The withering away of the party

China
The withering away of the party
大势已去
Economically, but not politically
在经济上，但不是在政治上
May 30th 2002 | BEIJING | from the print edition
IN URBAN China, the Communist Party's roots are weakening fast. In the late 1990s, the number of city dwellers employed by state-owned enterprises dropped to fewer than half the workforce. As the state sector crumbles, so too do the party branches that once controlled the lives of urban Chinese. Party officials talk of the urgency of setting up branches in non-state enterprises, but they are making little progress.
在中国的城市里，共产党的根基正在迅速削弱。九十年代末期，城市居民被国有企业雇用的数量降到不足工人总数的一半。当国有部门崩溃时，曾经控制着中国城市居民人生的党组织也亦步亦趋。党员干部谈论着在非国有企业里成立党支部的紧迫性，但他们几乎没取得任何进展。

The party itself is still expanding. It now has 64m members compared with 50m in 1990. But this is no reflection of the party's popularity among those who work in the most dynamic and productive area of urban China's economy. Take Wuhan, for example, a city of 4.4m people on the banks of the Yangtze. In 1993, a mere 0.9% of its party members worked in private or foreign-invested enterprises. Six years later, the proportion remained virtually the same. Or take similar-sized Shenyang, north-east China's biggest city. In 1999, some 640,000 people worked in non-state enterprises there. That year, the party managed to recruit only 29 of them as new members. Data on party membership are patchy. But according to one party journal, only 17% of private firms employed party members in 1999 and just 3% had any kind of party organisation. Foreign-funded enterprises are often formed in partnership with state-owned firms. Yet only 35% of them employed party members that year and a mere 17% had party cells.
党本身还在继续扩张。从1990年的5000万增加到现在的6400万。但是这不能说明党在中国城市经济最有活力和效率的那些地区工作的人们中间受到欢迎。以一个44万人口的长江沿岸城市武汉为例：在1993年只有0.9%的党员在私企或外企工作，六年以后该比例基本上维持不变。再来看类似规模的沈阳，它是中国东北部最大的城市。在1999年这里约有64万人在非国有企业里工作。那一年党在他们当中只吸收了29个新党员。尽管关于党员的数据并不完整，但根据一份党报，只有17%的私企在1999年雇佣了党员，3%设有某种党组织。外资企业通常和国有企业合伙，但那年它们当中只有35%雇佣了党员，只有17%有党小组。

Officials sometimes boast of successes. One example they cite is the party organisation in Motorola (China) Electronics Ltd, a factory complex in the port city of Tianjin owned by one of the biggest American investors in China. It produces mobile telephones and other electronic equipment. According to party publications, a branch was established in the company in 1990, even before its official founding. But the organisation remained clandestine, not wanting to alarm the foreign bosses.
干部们有时候夸耀他们的成就。他们引用的一个例子是设在摩托罗拉（中国）电子公司的党组织。该公司是位于港口城市天津的一个工厂复合体，一个由中国最大的美国投资者持有的公司。公司生产手机和其他的电子设备。根据党的出版物，一个党分支于1990在这个公司成立，当时该公司甚至还未正式成立。但是党组织保守秘密，不想惊动了外国老板。

Four years later, party leaders of the development zone where the Motorola plant is located decided to tell the company what was going on. A party journal said the foreigners were "pleasantly surprised" to find that members included most of the company's top technicians and managers. The journal said the company not only agreed to the establishment of a bigger party branch, but also offered a place for it to meet (Motorola itself refuses to comment on its dealings with the party). Now the company's party organisation boasts 300 members, though this is still only 3% of the workforce.
四年以后，党位于摩托罗拉工厂开发区的领导决定告诉这家公司发生了什么事。一份党报说外国人"惊喜"地发现公司的大部分高级技术人员和高层经理都是党员。这份党报还说公司不仅同意建立更大的党支部，还提供了一个场所供他们开会（摩托罗拉拒绝评论它和党的交易）。现在公司的党组织夸口有300会员，尽管仍只占总劳动人口的3%。

But does even this rare success make any difference? In state-owned enterprises, the party committee usually runs the factory. Often the factory manager serves as the party branch leader. At least until the 1990s, when the collapse of the state sector began in earnest, workers aspired to be party members because membership gave them power. But even where the party has managed to gain a foothold in private and foreign-owned enterprises, its role is inevitably far less important.
但是这些少数成功案例能带来什么不同吗？在国有企业，通常由党委会管理工厂，厂长通常是党委书记。至少直到90年代末期在国有部门的崩溃变得势不可挡的时候，工人们因为党员资格能带给他们权力而渴望成为党员。但是即使在那些党已经成功取得一块根据地的私企或外企，它在其中扮演的角色也将不可避免的非常之小。

Officials say that one function of party cells in the non-state sector is to help ensure that such enterprises uphold the law. But unlike in the state sector, employees are on short-term contracts if they have any contract at all, and are hardly likely to challenge bosses for violating regulations. This could be one reason why China's party chief, Jiang Zemin, decided last year to end the party's ban on admitting private-enterprise bosses as members. At least if an enterprise is led by a party member, the party might retain a modicum of influence. But as one official journal put it: "The party constitution requires party members to hold themselves responsible to the working class. The Company Law requires managers to hold themselves responsible to the board of directors."
干部们说在非国有企业的党小组的一个功能就是帮助确保这些企业维护法律。但是不像国有部门的职工，这些企业的员工要么就什么合约也没有，要么只有短期合同，几乎不可能对抗老板违反规章制度。这可能是中国党主席江泽民去年决定中止党对私人企业老板入党的禁令的一个原因。至少如果一个企业是由党员领导的，那么党也许能保持一部分影响力。但是就像一份官方日报说的那样："党章要求党员对工人阶级负责。公司法要求管理者对董事局负责。"

Pan Wei, of Beijing University, says that even in stodgy state enterprises, the party is losing its grip. "Party organisations at the grassroots have been decaying. Regular party activities have virtually stopped," he says. In a few years' time, this could mean that in urban China at least, the party's grassroots activities will be confined mainly to government departments and institutions, in which party membership remains a prerequisite for advancement. "It will be pretty much a bureaucratic party," says Mr Pan.
北京大学的潘伟（音译）说就算在沉闷的国有企业，党也在失去掌控，他说："党组织的群众基础在衰退。日常的党活动几乎停止了。"，这可能意味着中国的城市至少在几年之内，党的基层活动将会主要局限在政府部门和机构之内，在那儿党员资格仍然是获得晋升的前提条件。潘先生说："它将会变成一个非常官僚主义的政党。"
from the print edition | Asia