Growth tends to slow when GDP per head reaches a certain threshold. China is getting close

BRIC wall
 金砖四国发展之墙

 

Growth tends to slow when GDP per head reaches a certain threshold. China is getting close
 各国经济趋缓GDP已达到一定程度的临限，中国也快了

 

Apr 14th 2011 | from the print edition

 

 

 

 THE economic crisis may have been debilitating for the rich world but for emerging markets it has been closer to a triumph. In 2010 China overtook a limping Japan as the world's second-largest economy. It looks sets to catch America within a decade or two. India and Brazil are growing rapidly. The past few years have reinforced the suspicion of many that the story of the century will be the inexorable rise of emerging economies. If projections of future growth look rosy for emerging markets, however, history counsels caution. The post-war period is rich in examples of blistering catch-up growth. But at some point growth starts to disappoint. Gaining ground on the leaders is far easier than overtaking them.

 

 经济危机依然在使发达国家经济虚弱，但新兴市场几乎取得巨大的成功。在2010年中国一跃超过日本，成为世界第二大经济体，并且有望在10到20年的时间赶上美国。印度和巴西经济增长也非常迅速。过去的几年时间增强很多人这样的一种怀疑：新兴经济体的增长势不可挡。新兴市场对未来经济增长的规划项目是否感到乐观， 然而，以史为鉴，战后一段时期有许多赶上经济增长的实例，但是在一些方面的增长确实令人感到沮丧。从发达国家获得经验发展容易，但是超越他们确实很难

 

 Rapid growth is initially easy because the leader has already trodden a clear path. Developing countries can borrow existing technologies from countries that have already become rich. Advanced economies may be stuck with obsolete infrastructure; laggards can skip right to the shiniest and best. Labour productivity soars as poor economies shift workers from agriculture to a growing manufacturing sector. And rapid income growth among young workers boosts savings and fuels investment.
 刚开始经济很容易就增长是因为领导者已踩出一条明确的路线，发展中国家可以从致富的国家借用技术，发达国家可能为过时的基础设施犯愁，落后者可一跃成为闪耀的发展好的国家。弱国从农业到工业的转化中实现劳动生产率的不断提高。
 年青一代的收入快速增长由储蓄和石油投资方面获得。

 

 But the more an emerging economy resembles the leaders, the harder it is to sustain the pace. As the stock of borrowable ideas runs low, the developing economy must begin innovating for itself. The supply of cheap agricultural labour dries up and a rising number of workers take jobs in the service sector, where productivity improvements are more difficult to achieve. The moment of convergence with the leaders, which once seemed within easy reach, retreats into the future. Growth rates may slow, as they did in the case of western Europe and the Asian tigers, or they may falter, as in Latin America in the 1990s.

 

 但是新兴经济体越是模仿发达国家，就越是赶不上步伐。可借鉴的思想越来越少，发展中国家必须自己创新。农业廉价劳动力供应枯竭，越来越多的工人也都在服务业找到工作，那么劳动生产率的提高就更难了 ，这个时候正是收敛的时候了，对未来退缩啦，增长率缓慢，就像是西欧和亚洲四小龙的情况，或者说是衰落了，就像是19世纪90年代的拉丁美洲

 

 The world's reliance on emerging markets as engines of growth lends urgency to the question of just when this "middle-income trap" is sprung. In a new paper* Barry Eichengreen of the University of California, Berkeley, Donghyun Park of the Asian Development Bank and Kwanho Shin of Korea University examine the economic record since 1957 in an attempt to identify potential warning-signs. The authors focus on countries whose GDP per head on a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) basis grew by more than 3.5% a year for seven years, and then suffered a sharp slowdown in which growth dipped by two percentage points or more. They ignore slowdowns that occur when GDP per head is still below $10,000 on a PPP basis, limiting the sample to countries enjoying sustained catch-up growth. What emerges is an estimate of a critical threshold: on average, growth slowdowns occur when per-head GDP reaches around $16,740 at PPP. The average growth rate then drops from 5.6% a year to 2.1%.

 

 全球坚信新兴市场是经济增长动力，并把此当为"中等收入陷阱"出现时紧急的处理方法，在 一报告中 ，加利福尼亚大学的Barry Eichengreen ，亚洲发展银行的Berkeley, Donghyun Park 和高丽大学的 Kwanho Shin 调查了自1957年以来的经济记录，试图确认潜在的警告信号，这些人关注这样一些国家，即在购买力平价理论基础上GDP 7年连续增长超过3.5%，然后遭受缓慢增长比原来降2个百分点或更多的国家，他们忽略那些在购买力平价理论基础上GDP低于$10,000  的国家，并把这些国家局限在经济持续增长的国家，这样一个预测的临界点，通常来说在购买力平价理论基础上GDP达到约$16,740 时经济开始放缓，平均增长率会由5.6%降到2.1%

 

 This estimate passes the smell test of history (see chart). In the 1970s growth rates in western Europe and Japan cooled off at approximately the $16,740 threshold. Singapore's early-1980s slowdown matches the model, as does the experience of South Korea and Taiwan in the late 1990s. As these examples indicate, a deceleration need not precipitate disaster. Growth often continues and may accelerate again; the authors identify a number of cases in which a slowdown proceeds in steps. Japan's initial boom lost steam in the early 1970s, but its economy continued to grow faster than other rich nations until its 1990s blow-up.

