Not waving. Perhaps drowning

North Korea
朝鲜

Not waving. Perhaps drowning
溺水朝鲜，出路安在

North Korea, a nuclear-armed state, seems to be increasingly unstable. What can the big powers do about it?
朝鲜，一个核武化的国家，看似愈发的动荡不安。几个大国拿它怎么办呢？

May 27th 2010 | SEOUL AND TUMEN | From The Economist print edition



IT IS typical of China's entrepreneurial spirit that on its treacherous border with North Korea, you can hire army-style binoculars for ten yuan ($1.50) apiece to peer into one of the most ruthless police states on earth. It also says a lot about North Korea's couldn't-care-less attitude to the outside world that it makes no attempt to spruce up what voyeurs can see.
虽然中朝边境危机四伏，中国的企业家精神却在这里得到了很好的诠释。每人只需10元（合1.5美元）就能租到军用双筒望远镜遥看世界上一个统治最惨无人道的国家。那里的人们对这些窥探者毫无遮掩之意，这足以说明朝鲜毫不在意外部世界对自己的看法。

The country's crushing poverty is on parade. The biggest block of flats opposite the Chinese border town of Tumen, where the rent-a-binoculars trade flourishes, has no lights on in the fading daylight and its inhabitants can be seen drawing water in buckets from a well. The North Korean farms that run down to the river are so dilapidated they make the regimented red-and blue-roofed housing blocks on the Chinese side look cosy by comparison. Farmers work close enough to the river to see you waving. They do not wave back.
人们看到的是朝鲜的极度贫困。图们市是一个中国与朝鲜接壤的边境城镇，这里的望远镜租赁生意十分兴旺，其对岸坐落着朝鲜一些很大的公寓楼，即使太阳下山了也看不到哪家有点灯的，远远望去还能看到那里的居民在用桶从井里打水。朝鲜的农庄延伸至江边，那里的破败景象与中国一边形成了鲜明的对比，中国那些红蓝屋顶的房屋像兵营一般井然有序，舒适惬意。朝鲜农民劳作的地方离江边很近，都能看到你在挥手，但他们是不会回敬你的。

It seems a bit surprising that there is no border fence running along the North Korean side of the border. But Chinese locals say that there are North Korean snipers dug into the hillside opposite with a shoot-to-kill policy towards escapers.
朝鲜边境竟然没有安装围栏着实让人吃了一惊。不过中国当地居民表示，对面山坡上都藏有狙击手，一旦发现逃跑者就会进行射杀。

The contrast between the two supposedly compatible regimes appears bleakest as a visitor approaches the handsome bridge on China's far-eastern border with North Korea. This was built in 1938 by Japan to support its colonisation of Manchuria and, on the Chinese side, a modern highway big enough for semi-articulated lorries sweeps down to a sprightly border post. But at noon on one recent day there were no trucks. Instead, a handful of Chinese merchants climbed out of taxis, some carrying heavy bundles on poles slung across their shoulders. Battling against freezing sleet, they continued on foot across the bridge to where a shabby border post awaited them with a welcoming message in blood-red letters: "Guard With Your Life The Spirit Of The Revolution That Has The Great Kim Jong Il As Its Leader".
走近连接中国远东地区和朝鲜的那座雄伟大桥，人们才发现心中两个相通的政权却是如此的天壤之别。1938年日本为了支持满洲的殖民地化修建了这座雄伟的大桥，中国这边的一条现代化公路延伸至繁忙的边防哨所，这条路的宽度足以半挂式铰接货车畅行。最近一天的中午根本没有看到卡车；相反，倒是有一些中国商人从出租车里钻出来，他们中还一些人用肩膀扛着沉重的包裹。冒着寒冷的雨雪，他们步行穿越大桥走向对面一座破烂不堪的边检哨所，等待他们的还有深红字体写成的欢迎致辞："誓死捍卫伟大领袖金正日的革命精神"。

