Buttonwood
Something doesn't fit
有些不对劲
Why are both Treasury bonds and gold performing so well?
为什么国债和黄金双双走好？
Jun 17th 2010
"ALICE laughed: 'There's no use trying,' she said; 'one can't believe impossible things.' 'I daresay you haven't had much practice,' said the Queen. 'When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.'"
"爱丽丝笑道：'不用试啦，没用的。人总不能相信不可能的事吧。''我敢说你还没多次练习吧，'皇后说道，我在你这么大时，我总是每天为此花上半个小时，为什么？有时，就早饭前的这一会我已经相信六件不可能的事了！"（爱丽丝仙境奇遇记台词）
Occasionally investors can believe impossible things, as they did when dotcom stocks with no profits were valued at more than flourishing multinationals. But they can also believe in incompatible things, which is even more striking.
偶尔，投资者也会异想天开，譬如当年，投资者便相信了那些毫无利润可言，而且每股定价高于蓬勃发展的跨国公司的网络股。更有甚者，他们甚至相信水火可以兼容，这让人更为咋舌。
Take the recent surge in the gold price to a nominal record of $1,251.20 an ounce. Owning gold is traditionally seen as offering protection against inflation. And inflation is very bad news for owners of government bonds. But the ten-year Treasury bond yields just 3.3%, a level that is towards the low end of the historical range.
以黄金价格为例。最近黄金价格飙升至1,251.20每盎司的的名义价，创下新高。传统而言，持有黄金可以抵御通胀。而通胀对于政府债券所有者来说无异于噩耗。但是目前，10年期的国债收益仅为3.3%，接近历史最低水平。
There is something remarkable about this combination. You would expect the performance of gold and Treasury bonds to be inversely correlated. When gold was at its real all-time high in 1980, the ten-year Treasury-bond yield was 10.8%. Fixed-income investors had suffered years of negative real returns in the 1970s.
低债券收益高黄金价同时出现有其异常之处。黄金和债券的表现一般认为是负相关的（译者注：高金价一般是伴随着高债券收益的，因为金价高意味着投资者不愿意去买国债，因此政府不得不承诺更高的债券收益率来吸引投资者，这会方便大家理解下文。）。在1980年，黄金价格处于最高水平时，10年国债收益率为10.8%。七十年代，固定收益投资者获得的实际回报长年为负。
Adding other assets to the mix does not solve the dilemma. David Ranson of Wainwright Economics, a consultancy, has examined how gold and corporate-bond spreads have worked as a guide to asset allocation since 1978. The gold price is an indicator of inflationary pressures. Bond spreads are an indicator of growth: investors are happy to take the risk of owning corporate bonds, and spreads come down, when the economy, and thus business revenues, are strengthening. Over the year to end-May gold was up by 25% while corporate-bond spreads narrowed sharply. History suggests that such a combination should be bad news for government bonds.
通过向产品组合中加入其它资产并不能纾困。咨询机构Wainwright Economics的David Ranson研究了自1978以来黄金和企业债券利差对资产分配的指导作用。黄金价成为通胀压力的风向标，而企业债券利差则指向增长：当经济向好，由此引发企业收入上升时，投资者乐于冒风险持有企业债券，此时利差下降。截止今年五月底，金价上涨25%而企业债券利差大幅收紧。历史暗示我们此等情况同时出现对于政府债券来说极为不妙。
So what explains the current situation? Both gold and Treasury bonds could be classed as "safe haven" assets that investors buy when they are risk-averse. But if not inflation, safe havens against what? Investors did buy gold in 2007 and 2008 when they were worried about the health of the banking system. Some thought that physical gold would be a lot safer than a deposit in an insolvent bank.