 

 如图所示，1970年代西欧和日本的增长降到约$16,740 的界限值，新加坡在1980年代早期的经济也到这个程度，相继的是韩国和台湾在1990年代后期也是这样。这些实例表明经济减速需要的不是经济加速的祸害，经济依然在增长且有可能继续加速，这些发起人通过一些步骤验明了一系列的经济发展迟缓的情况，日本在1970年代早期没经过蒸汽时代也开始迅速发展　，但是直到1990年代它的经济依然比其他富国发展的更加迅速　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　

 

 In the right circumstances the good times may be prolonged, allowing an economy to reach a higher income level before the inevitable slowdown. When America passed the threshold it was the world leader and was able to keep growing rapidly so long as its own innovative prowess allowed. Britain's experience indicates economic liberalisation or a fortunate turn of the business cycle may also prevent the threshold from binding at once.

 

 好的经济状况下，这些时间有可能更长，在不可避免的经济放缓之前有可能使国家达到高收入水平。当美国越过这个临限，就成了世界的领导者并且他们有一种创新能力能够保持经济的快速增长，英国的发展表明经济自由化或者是商业循环的幸运转折也能跨越界限的束缚

 

 Openness to trade appears to be a potent stimulant: the authors attribute the outperformance of Hong Kong and Singapore to this effect. Lifting consumption to just over 60% of GDP is useful, as is a low and stable rate of inflation. Neither financial openness nor changes of political regime seem to matter much, but a large ratio of workers to dependents reduces the odds of a slowdown. An undervalued exchange rate, on the other hand, appears to contribute to a higher probability of a slowdown. The reason for this is not clear but the authors suggest that undervaluation could lead countries to neglect their innovative capacity, or may contribute to imbalances that choke off a boom.

 

 贸易开放似乎是强大的兴奋剂，这些人把香港和新加坡的流出状态归于此，把消费提升到GDP的60%很有用，对通货膨胀来说是一个低而稳定的比率，不论是经济开放或是政治制度变更似乎其的作用都不大，估价过低的交易利率，另一方面可能对高风险的经济放缓起到一定作用，原因尚不清楚，但是这些人提出这种低估可能导致国家忽略自己的创新能力，或者是导致阻塞发展的不协调性

 

Middle Kingdom, middle income
 中等王国，中等收入

 

 The authors are careful to say that there is no iron law of slowdowns. Even so, their analysis is unlikely to cheer the leadership in Beijing. China's torrid growth puts it on course to hit the $16,740 GDP-per-head threshold by 2015, well ahead of the likes of Brazil and India. Given the Chinese economy's long list of risk factors―including an older population, low levels of consumption and a substantially undervalued currency―the authors suggest that the odds of a slowdown are over 70%. It is hazardous to extend any analysis to a country as unique as China. The authors acknowledge that rapid development could shift inland, where millions of workers have yet to move into manufacturing, while the coastal cities nurture an ability to innovate. The IMF forecasts real GDP growth rates above 9% through to 2016; a slowdown to 7-8% does not sound that scary. But past experience indicates that slowdowns are frequently accompanied by crises. In East Asia in the late 1990s it became clear that investments which made sense at growth rates of 7%, say, did not at expansion rates of 5%. Political systems may prove similarly vulnerable: it has been many years since China has to deal with an annual growth rate below 7%. Structural reforms can help to cushion the effects of a slowdown. It would be wise for China to pursue such reforms during fat years rather than the leaner ones that will, eventually, come.

 

 研究者谨慎的说，经济放缓没有铁定的规律，即使这样，他们的分析也并不对来自北京的领导祝贺什么，中国艰难的经济增长有可能到2015年把  $16,740 GDP-per-head  的界限打破，排在印度和巴西的前面，中国经济发展的风险因素包括：人口老龄化，低消费水平，和持续贬值的货币―研究者们经济放缓几率超过70%.把这些分析强加到像中国这样优秀的国家是冒很大风险的，研究者们承认快速发展可以转移到内陆，这些地方的工人都转向制造业，而在沿海地区培养一种创新能力。IMF预测实际的经济增长率超过9%达到2016；经济增长放缓到7%---8%并不可怕，但是过去的经验表明经济放缓大多是伴随经济危机的，以19世纪90年代末的东亚为例，投资预言增长7%但是并未达到5%。政治体系也被证实是很脆弱的了。中国年均增长率一直低于7%也有好长一段时间，结构改革对经济放缓有一定的缓冲作用。对于中国来说在肥年追求这样一种改革比在瘦年追求这样的改革更加明智

 

 "When Fast Growing Economies Slow Down: International Evidence and Implications for China". NBER working paper, March 2011   
 "快速增长的经济体放缓脚步，对中国来说的国际证据和推断"NBER工作报告,2011年3月