紧缩问题吗? These questions preoccupy Kosuke Motani, author of "The Real Face of Deflation". In this book's first seven months in print, 500,000 copies have been sold, including one to Naoto Kan, the prime minister. Mr Motani argues that deflation in Japan is not so much a monetary problem as a structural one linked to bad business decisions and demography. 这些问题引起了Motani Kosuke的兴趣，他是《通胀的真实面目》一书的作者。在这本书出版后的头七个月里，50万册全部售罄，其中包括一本给了首相Naoto Kan。Motani 认为与其说日本的通货紧缩是一个货币问题的话，不如说是一个与错误的商业决策和人口统计学有关的结构性问题。 If Japanese firms produced new types of luxury goods, he believes, they could unleash pent-up demand among Japan's growing, and wealthy, ranks of old people and pay higher wages to Japan's shrinking, and relatively poor, youth. Unsurprisingly, his views have won a sympathetic hearing at the Bank of Japan (BoJ), which has often been accused of failing to do enough to reverse falling prices. 他相信，如果日本企业产生了新型的奢侈品，它们不仅可以满足人数不断攀升的有金老年阶层长久以来的需求，而且可以为人数逐渐缩小的日本年轻穷困一代提供更高的薪酬。毋庸置疑的是，他的观点已经博得了日本央行的同情，日本银行曾经常被指责在扭转价格下跌方面做得不够。 At a news conference on February 7th Masaaki Shirakawa, the BoJ's governor, touched on similar themes. The fundamental cause of deflation, he said, was the protracted downward trend in Japan's underlying GDP growth, caused both by the decrease in the number of workers and declining productivity growth. Monetary easing was important to ease deflationary pressures, but by itself was not enough, he asserted. Businesses needed to bring more old people and women into jobs, to counter the decline in the working-age population. They also needed to go beyond the concept of monozukuri—the well-honed skill of making things—to shikake zukuri, which he described as the creation of products that attract demand by telling a new story, as Sony once did with the Walkman. 在2月7日的一次新闻发布会上，日本央行官员Masaaki Shirakawa谈及了类似的主题。他说，通货紧缩的根本原因在于日本潜在GDP增长呈现持续下降趋势，这是由就业者数量和生产率增长出现下滑导致的。他也强调，宽松的货币政策可以缓解通货紧缩的压力，但是仅仅宽松的货币政策还远远不够。企业需要让更多的老人、妇女投入工作，以针对性地解决工作年龄的人口减少的问题。同时，也需要超越"造物"（用娴熟的技术创造东西）观念的限制，（而是shikake zukuri），他说这就像产品的创造，通过编一个新故事来吸引需求，Sony在随身听上的做法就是这样一个例子。 Many will argue that this line is a cop-out. Businessmen quibble that they could better tap fast-growing markets in Asia if the BoJ did more to cheapen the yen. Critical economists such as Koichi Hamada of Yale University argue that if the BoJ put more cash into people's wallets, it would spur domestic demand. Many believe it will take a combination of forces to end deflation in Japan, and one of the biggest dangers is that government agencies, including the central bank, put the onus on others to fix the problem. 很多人会说这条路线是逃避责任的借口。商人们质疑如果日本央行采取更多行动让日元贬值就会在亚洲的开拓快速增长的市场的做法。诸多权威经济学家，如耶鲁大学的Koichi Hamada认为如果日本央行应该让国民拥有更多资金，就会刺激国内需求。许多人都认为需要采取多方面力量来结束日本的通货紧缩，其中最大难题就是政府部门，包括中央银行，也就此问题推卸责任。 There does, however, finally appear to be some joined-up thinking. Mr Shirakawa supports Mr Kan's efforts to raise productivity by promoting free trade. If Japan raises its consumption tax to improve the public finances, the BoJ may be prepared to use accommodative monetary policy to offset fiscal tightening. 尽管如此,最终还是要从整体大局上考虑。Shirakawa赞成Kan的做法，Kan一直致力于通过促进自由贸易来提高生产率。如果日本想要通过提高消费税来提高公共财政收入,日本央行可能会使用宽松的货币政策来弥补财政紧缩政策。 