那么，如何解释当前的状况？黄金和国债都可以划分为"避难"资产，即投资者不愿冒险时将其买入。但是，一旦没有通胀，那这些资产用来避什么难呢？的确，2007年和2008年，投资者由于担心银行体系的的安危，买入了黄金。有些人认为持有货真价实的黄金远比把钱存在破产的
银行里强。
In recent weeks there has been a rise in both LIBOR (a gauge of banks' borrowing costs) and the credit-default-swap spreads on bank bonds (the cost of insuring against default risk). But in neither case are things as bad as they were in the autumn of 2008, when Lehman fell and no bank seemed safe. Gold was only around $900 an ounce during that burst of risk aversion.
最近几周，LIBOR指数（银行借入成本的指标）银行债权的CDS（信用违约互换）利差（为抵御破产风险所支付的成本）都有所上涨。但是两者的情况都比08年秋季时更有起色。当时雷曼倒下，各大银行岌岌可危。即便规避风险的情绪汹涌，当时的金价也不过900美元一盎司。
Of course, safety is relative. The finances of Germany and America look better than those of Greece or Spain. Some say banks have been demanding German bonds as collateral for financing and refusing to accept the bonds of other euro-zone countries. This could be holding down the yields of the most liquid markets.
当然，安全也只是相对的。德国和美国的金融状况要强过希腊和西班牙。有人称银行已经要求以德国债券作为融资担保，拒绝接受其它欧元区国家的债券。此举将抑制多数流动市场的收益。
But that raises a related point that investors seem to be overlooking. Many people argue that Britain and America, for example, are in a better position than euro-zone members like Greece because they can depreciate their currencies. That may be good news for the governments concerned but it is bad news for investors. It does not take much depreciation to wipe out an annual yield of 3-4% a year. For hedge funds and other investors which will not be holding bonds to maturity, currency movements may determine their return. They ought to demand extra yield as compensation for the risk.
但是这也引发了一个投资者似乎忽视了的相关问题。例如许多人认为英国和美国之所以比欧元区成员例如希腊的处境要好是因为这两国贬值了各自的货币。这一消息对于相关的国家是利好，但是对于投资者来说则是噩耗。因为不消贬值多少，3-4%的年收益便可化为乌有。这主要是因为对冲基金和其它投资者不会持有债券一直到期，因此货币波动决定了他们的回报。所以，他们需要寻求额外的收益来作为这一风险的补偿。
Then again, private investors may not be setting the price. Government-bond yields are being held artificially low by central-bank actions. In some cases (the European Central Bank or the Bank of England) this is because of direct purchases of bonds. In others it may be because central banks have rigged the yield curve, holding short-term rates artificially low and inducing banks to make money by buying longer-dated government bonds. A third factor is that Asian central banks are big buyers of Treasury bonds as part of their exchange-rate management policies, and are relatively indifferent to future returns.
然后回过头来看，私人投资者不大可能决定价格。政府债券的收益通过央行的作用被人为地保持在低水平。而在有些情况下（譬如欧洲央行和英格兰银行），低收益又可以归咎于债券可以直接购买。还有其他一些情况，可能是因为央行操纵了收益曲线，人为地将短期利率控制在低位，吸引银行去购买长期国债以获利。第三个因素则是亚洲的央行作为国债的大买家，这是它们汇率管理政策的一部分，它们相对而言不关心未来的回报。
Perhaps the explanation is simpler. Martin Barnes of Bank Credit Analyst, a research firm, points out that the direction of official policy (low rates, quantitative easing, big deficits) looks inflationary but the economic fundamentals (a big output gap, sluggish credit growth) look deflationary. Faced with this dichotomy, investors who buy both Treasury bonds and gold are not displaying cognitive dissonance. They are just hedging their bets.
可能最终的答案没那么深奥。研究公司Bank Credit Analyst的Martin Barnes指出，官方政策的指导（低利率，量化宽松，大规模赤字）看起来似乎引发通胀，但是经济的基本面（大规模的产出缺口，缓慢的信贷增长）又似乎会引发紧缩。面对此等对立情况，同时购买国债和黄金投资者并不是表现出认知失调，他们只是在对冲自己的赌注罢了。
Something doesn't fit
有些不对劲
Why are both Treasury bonds and gold performing so well?
