Why China fails at football
中国足球萎靡不振，原因何在？
Little red card
小红牌
The telling reasons why, at least in football, China is unlikely to rule the world in the near future
在不久的将来，中国至少在足球领域不太可能统治世界的有力理由
Dec 17th 2011 | from the print edition
The Buddha tells the people he can fulfil only one of their wishes. Someone asks: "Could you lower the price of property in China so that people can afford it?" Seeing the Buddha frown in silence, the person makes another wish: "Could you make the Chinese football team qualify for a World Cup?" After a long sigh, the Buddha says: "Let's talk about property prices."
佛说，他仅能实现人的一个愿望。有人问："您能把中国房价降到人们承受得起的水平吗？"见佛眉头紧蹙、一言不发，那人许下另一个愿望："您能让中国足球队打进世界杯吗？"佛一声长叹，说道："我们来谈下房价吧。"
THE pass back to the goalkeeper seemed routine for Qingdao Hailifeng FC in its match against Sichuan FC in September 2009, even if the ball was struck a little too hard and the keeper only just managed to stop it running past him and into the net. Qingdao was safely ahead 3-0 with two minutes left in a meaningless match in China's second division. What could be amiss?
在 2009 年 9 月青岛海利丰足球俱乐部对阵四川队的比赛中，回传守门员似乎成了海利丰的惯例。即使稍稍用力击打皮球，守门员也只是刚好能够停球跃身入网。在一场无足轻重的中甲比赛中，青岛队在比赛时间还剩两分钟时 3-0 领先对手，锁定胜局。哪根经抽了？
Then a Qingdao assistant coach gestured for the keeper to come forward from the penalty area. Another Qingdao player promptly chipped the ball over him and towards the net, missing an own goal by inches. The final whistle blew soon afterwards.
随后，一名青岛助理教练示意守门员从禁区位置提上。另外一名青岛队员旋即一角吊球，皮球越过守门员，直奔球网，差几英寸就自摆乌龙。接着比赛终场哨声吹响。
Qingdao's owner Du Yunqi was irate―at his team's utter incompetence. As he would later admit to investigators, he had just lost a bet that there would be a total of four goals scored in the game. His humiliated assistant coach said on national television, "Afterward the boss was angry and scolded me, saying I bungled things and couldn't even fix a match."
青岛队老板杜允琪对于球队的无能表现十分恼火。正如日后向调查人员所供认的，他刚输掉了一场关于本场比赛进四球的赌局。蒙羞的青岛队助理教练在国家电视台上说："比赛结束后，老板生了气，训斥了我，还说我把事搞砸了，连一场比赛都搞不定。"
The hapless case of "chip-shot gate", as the Qingdao game came to be known, is just one low point in aeons of Chinese footballing ineptitude. The only time China qualified for the World Cup finals, in 2002, its side failed to score in any of its three matches; the team has never won a game at the Olympics. And Chinese players are sometimes too incompetent not only to win matches, but also to rig them.
中国足球技能低下由来已久。这次逐渐为人所知的青岛队"吊球门"霉运事件只是这一漫长历程中的一个低点而已。中国男足仅打进过 2002 的世界杯。当时，中国队三场比赛未进一球。在奥运会比赛中，中国男足未曾赢过一场胜利。而且，中国运动员有时能力低下到不仅无法赢得比赛，就连操纵比赛都不能如其所愿。
In a country so proud of its global stature, football is a painful national joke. Perhaps because Chinese fans love the sport madly and want desperately for their nation to succeed at it, football is the common reference point by which people understand and measure failure. When, in 2008, milk powder from the Chinese company Sanlu was found to have been tainted with melamine, causing a national scandal, the joke was: "Sanlu milk, the exclusive milk of the Chinese national football team!"
中国如此在乎自己的全球地位，而足球却是一个令人痛心的民族笑柄。或许是因为中国球迷疯狂地热爱这项运动，迫切地渴求国足功成名就，足球也就成了人们理解和衡量失败的共同参考点。当 2008 年查出三鹿奶粉遭三聚氰胺污染，招致民族丑闻时，就有了这样的笑话："三鹿奶粉，国足指定专用奶粉！"
Everyone is free to take aim, and publicly. When China was dispatched 2-0 by Belgium in the 2008 Olympics in Beijing (pictured above), a presenter on national CCTV said: "The Chinese football team decided to get out quickly, so as not to affect the people's mood while they watch the Olympics." Chinese fans chanted for the ouster of the head of China's Football Association, Xie Yalong. The authorities sacked Mr Xie shortly after the games.