Where Mr Shirakawa and Mr Motani most directly see eye to eye is on the need for companies to boost domestic demand by unleashing the latent spending power of the elderly, who sit on the vast majority of Japanese households' ¥1,500 trillion ($18 trillion) of savings. Mr Shirakawa believes there will be growing demand for health care, nursing, tourism and leisure. He reckons that a 40% rise in the turnover of fitness clubs in Japan in the past decade is due to increasing health consciousness as people live longer. He says deregulation would increase supply in such fields. 要通过释放老一辈人的潜在购买力来扩大企业的内需，而这些人坐拥日本居民1500万亿日元(相当于18万亿美元) 的存款，在这个观点上Shirakawa和Motani 的态度是一致的。Shirakawa先生认为,人们对医疗保健、护理、旅游、休闲的需求将会持续增加。他估算，日本健身俱乐部在过去的十年里营业额上升了40%是随着人们更长寿健康意识也增加了。他说放宽限制会增加这些方面服务的提供。 Mr Motani takes a more draconian view. He is fed up with the elderly hoarding their money. He says they do this because of a "King Lear" complex: they feel they will be deserted if they give too much away. And he favours tax reform to encourage them to bequeath their money to their grandchildren, rather than their children. One of the flipsides of longevity, he points out, is that the average age of those who inherit is a grand old 67. Motani则持更严格的观点。他对老年人攒钱感到反感。他说，老年人之所以这麽做，是因为他们有《李尔王》情结：如果他们给子孙的太多了，就会有被抛弃的感觉。同时，他更赞同税制改革，以鼓励老年人把他们的钱交给他们的孙辈，而不是他们的孩子。他指出，长寿的负面问题之一，是他们平均继承年龄是年逾花甲的67岁。 from PRINT EDITION | Finance and Economics |
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Splay-footed, not flat-footed八字足，而非平足
Splay-footed, not flat-footed八字足，而非平足
A new fossil shows that evolution does not always mean change
一个新的化石表明：进化并不总是意味着改变
Palaeontology古生物学
Feb 10th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION
Then and now
过去与现在
WHEN a coelacanth, a type of lobe-finned fish once considered the missing link between fish and amphibians, was found off the coast of South Africa in 1938, it came as a shock to palaeontologists. Until then, the most recent traces of such a creature had been in rocks dating from the last days of the dinosaurs, 65m years ago. It was, in its way, as surprising as if a live Tyrannosaurus had been found hiding in an obscure part of Montana. Now the same experience is hitting palaeontologists again—but this time in reverse. Instead of finding a “living fossil” identical to an ancient beast, they have found a real fossil identical to a modern one.
以前人们一度认为一种叫做腔棘鱼的鳍鱼是鱼类和两栖类之间缺少的环节，1938年当腔棘鱼在南非海岸沿海被发现时，古生物学家对它的出现大感震惊。在此之前，这种动物最近的遗迹出现在6500万年前恐龙时代后期的岩层中。而它这次的出现方式，就好像一个活生生的霸王龙属被发现藏身在蒙大拿州的模糊地带一样令人惊讶。现在，同样的经历再次让古生物学家碰上了，不过这次相反。他们不是找到了一个与古兽相同的“活化石”，而是找到了一个跟现代兽类相同的真正化石。
The fossil in question, a 100m-year-old specimen from north-east Brazil, belongs to the genus Schizodactylus. These are large, carnivorous, cricket-like insects whose feet splay out wildly in different directions. Modern Schizodactylus use their feet like snowshoes, to help them remain stable as they travel over sandy terrain in search of prey.
所讨论的的化石采自巴西东北部，是一亿年前的标本，属于节肢动物类。这类节肢动物是大型类似板球的食肉昆虫，其足向不同方向伸展开来。现代节肢动物在沙地爬行寻找猎物时用它们雪鞋般的脚来帮助身体保持稳定。
If the new fossil—whose discovery has just been published in ZooKeys by Sam Heads of the Illinois Natural History Survey and Léa Leuzinger of the University of Fribourg, in Switzerland—were merely similar to modern splay-footed insects, the find would not be particularly surprising: it simply demonstrates a phenomenon called evolutionary stasis, in which a specific type of body form hangs around for a long time. What is surprising is just how static Schizodactylus has been.