为什么国债和黄金双双走好？
Jun 17th 2010
"ALICE laughed: 'There's no use trying,' she said; 'one can't believe impossible things.' 'I daresay you haven't had much practice,' said the Queen. 'When I was your age, I always did it for half an hour a day. Why, sometimes I've believed as many as six impossible things before breakfast.'"
"爱丽丝笑道：'不用试啦，没用的。人总不能相信不可能的事吧。''我敢说你还没多次练习吧，'皇后说道，我在你这么大时，我总是每天为此花上半个小时，为什么？有时，就早饭前的这一会我已经相信六件不可能的事了！"（爱丽丝仙境奇遇记台词）
Occasionally investors can believe impossible things, as they did when dotcom stocks with no profits were valued at more than flourishing multinationals. But they can also believe in incompatible things, which is even more striking.
偶尔，投资者也会异想天开，譬如当年，投资者便相信了那些毫无利润可言，而且每股定价高于蓬勃发展的跨国公司的网络股。更有甚者，他们甚至相信水火可以兼容，这让人更为咋舌。
Take the recent surge in the gold price to a nominal record of $1,251.20 an ounce. Owning gold is traditionally seen as offering protection against inflation. And inflation is very bad news for owners of government bonds. But the ten-year Treasury bond yields just 3.3%, a level that is towards the low end of the historical range.
以黄金价格为例。最近黄金价格飙升至1,251.20每盎司的的名义价，创下新高。传统而言，持有黄金可以抵御通胀。而通胀对于政府债券所有者来说无异于噩耗。但是目前，10年期的国债收益仅为3.3%，接近历史最低水平。
There is something remarkable about this combination. You would expect the performance of gold and Treasury bonds to be inversely correlated. When gold was at its real all-time high in 1980, the ten-year Treasury-bond yield was 10.8%. Fixed-income investors had suffered years of negative real returns in the 1970s.
低债券收益高黄金价同时出现有其异常之处。黄金和债券的表现一般认为是负相关的（译者注：高金价一般是伴随着高债券收益的，因为金价高意味着投资者不愿意去买国债，因此政府不得不承诺更高的债券收益率来吸引投资者，这会方便大家理解下文。）。在1980年，黄金价格处于最高水平时，10年国债收益率为10.8%。七十年代，固定收益投资者获得的实际回报长年为负。
Adding other assets to the mix does not solve the dilemma. David Ranson of Wainwright Economics, a consultancy, has examined how gold and corporate-bond spreads have worked as a guide to asset allocation since 1978. The gold price is an indicator of inflationary pressures. Bond spreads are an indicator of growth: investors are happy to take the risk of owning corporate bonds, and spreads come down, when the economy, and thus business revenues, are strengthening. Over the year to end-May gold was up by 25% while corporate-bond spreads narrowed sharply. History suggests that such a combination should be bad news for government bonds.
通过向产品组合中加入其它资产并不能纾困。咨询机构Wainwright Economics的David Ranson研究了自1978以来黄金和企业债券利差对资产分配的指导作用。黄金价成为通胀压力的风向标，而企业债券利差则指向增长：当经济向好，由此引发企业收入上升时，投资者乐于冒风险持有企业债券，此时利差下降。截止今年五月底，金价上涨25%而企业债券利差大幅收紧。历史暗示我们此等情况同时出现对于政府债券来说极为不妙。
So what explains the current situation? Both gold and Treasury bonds could be classed as "safe haven" assets that investors buy when they are risk-averse. But if not inflation, safe havens against what? Investors did buy gold in 2007 and 2008 when they were worried about the health of the banking system. Some thought that physical gold would be a lot safer than a deposit in an insolvent bank.