Their forlorn-looking journey made it clear that capitalism reaches a dead end on the North Korean side of the Tumen river. The rattle of an engine could just be heard as an old bus took the merchants up a rutted, unpaved road into the mountains. Charitably, you could call those merchants capitalism's foot soldiers. Less charitably, you could see them as part of a sort of 19th-century Great Game from which China has emerged as the one remaining pillar of support for the economically and morally bankrupt regime in Pyongyang.
他们孤独的旅程清楚的表明资本主义在图们江另一边的朝鲜走到了尽头。一俩破旧的公共汽车载着他们行驶在坑坑洼洼的土路上向山里进发，还隐隐可以听见引擎发出的咯咯声。说的客气一点，这些商人就是资本主义的马前卒；不客气的说，你可以把他们看成是又一场类似于19世纪的大博弈的一部分。中国在那次的大国博弈中成为唯一支持朝鲜的后台，那时平壤政权统治下的朝鲜还是一个经济衰败、道德败坏的国家。

It is a relationship that leaves a lot to be desired from China's point of view. China's rulers had no choice but to fete Kim Jong Il and his entourage as, earlier this month, he stepped off a lavish train in Beijing to plead for financial help for a country that his economic "reforms" have brought close to ruin. But China, like much of the rest of the world, was angered by his second nuclear test last year (the first was in 2006). It fears that an escalating nuclear threat on the peninsula could upset the region's delicate security balance, with dangerous consequences for itself. Its attempts to restart the six-party talks that it chairs between North and South Korea, America, Russia and Japan to rid the north of its nuclear weapons have failed.
在中国看来，中朝关系还有很多亟待改进的地方。金正日的经济"改革"已经将朝鲜引向毁灭的边缘，当他本月早些时候走下专列，向中国请求金融援助之时，中国领导人没得选择只能盛情款待金正日及其随行人员。然而，同世界其他国家一样，中国对朝鲜去年进行的第二次核试验（第一次核试验发生于2006年）很是恼怒。中国担心朝鲜半岛逐步升级的核威胁将打破该地区脆弱的安全均势，因为这样势必会对中国本身带来危险的后果。中国为重启六方会谈而做出的种种努力均以失败而告终。六方会谈是指由中国主持，朝鲜、韩国、美国、俄罗斯和日本五国共同参与的旨在解决朝鲜去核化问题的一系列谈判。



Evidence produced by international experts that a North Korean submarine fired a torpedo that sank a South Korean warship, the Cheonan, on March 26th with the loss of 46 sailors' lives, brought additional demands on China this week in the shape of Hillary Clinton, America's secretary of state. The pressure will intensify as South Korea seeks a condemnation of North Korea from the UN Security Council, over which the Chinese have a veto. So far, China has been reluctant to do more than express consternation and call for restraint (see article). Fears of escalation, as both North and South Korea curbed cross-border trade, helped to rattle global financial markets this week, including Shanghai's.
国际专家搜寻到证据证明朝鲜潜艇发射的鱼雷致使韩国"天安舰"沉没。发生在3月26日的"天安舰"沉没事件导致46名海员死亡。本周美国国务卿希拉里•克林顿出访北京，到时她将以自己的方式向中国提出更多的诉求。由于韩国要求联合国安理会对朝鲜实施制裁，拥有否决权的中国将会面临越来越大的压力。迄今为止，中国所做的仅限于对"天安舰"沉没事件表示大为震惊，希望各方保持冷静克制。随着朝韩双方中断边境贸易，人们对朝韩关系可能进一步恶化的恐惧使本周的全球股市动荡不安，也包括上海股市在内。

But the drawbacks of cosseting an unruly ally have long been outweighed for China by the fear of what would happen if the regime running North Korea were to collapse. A paper published in May by the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC, written by two American academics, Bonnie Glaser and Scott Snyder, details the possible consequences: refugees pouring into China and South Korea, insecure weapons of mass destruction ("loose nukes") and the threat of unco-ordinated military actions taken in North Korea by South Korea, China and America.
与放纵一个不守规矩的盟友带来的弊端相比，长期以来中国更担心目前统治朝鲜的政权一旦垮台究竟会产生什么事情。美国国际战略研究中心发表了研究员葛来仪和施奈德撰写的一篇文章，详细论述了金正日政权垮台可能产生的后果：大量难民涌向中国和韩国，大规模杀伤性武器（管理松散的核武器）的安全没有保障，韩国、中国和美国未经协调而采取的军事行动。