如果新化石（其发现刚由伊利诺斯州自然史调查的负责人山姆和瑞士弗里堡大学的李•劳伊辛格发表在《动物图谱》上）仅是类似现代的八字足昆虫，那么这个发现不会特别令人惊讶：它只是证明了一种被称为进化停滞的现象，在这种现象中特定类型的体型存留很长一段时间了。令人惊讶的是节肢动物停止进化竟有这么久了。
Evolutionary stasis is fairly common at the higher levels of the Linnaean system of biological classification (class, order and family). Natural selection hits on a good design. That design is then adopted in slightly different forms by species after species. The shelled bodies of turtles, for example, evolved between 250m and 200m years ago, while the body plans of scorpions have been around for more than 400m years. That does not mean, however, that a zoologist would mistake a 200m-year-old turtle or a 400m-year-old scorpion for any species now alive.
在林耐生物分类（类，属和门）系统的高等类别中进化停滞现象是相当普遍的。自然选择的图案都是最好的。然后，这种图案就被一个接一个的物种以略有不同的形式所采纳。例如，海龟的壳体是在2.5～2.0亿年前进化的，而蝎子的体型方案已超过4亿年的历史。然而这并不意味着一个动物学家会弄错2亿岁的海龟或是4亿岁的蝎子属于现在存活的何种物种。
What is remarkable about the new find is that it is so similar to modern animals that it can be assigned to an existing genus—the lowest level of Linnaean classification above a species—rather than just to some higher taxonomic group. That is rare indeed. Even the modern coelacanth, on closer examination, had to be put in a different genus from any known fossil.
新发现引人注目的是它与现代动物如此相似，以致它可以被列入现有生物分类种类（林奈物种以上分类的最低等），而不是只被列入某一更高等的分类组。这的确罕见。经过仔细观察，甚至就连现代腔棘鱼都必须得归类于不同于任何已知化石的种类。
Clearly the body plan of Schizodactylus is not merely good, but optimal, at least for the environment the animal lives in. Alas for Schizodactylus, the sandy deserts it prefers have retreated from north-eastern Brazil and its optimality there has vanished. But its discovery shows better what this part of the world was like 100m years ago—and also illustrates an important point about evolution that is often forgotten in biologists’ understandable focus on the development of novelty. The first rule of natural selection is: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
显然，节肢动物的体型方案不仅是最好的，也是最佳的，至少对这种动物生活的环境而言是如此。唉，对节肢动物来说，它所喜爱的沙质沙漠已经从巴西东北部退却，它在那里的最佳体态已经消失。但它的发现恰好说明这部分的大千世界跟1亿年前的样子很象，也说明了进化论的一个重点，而这点在生物学家关注理解新颖性的发展时往往被遗忘了。自然选择的第一条规则是：“如果没坏，就不要修理它。”
from PRINT EDITION | Science and Technology
A new fossil shows that evolution does not always mean change
一个新的化石表明：进化并不总是意味着改变
Palaeontology古生物学
Feb 10th 2011 | from PRINT EDITION
Then and now
过去与现在
WHEN a coelacanth, a type of lobe-finned fish once considered the missing link between fish and amphibians, was found off the coast of South Africa in 1938, it came as a shock to palaeontologists. Until then, the most recent traces of such a creature had been in rocks dating from the last days of the dinosaurs, 65m years ago. It was, in its way, as surprising as if a live Tyrannosaurus had been found hiding in an obscure part of Montana. Now the same experience is hitting palaeontologists again—but this time in reverse. Instead of finding a “living fossil” identical to an ancient beast, they have found a real fossil identical to a modern one.
以前人们一度认为一种叫做腔棘鱼的鳍鱼是鱼类和两栖类之间缺少的环节，1938年当腔棘鱼在南非海岸沿海被发现时，古生物学家对它的出现大感震惊。在此之前，这种动物最近的遗迹出现在6500万年前恐龙时代后期的岩层中。而它这次的出现方式，就好像一个活生生的霸王龙属被发现藏身在蒙大拿州的模糊地带一样令人惊讶。现在，同样的经历再次让古生物学家碰上了，不过这次相反。他们不是找到了一个与古兽相同的“活化石”，而是找到了一个跟现代兽类相同的真正化石。
The fossil in question, a 100m-year-old specimen from north-east Brazil, belongs to the genus Schizodactylus. These are large, carnivorous, cricket-like insects whose feet splay out wildly in different directions. Modern Schizodactylus use their feet like snowshoes, to help them remain stable as they travel over sandy terrain in search of prey.