那么，如何解释当前的状况？黄金和国债都可以划分为"避难"资产，即投资者不愿冒险时将其买入。但是，一旦没有通胀，那这些资产用来避什么难呢？的确，2007年和2008年，投资者由于担心银行体系的的安危，买入了黄金。有些人认为持有货真价实的黄金远比把钱存在破产的
银行里强。
In recent weeks there has been a rise in both LIBOR (a gauge of banks' borrowing costs) and the credit-default-swap spreads on bank bonds (the cost of insuring against default risk). But in neither case are things as bad as they were in the autumn of 2008, when Lehman fell and no bank seemed safe. Gold was only around $900 an ounce during that burst of risk aversion.
最近几周，LIBOR指数（银行借入成本的指标）银行债权的CDS（信用违约互换）利差（为抵御破产风险所支付的成本）都有所上涨。但是两者的情况都比08年秋季时更有起色。当时雷曼倒下，各大银行岌岌可危。即便规避风险的情绪汹涌，当时的金价也不过900美元一盎司。
Of course, safety is relative. The finances of Germany and America look better than those of Greece or Spain. Some say banks have been demanding German bonds as collateral for financing and refusing to accept the bonds of other euro-zone countries. This could be holding down the yields of the most liquid markets.
当然，安全也只是相对的。德国和美国的金融状况要强过希腊和西班牙。有人称银行已经要求以德国债券作为融资担保，拒绝接受其它欧元区国家的债券。此举将抑制多数流动市场的收益。
But that raises a related point that investors seem to be overlooking. Many people argue that Britain and America, for example, are in a better position than euro-zone members like Greece because they can depreciate their currencies. That may be good news for the governments concerned but it is bad news for investors. It does not take much depreciation to wipe out an annual yield of 3-4% a year. For hedge funds and other investors which will not be holding bonds to maturity, currency movements may determine their return. They ought to demand extra yield as compensation for the risk.
但是这也引发了一个投资者似乎忽视了的相关问题。例如许多人认为英国和美国之所以比欧元区成员例如希腊的处境要好是因为这两国贬值了各自的货币。这一消息对于相关的国家是利好，但是对于投资者来说则是噩耗。因为不消贬值多少，3-4%的年收益便可化为乌有。这主要是因为对冲基金和其它投资者不会持有债券一直到期，因此货币波动决定了他们的回报。所以，他们需要寻求额外的收益来作为这一风险的补偿。
Then again, private investors may not be setting the price. Government-bond yields are being held artificially low by central-bank actions. In some cases (the European Central Bank or the Bank of England) this is because of direct purchases of bonds. In others it may be because central banks have rigged the yield curve, holding short-term rates artificially low and inducing banks to make money by buying longer-dated government bonds. A third factor is that Asian central banks are big buyers of Treasury bonds as part of their exchange-rate management policies, and are relatively indifferent to future returns.
然后回过头来看，私人投资者不大可能决定价格。政府债券的收益通过央行的作用被人为地保持在低水平。而在有些情况下（譬如欧洲央行和英格兰银行），低收益又可以归咎于债券可以直接购买。还有其他一些情况，可能是因为央行操纵了收益曲线，人为地将短期利率控制在低位，吸引银行去购买长期国债以获利。第三个因素则是亚洲的央行作为国债的大买家，这是它们汇率管理政策的一部分，它们相对而言不关心未来的回报。
Perhaps the explanation is simpler. Martin Barnes of Bank Credit Analyst, a research firm, points out that the direction of official policy (low rates, quantitative easing, big deficits) looks inflationary but the economic fundamentals (a big output gap, sluggish credit growth) look deflationary. Faced with this dichotomy, investors who buy both Treasury bonds and gold are not displaying cognitive dissonance. They are just hedging their bets.
可能最终的答案没那么深奥。研究公司Bank Credit Analyst的Martin Barnes指出，官方政策的指导（低利率，量化宽松，大规模赤字）看起来似乎引发通胀，但是经济的基本面（大规模的产出缺口，缓慢的信贷增长）又似乎会引发紧缩。面对此等对立情况，同时购买国债和黄金投资者并不是表现出认知失调，他们只是在对冲自己的赌注罢了。
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