Diplomats in the region conjure up other possible crises, including a civil war between opposing factions loyal to different members of Mr Kim's family. A particularly alarming prospect is that of Chinese and American troops facing each other in North Korea with no pre-arranged mechanism for defusing a great-power stand-off.
驻朝鲜的外交官们则想象了其他可能出现的危机，比如效忠金正日家族不同成员的派系可能发动内战。特别值得警惕的一个问题就是中美两军没有建立预先机制，化解在朝鲜可能出现的大国对峙局面。

Given such scenarios, China may choose to cling to the hope that it can maintain the status quo in North Korea. The rogue regime serves as a buffer against American forces in South Korea―and its collapse into a failed state could damage China's prized economic stability.
鉴于这些可能发生的情况，中国可能会抱定希望：他能维持朝鲜的现状。朝鲜这个流氓国家能够充当中国的缓冲区，以对抗驻扎在韩国的美军；朝鲜政权垮台将损害中国看重的经济稳定局面。

Thinking the unthinkable
想其不敢想

But North Korea-watchers now discuss openly the possibility that the regime in Pyongyang may be less solidly entrenched than was once thought. It looked particularly vulnerable in 2008 when Mr Kim had what was thought to be a stroke. Since then his health seems to have improved somewhat―he withstood a punishing work schedule in China―and people who have visited Pyongyang say he appears still to be firmly in control.
目前朝鲜事务专家公开讨论平壤政权可能没有以前想象的那样团结一致、牢不可破。2008年似乎更是不堪一击，当时外界认为金正日患了中风。自那以来，他的身体状况似乎有所好转，比如最近去中国他就经受住了辛苦的日程安排带来的考验。此外，那些去过平壤的人表示，金正日看起来身体状况还很不错/还牢牢地掌握着大权。

Even so, some diplomats speculate that he may be preparing for a succession of sorts, handing over to his third son, Kim Jong Un. This, they suggest, might happen in 2012, the 100th anniversary of the birth of his father, the revered Kim Il Sung. In a nicely North Korean twist, Kim Jong Il will officially be 70 in 2012, and his son will be close enough to 30 to make the switch look preordained to chime with the regime founder's centenary.
即使这样，一些外交家推测金正日可能正准备移交事宜，将大权传给自己的第三个儿子――金正云。他们暗示可能在2012年进行权力移交工作，那年将是金正日的父亲金日成诞辰100周年。这个权利交接真的很有意思，届时金正日将步入70岁高龄，而他的儿子也近30岁，又时值金日成100周年，看起来真是天命如此。

But a handover of power―whenever that happens―may not be smooth. So a number of academics, in China as well as in America and South Korea, are arguing that the three countries―and perhaps Japan and Russia too―should consider a new co-ordinated approach to deal with the eventuality that the hermit kingdom spins dangerously out of control.
不管什么时候进行，权力的移交也许都不会一帆风顺。因此，中美韩三国的大批学者主张这三个国家（也许再加上日本和俄罗斯）应该协调合作，想出一个办法应对这个"隐士王国"可能出现失控的不测情况。

In gauging the regime's stability, analysts look at the economy, the armed services and the political powerbrokers likely to survive Mr Kim's eventual demise. There is a great deal of uncertainty about each―North Korea-watchers have remarkably little to go on. Economic problems are the most apparent but may also be the least important: for years the regime has shown that it can carry on with its policies regardless of the hunger of its people.
在评判朝鲜政权是否稳固时，分析人士通常看其经济发展情况、武装力量及金正日死后可能上台的政治掮客。目前每个问题都带有极大的不确定性，因此这些朝鲜事务专家们根本不敢妄加揣测。朝鲜面临的经济问题是最明显的，但也是最不重要的，因为数年来的事实已经证明即使置人们的饥饿问题与不顾，这个政权也能够照常运行。



Yet it is plain that the economy has suffered appallingly from the crackdown on private markets that started in 2005, culminating in a botched currency reform at the end of last year. Ironically, in a godless country where possession of a Bible can carry the death penalty, Christian missionaries operating not-for-profit factories producing food and other goods inside North Korea provide some of the best first-hand evidence of this, though they speak on condition of anonymity.
不过很明显， 2005年开始的打压私人市场活动让朝鲜经济遭受到沉重打击，去年年底失败的货币改革达到顶峰。颇具讽刺意味的是，在一个携带圣经就会被判死刑的无神论国家竟然有一些基督教传教士经营着生产食品和其他商品的非盈利工厂，尽管他们拒绝透露身份，但这足以提供最好的第一手证据证明朝鲜经济的惨状。