所讨论的的化石采自巴西东北部，是一亿年前的标本，属于节肢动物类。这类节肢动物是大型类似板球的食肉昆虫，其足向不同方向伸展开来。现代节肢动物在沙地爬行寻找猎物时用它们雪鞋般的脚来帮助身体保持稳定。
If the new fossil—whose discovery has just been published in ZooKeys by Sam Heads of the Illinois Natural History Survey and Léa Leuzinger of the University of Fribourg, in Switzerland—were merely similar to modern splay-footed insects, the find would not be particularly surprising: it simply demonstrates a phenomenon called evolutionary stasis, in which a specific type of body form hangs around for a long time. What is surprising is just how static Schizodactylus has been.
如果新化石（其发现刚由伊利诺斯州自然史调查的负责人山姆和瑞士弗里堡大学的李•劳伊辛格发表在《动物图谱》上）仅是类似现代的八字足昆虫，那么这个发现不会特别令人惊讶：它只是证明了一种被称为进化停滞的现象，在这种现象中特定类型的体型存留很长一段时间了。令人惊讶的是节肢动物停止进化竟有这么久了。
Evolutionary stasis is fairly common at the higher levels of the Linnaean system of biological classification (class, order and family). Natural selection hits on a good design. That design is then adopted in slightly different forms by species after species. The shelled bodies of turtles, for example, evolved between 250m and 200m years ago, while the body plans of scorpions have been around for more than 400m years. That does not mean, however, that a zoologist would mistake a 200m-year-old turtle or a 400m-year-old scorpion for any species now alive.
在林耐生物分类（类，属和门）系统的高等类别中进化停滞现象是相当普遍的。自然选择的图案都是最好的。然后，这种图案就被一个接一个的物种以略有不同的形式所采纳。例如，海龟的壳体是在2.5～2.0亿年前进化的，而蝎子的体型方案已超过4亿年的历史。然而这并不意味着一个动物学家会弄错2亿岁的海龟或是4亿岁的蝎子属于现在存活的何种物种。
What is remarkable about the new find is that it is so similar to modern animals that it can be assigned to an existing genus—the lowest level of Linnaean classification above a species—rather than just to some higher taxonomic group. That is rare indeed. Even the modern coelacanth, on closer examination, had to be put in a different genus from any known fossil.
新发现引人注目的是它与现代动物如此相似，以致它可以被列入现有生物分类种类（林奈物种以上分类的最低等），而不是只被列入某一更高等的分类组。这的确罕见。经过仔细观察，甚至就连现代腔棘鱼都必须得归类于不同于任何已知化石的种类。
Clearly the body plan of Schizodactylus is not merely good, but optimal, at least for the environment the animal lives in. Alas for Schizodactylus, the sandy deserts it prefers have retreated from north-eastern Brazil and its optimality there has vanished. But its discovery shows better what this part of the world was like 100m years ago—and also illustrates an important point about evolution that is often forgotten in biologists’ understandable focus on the development of novelty. The first rule of natural selection is: “If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it.”
显然，节肢动物的体型方案不仅是最好的，也是最佳的，至少对这种动物生活的环境而言是如此。唉，对节肢动物来说，它所喜爱的沙质沙漠已经从巴西东北部退却，它在那里的最佳体态已经消失。但它的发现恰好说明这部分的大千世界跟1亿年前的样子很象，也说明了进化论的一个重点，而这点在生物学家关注理解新颖性的发展时往往被遗忘了。自然选择的第一条规则是：“如果没坏，就不要修理它。”
from PRINT EDITION | Science and Technology
2011年2月6日
For Investors, China's Boom Is a Rough Ride
For Investors, China's Boom Is a Rough Ride
By GREGORY ZUCKERMAN
Investing in China is the only way to enjoy heady gains over the next few years, bulls say.
Bears counter that investors risk huge losses unless they protect against a bursting of what they view as a bubble in China. Such an event could rock global markets, they warn.
Adding to the challenges for investors: Betting on -- or against -- China is not easy.
All kinds of Chinese companies are demonstrating rapid growth, and many have public shares. The value of shares of Chinese companies is more than $3.7 trillion.
![[sjlede06]](http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OB-MJ529_sjlede_DV_20110205162311.jpg)
Jason Schneider Some, led by state-owned enterprises, rank among the world's largest companies. China Mobile, for example, is the world's largest mobile-phone company by subscribers; its stock trades as American depositary shares on U.S. markets under the symbol CHL. Depositary shares of the largest oil and gas producer, China Petrochemical (Sinopec Group), trade in the U.S. under the symbol SNP. Baoshan Iron & Steel, China's biggest publicly traded steel maker, is listed on only the Shanghai Stock Exchange.