Some missionaries, even American ones, are allowed in and out of the country, provided they do not evangelise. They are rarely able to speak to the closely watched North Koreans. But they say they can see with their own eyes that the level of hunger has become considerably worse in the past few years―in a country where famine led to the deaths of some 1m people, or nearly 5% of the population, in the 1990s.
朝鲜允许一些传教士进出该国，甚至美国传教士也可以，条件是不进行传道活动。他们几乎无法和那些被严密监控的朝鲜人交谈，但是他们表示能够亲眼看到朝鲜民众的饥饿程度比过去几年更加严重。20世纪90年代，朝鲜发生的饥荒导致大约100万人死亡，差不多占全国人口的5%。

For instance, one man who works there says the number of orphans has surged recently as hunger has claimed their parents' lives. Since the state food-distribution system does not provide people with enough to live on, and the main private markets, the jangmadang, were closed, people, he says, have survived on "skeleton markets" operating in back alleys. Even though many of the bigger markets have now reopened, the supply of food is still meagre.
举例来说，一个在这类工厂干活的工人表示，最近由于死于饥饿的人数增多，孤儿的数量出现激增。根据国家食品分配制度分给人们的食物根本不够他们维持生计，主要的私人市场也被关闭，人们只能依靠穷街陋巷的"基本市场"过活。尽管许多较大一点的市场重新开放，食物供应还是匮乏。

Many Chinese merchants have been put off trading because they lost fortunes when they were forced to convert their yuan, dollars and euros in North Korea into the new currency during the reforms. North Korean middlemen, whose savings were confiscated during the redenomination of the currency, have been forced out of business. And the shortages, coupled with a lack of faith in the new won, have caused extreme fluctuations in the price of rice, as well as in the exchange rate.
朝鲜政府推行货币改革，强迫人们将元、美元和欧元兑换成新币种，很多中国商人因此都破产了，无心再做生意。朝鲜中间商的存款在货币置换期间被充公，大都失业破产。物资短缺加上对新朝元缺乏信心，大米价格和汇率出现剧烈波动。

Another man who works in the north-eastern enclave of Rajin-Sonbong, where foreign investment is allowed, says he has seen open expressions of defiance by North Koreans. After the currency reforms, angry citizens threw anonymous notes on the ground criticising the debacle. He says a restaurant he regularly visits with his North Korean police guard allows him to pay in foreign currency, even though there is a notice on the door saying such tender is illegal. On a trip on a rickety bus from the border, he sat alone with a North Korean doctor while the driver mended a puncture. He says she vented her anger over the currency reforms, claiming she had lost her life savings of 20m won ($20,000). Then she asked wistfully how much more she could earn as a doctor in China.
位于朝鲜东北部的罗津先锋允许外资进入，在这里工作的另一个人表示，他看到朝鲜民众公开表达自己的不满。货币改革后，愤怒的朝鲜市民将批评那些致使自己破产的措施的匿名纸条仍的到处都是。他还说经常去的一家餐馆的门上贴着写有"外币支付是违法的"的告示，朝鲜军警还是允许他这样做。从边界回来时他坐上了一辆摇摇晃晃快散架了的公共汽车，在司机补车胎的时候，他和一名朝鲜医生坐着聊天，她对国家实行的货币改革非常恼火，还说一生攒下来的2000万朝元（2万美元）全没了。她若有所思的问道，要是在中国当医生，能挣到多少呢。

Saved by the markets, for a time
暂时的市场提振

To understand the scale of the damage wrought by the crackdown on markets, it is important to recognise what a survival mechanism they had become after famine in the mid-1990s exposed the failure of the state distribution system. The government initially acquiesced in their growth, and they quickly became relatively well stocked and sophisticated.
为了弄清打击私人市场活动带来的损害有多大，了解20世纪90年代中期的饥荒破坏国家分配制度之后，私人市场已经发展成什么样的生存机制则更为重要。起初朝鲜政府默许了这些私人市场的发展，它们的货源很快变得相对充足，经商的经验也更加丰富。