Foreigners need a permit to buy shares in China's domestic stock markets. Permits are expensive and hard to get so foreign capital amounts to less than 1% of those markets.
More companies, even those that are majority owned by the government, are selling shares to investors. Global initial public offerings of Chinese companies, including those based in Hong Kong, amounted to $126 billion in 2010, according to data tracker Dealogic, up from $54 billion in 2009. By comparison, less than $34 billion of U.S. IPOs took place in 2010, the second consecutive year that Chinese companies topped U.S. companies in IPO issuance.
There are drawbacks here as well -- few Chinese companies share the level of financial transparency of Western companies.
That's why some say the best way to wager on the growing nation is through shares of Western companies with expanding operations in the country. One example: General Motors, which now sells more Buicks in China than in the U.S. Chinese sales are responsible for more than 25% of profits earned by BMW and Mercedes-Benz. Other shares bullish investors are buying include Apple, chemical provider Solutia and Yum Brands.
![[SJ-06LEDa]](http://si.wsj.net/public/resources/images/OB-MJ476_SJ06LE_NS_20110204225105.jpg)
But bears warn that investors could suffer losses in some global companies that have been bid up because of their Chinese operations. They urge investors to take profits from shares like Vale, the huge Brazilian commodity producer, which might be hurt if China's growth slows. Even investors who don't usually short overpriced shares should consider buying some protection, such as a bearish exchange-traded fund that could rise in value if China runs into economic problems, bears say.
Here are the bullish and bearish views on China, and how various investors are laying out their strategies.
The Bulls
China likely emerged as the world's second-largest economy in 2010. The nation is expected to show close to 10% growth in both 2010 and 2011, far outstripping the U.S. and most developed nations. Stock-trading volume on Chinese and Hong Kong exchanges now rivals that of U.S. markets.
Key to the bulls: The nation, which enjoys $2.6 trillion of foreign-currency reserves, remains only partially urbanized. The rural-to-urban shift, one of the largest human migrations in history, is helping create a new middle class that is embracing higher standards of living. That leads to ripe investment opportunities.
Daniel Arbess, who runs a hedge fund for Perella Weinberg Partners, has been profiting by buying shares of global companies, like Apple, helped by Chinese growth, and betting against those having a hard time competing with Chinese rivals.
"Analysts have been so focused on Apple's blistering growth at home that they are only now just starting to contemplate how giant the opportunity is in China," says Mr. Arbess, who predicts that as China's middle class grows, the nation soon will represent as much as 20% of Apple's revenues. "Over the next 10 years, China will become by far the largest market for Apple and other global consumer brands."
"The one 'Chinese' stock that we have purchased and do own is Baidu -- the Google of China," says Jeffrey Rubin of Birinyi Associates, who generally is cautious about investing in China. "As the Chinese government allows more and more access to the Internet and more freedoms are allowed, the Chinese population will head toward the Internet. And Baidu [BIDU] is a direct benefit of that growth."
"While a slowdown in China is inevitable, as nothing grows for 10% a year forever," Mr. Rubin says, "trying to predict when that will be is a losing game. Investors need to focus on stocks that will benefit from the long-term prospects of China and not what will happen over the next 12 months."
For investors wary of individual shares, Rob Lutts of Cabot Money Management recommends ETFs such as the SPDR S&P China ETF (GXC) and iShares FTSE China 25 Index Fund (FXI) and Morgan Stanley China A Share Fund (CAF), a closed-end fund.
The Bears
Chinese authorities are trying to keep growth strong so employment gains continue. But they're also pressing the brakes on inflation, with prices growing at an annual rate of more than 5%, and trying to rein in real-estate speculation. Skeptics doubt they can pull it all off.
For foreign investors worried that a downturn in China could cripple their portfolios, Citigroup strategist Tobias Levkovich recommends betting against industrial-related commodities, since "in some cases China accounts for 50% to 75% of incremental demand," and increasing exposure to the U.S. dollar, which likely would be boosted if investors fear a Chinese downturn.
Some bears are shorting the US PowerShares DB Base Metals Fund (DBB), an ETF that aims to track the performance of commodities such as aluminum, zinc and copper that is up more than 25% in the past year.
―Email: gregory.zuckerman@wsj.com
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