According to Park In-ho, an editor at Daily NK, a web-based news agency based in Seoul but with informants inside North Korea, the markets not only supplied food but also functioned as labour exchanges, gave birth to a private transport industry and led to the emergence of financial services, such as street-corner currency exchanges. There was even, he says, a type of "mutual fund" in which villagers would pool their savings to buy goods from China. When they were sold in North Korea, the profits were distributed.
《每日朝鲜》是一家位于首尔的网站新闻社，但是在朝鲜有自己的消息灵通人士。根据这家新闻社的编辑Park In-ho讲述，朝鲜的私人市场不仅提供食物，也是劳工介绍所。在这些市场里还产生了私人运输业，出现了像街角提供货币兑换业务的金融服务业。他表示，村民甚至拿出自己的存款成立"共同基金"用来从中国购买商品。在韩国将商品卖掉后，再将赚得的利润进行分成。

Even more important, he says, the markets served as a place for valuable information exchange. Illegal DVDs showing South Korean soap operas gave northerners a taste of the better life their former countrymen enjoyed, helping to destroy the myth of South Korea as a downtrodden Yankee colony. Smuggled mobile telephones could be bought, tapping into signals from across the Chinese border. Financial information helped make the markets more efficient. Mr Park believes the gap between rice prices in different parts of the country fell thanks to the new mobile-communication networks.
Park In-ho表示，更为重要的是这些私人市场还是重要情报交换的场所。非法购买的DVD用来播放韩国的肥皂剧，让他们感受到了韩国人享受的美好生活，他们不再相信韩国是美国践踏下的殖民地。也可以买到走私的手机，接收来自中国一方的信号。金融信息让这些私人市场运行的更加高效。Park In-ho认为新的移动通信网络帮助缩小了朝鲜不同地区大米的价格差。

This is not to say that North Korea came to resemble anything like a modern economy. In just one sign of long-standing deprivation, many women still have no choice but to use dried leaves as sanitary towels: a Korean-American missionary says the greatest gift you can give to a North Korean woman is a washable one made of fabric. "They cry with joy."
这并不是说朝鲜经济同现代经济出现相似之处。只需看看朝鲜人们被长期剥夺的权利就知道这根本不是现代经济，很多妇女别无他法只能使用干树叶最为卫生巾。一名韩裔美国传教士表示给朝鲜妇女最好的礼物就是用布做成的耐洗卫生巾，收到这样的礼物会"让他们高兴的哭起来。"

In public statements, the regime in Pyongyang justified the economic measures as a step towards bolstering the socialist economy ahead of the 2012 centenary. Yet in what is seen as an almost unprecedented admission of failure, most of the reforms have been rolled back. A top official is said to have been publicly shot for orchestrating them―though it is barely credible that they could have taken place without Mr Kim's blessing.
在公开声明中，平壤政权辩解说这些措施是为了在2012年金日成诞辰100周年前建成强大的社会主义经济。但是眼前的景象表明这分明是史无前例的失败，现在大部分改革不是被取消就是被限制。据说朝鲜一名高级官员因精心策划这些导致国家陷入困境的改革措施而被公开枪决，但谁都清楚没有金正日的支持根本无法进行这些改革。

The struggle within
内部斗争/内耗

Some North Korea-watchers believe the roots of the debacle go deeper, stemming from power struggles between senior army officers and party officials during and after Mr Kim's illness. According to Park Hyung-jung, of the government-affiliated Korea Institute for National Unification in Seoul, the army was "the artery and backbone" of the growth of the markets after the famine. It had the people (with 1.1m troops, it is the world's fourth-largest standing army), the transport systems and control of the border to enable markets to flourish―and almost every unit had its own trading firm. As one resident of Pyongyang wryly notes, most of the flashy cars in the capital have military licence plates.
一些朝鲜事务专家认为，金正日患病后高级军官和劳动党高管进行的权利之争使得平壤政权垮台的根源更加深刻。位于首尔的韩国统一研究院（Korea Institute for National Unification）是一家隶属于政府的研究机构，该机构研究员Park Hyung-jung透露，朝鲜经历大饥荒后军队是这些私人市场发展的主心骨。朝鲜军方具有促使市场繁荣的有利条件：人数众多，朝鲜现役部队共有110万人，号称世界第四大军队；完善的运输系统；边境出入控制权；几乎每支部队都经营着自己的贸易公司。一个平壤的居民苦笑地指出，平壤城里大部分外观华丽的汽车都挂着军队牌照。

But since 2005 Mr Kim has overseen anti-market measures that seem also to be aimed at returning the soldiers to their garrisons. There are many possible reasons. He may have been worried about the threat that increased private wealth posed to the regime. He may have wanted to erase the stain of corruption and profiteering from his supposedly upstanding soldier-heroes. Or he may have thought that he had done enough to stave off threats to his rule and could go into reverse.
从2005年起金正日就已经开始制定打击私人市场的措施，这一举措看似也旨在令那些忙于赚钱的士兵回到驻防岗位。他这样做可能有很多原因：也许担心增加的私有财富会对其政权构成威胁；也许想铲除腐败行为及那些从他心目中的可敬的士兵英雄手中牟取暴利的现象；抑或被告知他做的已经够多的了，那些威胁其政权的因素被阻挡在千里之外，如果继续进行下去或许会产生不利的效果。

Whatever the reason, the army's role in business has waned. Since Mr Kim's illness in 2008, conservative hardliners including his powerful brother-in-law, Chang Sung Taek, are thought to have become stronger. Mr Chang, who as head of domestic security runs North Korea's equivalent to the KGB, was elected to the powerful National Defence Commission (NDC) last year. He and other NDC members travelled with Mr Kim on his recent visit to China, leading some to suspect they were being presented to China as a government-in-waiting to maintain continuity during the handover of power to his son.
不管源于什么缘故，军队在朝鲜商业中起的作用已经衰弱。2008年金正日患病以来，保守的强硬派变得更加强大，其中就包括金正日的妹夫、实力强大的张成泽。张成泽掌管着朝鲜的国家安全局，负责国内安全工作，并于去年进入势力强大的朝鲜国防委员会(National Defence Commission)。金正日最近一次对北京的访问中就有张成泽及其他委员陪同，这也让外界不由感到在金正日将大权移交给儿子期间，为了维持统治的持续性，他们将作为过渡政府展现给中国。

Perhaps in compensation for its business losses, the army seems to be flexing its muscles. Some analysts reckon that the sinking of the Cheonan has to be seen in this context. Though North Korea has denied its involvement both to its own people and to the outside world, some suspect that the attack was a way to burnish military pride―and also reinforce North Koreans' useful fear of invasion.
也许为了弥补自己在商业上损失，朝鲜军方似乎想展示自己的军事力量。一些分析家认为，必须在这种背景下分析"天安舰"沉没事件。虽然朝鲜对内对外宣称自己与这起事件无关，仍有一些人感觉朝鲜发动攻击是为了重燃自己的军事自豪感，也强化外界入侵在民众的思想意念，长期以来朝鲜使用这招都是很灵的。

If that is indeed the case, it has met a stern foe. Since receiving resounding evidence of North Korea's culpability, Lee Myung-bak, South Korea's pro-business president, has reacted resolutely, shutting off the South's sea lanes to North Korean ships, halting much of the $1.7 billion in inter-Korean trade and reintroducing propaganda broadcasts hurled at the north.
如果真是这样的话，朝鲜真是遇到了一个不屈的对手。搜集到朝鲜"涉案"的确凿证据后，韩国亲商总统李明博做出果断反应，禁止朝鲜船只进入韩国领海，中断大部分的韩朝贸易活动（韩朝年贸易额为17亿美元），重新使用边界的高音喇叭广播对朝鲜进行政治宣传。

But the Cheonan incident also comes at a time when influential voices in America, China and South Korea are starting to worry that none of the countries involved has a contingency plan to cope with an even more momentous event―such as a sudden collapse of the regime. Some outspoken Chinese scholars are raising that previously taboo idea in public, albeit with caveats. Zhu Feng, professor of the School of International Studies at Peking University, told a symposium in Seoul in April that, though Mr Kim appears in control for now, a combination of his poor health, soaring inflation and a succession crisis could finish off the regime. He stressed that the risks of such an eventuality were too great to ignore and that countries needed to prepare an "emergency plan".
"天安舰"沉没事件来的也真是时候，中国、美国及韩国有影响的人士开始担忧起来，因为有关各方根本没有应急预案来处理更糟糕的状况，比如金正日政权垮台。虽然中国当局多次警告，国内的一些学者还是直言不讳的在公共场合谈论以前为人所忌讳的观点。北京大学国际关系学院教授朱峰四月在参加首尔的一个研讨会时表示，虽然表面看来金正日还是大权在握，但是身体的不适、朝鲜国内激增的通货膨胀率及政权继承危机的组合作用可能会结束这个政权。他强调这件不测事件带来的危险很大，不容忽视，这几个国家需用准备一个"应急计划"。

The governments themselves do not, at least publicly, rate the possibility of collapse very high. South Korean officials play it down, arguing that sometimes North Korea acts illogically for no apparent reason. The North Koreans, says Wi Sung-lac, the foreign ministry's main representative in the six-party process, "sometimes build with one hand, demolish with the other. The currency-exchange reform and its aftermath have disillusioned people. But in talking about the nature of this regime, disillusion does not make much difference."
这几个国家的政府认为朝鲜政权的垮台的可能性并不高，至少对外界是这样说的。韩国官员对此也是轻描淡写，表示朝鲜做出这样不合逻辑的行为毫无缘由。朝核六方会谈韩国主要代表魏圣洛表示，"朝鲜方面有时一手搞建设，一手搞破坏。朝鲜进行的货币兑换改革及其带来的后果已经打破了人们的幻想。但是谈到朝鲜政权的本质，民众心中幻想的破灭对其没多大影响。"



China's president, Hu Jintao, speaks of passing on the two countries' friendship "from generation to generation"―which sounds a bit as if he were extending the hand of friendship to Mr Kim's eventual heir. Meanwhile China continues to invest in mines in North Korea and a potentially valuable docking facility in Rajin-Sonbong that gives it its first access to the Sea of Japan. As Ms Glaser of the CSIS puts it, China still sees North Korea more as a strategic asset than a liability.
中国国家主席胡锦涛表示，要将中朝"友谊""世代相传"，听起来有点像胡正向金正日的最终继任者伸出友谊之手。与此同时，中国继续在朝鲜煤炭领域进行投资，将在朝鲜的罗津先锋建造意义重大的泊船设施，首次开辟日本海通道。正如美国国际战略研究中心的葛来仪所述，中国仍然视朝鲜为自己的战略资产，而不是一个累赘。

If China is wrong, however, and a meltdown does occur, the risks are enormous. North Korea's GDP per head is about 6% that of South Korea's (see chart), which is far lower than East Germany's was compared with West Germany when the Berlin Wall collapsed. This means that unifying the two countries could be treacherous, with costs that the South Korean central bank has put as high as $900 billion over four decades. There could be arguments over which special forces―China's or America's―would secure the north's nuclear weapons. And if a desperate North Korea started shooting missiles at its enemies in the region, how would America and China react?
然而，一旦中国押错了赌注，朝鲜政权垮台，那么造成的风险也是不可估量的。朝鲜人均国内生产总值（GDP）约为韩国的6%，这比柏林墙倒塌时东德同西德之间的差距还要大。这就意味着实现两个国家的统一可能不牢靠，况且过去40年韩国央行已经投入高达9000亿美元的资金。朝鲜政权垮台后还可能引起其他的争论，哪支特种部队来保障朝鲜核武器的安全，是中国的还是美国的？如是孤注一掷的朝鲜向这一地区的敌人发射导弹，美国和中国又该如何应对？

It is for reasons like this that people are beginning to believe that it would be good for the countries involved to have talks at some level―albeit secret ones. Planning in advance should help to avoid potentially catastrophic misunderstandings. The outside world's knowledge of the regime in Pyongyang is minimal and China may not want to offend an old ally. But sooner or later, Mr Kim will go, and that will mark a moment of immense tension in a country where his personality cult is about the only thing the people have left. No one needs a pair of binoculars to see that.
正是这类的原因使得人们开始认为，有关国家有必要举行某种级别的会谈，即使秘密会谈也行。预先制定计划有助于避免误解可能导致的灾难性后果。外界对平壤政权的了解程度是很低的，中国也许并不想激怒自己的老盟友。但是金正日迟早会下台，到那时在这个局势紧张的国家里留给民众的也仅仅是对他的个人崇拜罢了。这些东西不用双筒望远镜也能看得到。