每个人都可以自由地公开开炮。当 2008 年北京奥运会上中国队遭比利时 2-0 拿下时（见上图），央视的一名主持人说："中国国足可能是怕影响大家看奥运开心的心情，所以决定提前退出比赛。"中国球迷反复高喊口号，要求中国足协主席谢亚龙下课。当局在奥运会结束后解雇了谢亚龙。
All this hints at something rather unique and powerful about the place of football in Chinese society. It is, like all organised sport in China, ultimately the domain of the government; so, according to the Communist Party's normal methods, senior football officials should be provided at least some protection from scrutiny. In general the secretive state machinery of sport is shielded from public inspection, as it manufactures medal-winning Olympic athletes in dozens of disciplines. Chinese football, though, is so flagrantly and undeniably terrible and corrupt that all potshots are allowed: at officials, referees, owners and players―even, implicitly, at the heart of the communist system itself.
所有这些都暗示出足球在中国社会中相当独特而又强大的地位。同中国所有的组织性体育项目一样，足球最终属于政府的管辖领域；因此，依共产党的正常做法，最少也会提供高级足球官员某些免于审查的保护。当秘密的国家体育机构在数十个奥林匹克分项运动中培养出摘牌运动员时，它会一般会免于公众审查。然而，中国足球表现糟糕、腐败堕落、臭名昭著且不容辩驳，所有的肆意抨击都未加禁止：官员、裁判、老总以及球员都是抨击对象――甚至还隐含这对共产主义制度核心的抨击。
Solving the riddle of why Chinese football is so awful becomes, then, a subversive inquiry. It involves unravelling much of what might be wrong with China and its politics. Every Chinese citizen who cares about football participates in this subversion, each with some theory―blaming the schools, the scarcity of pitches, the state's emphasis on individual over team sport, its ruthless treatment of athletes, the one-child policy, bribery and the corrosive influence of gambling. Most lead back to the same conclusion: the root cause is the system.
这样一来，解开中国足球糟糕表现之谜也就成为一项颠覆性的调查。这一调查涉及到阐明中国及其政治在多大程度上出现了差错。每一位关心足球的中国公民都参与到了这场颠覆性的调查中，每个人都提出了某种理论――责备学校，球场稀缺，国家对个人的重视高于对团队的重视，国家对待运动员的无情态度，独身子女政策，贿赂以及赌博的腐蚀。大多数调查都回到同一个结论：根源是制度。
A recent crackdown on football corruption offers little solace; it simply mirrors the pyrrhic campaigns against official corruption elsewhere in China. A mid-level functionary in China's state security apparatus puts it candidly: "You know all those problems with society that you like to blame on China's political system? Well it really is like that with football."
最近的打击足球腐败鲜有慰藉之用；只不过同那些付出极大代价打击其他领域的官员腐败如出一辙罢了。一位中国国家安全机构的中层官员坦率地指出："你知道所有那些你可能会怪罪到中国政治体制头上的社会问题吗？好吧，足球真的就像那么回事儿。"
Three little wishes
三个小愿望
China cherishes its many inventions, real and purported. It recently laid official claim to creating Mongolian throat singing (much to Mongolia's consternation). With the blessing of the international football body FIFA, China also claims the world's earliest recorded mention of a sport similar to football, during the Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC. A version of the game cuju, or "kick ball", involved a single, elevated net and two sides of 12 men.
中国珍视自己的许多发明创造，真实的也好，宣称的也罢。最近，中国正式声称创造了蒙古喉音唱法（这令蒙古惊慌失措）。经国际足协同意，中国也宣称在公元前 2 世纪的汉代就提到了一项类似足球运动的记载，为世界之最。这项运动是"蹴鞠"的变体，也称"踢球"。它涉及一个高架网以及两组队员，每组各12名。
In later centuries a version of the sport prevailed that favoured individual over team skill. China's rulers took an interest; one Ming-era painting depicts the Xuande Emperor watching his subjects kick the ball around at court. However, by the time football was indigenously innovated in England in the 19th century, cuju and its variants had all but disappeared.
在随后的几个世纪里，蹴鞠的一个变体兴盛了起来，它偏重个体而非团队技能。中国统治者对此别有一番兴致；一幅明朝时期的绘画描绘了宣德皇帝观看臣民在宫廷中踢球的场景。然而，到 19 世纪足球在英格兰本土发明时，蹴鞠及其变体几乎杳无踪影了。
Football was then introduced to modern China as a foreign invention―but the young nationalists who would later lead the nation still took to it. In his early 20s Mao Zedong played keeper at a teachers' college in his native Hunan Province. Deng Xiaoping spent precious francs to watch football at the 1924 Olympics in Paris, where he was studying. After he became one of China's most powerful leaders, Deng, still a football fanatic, paid a visit to the national team, saying that he hoped they would become an excellent side "as soon as possible".
随后，足球作为一项外国发明引进至现代中国――但是未来领导这个国家的民族主义青年们仍然对它产生了好感。20 岁出头的毛泽东在家乡湖南省的一所师范学院打守门员的位置。留法期间，邓小平花费不菲法郎观看 1924 年巴黎奥林匹克足球赛。成为中国最有权势的领导人之一之后，邓小平依旧是个足球迷。他参观过国家队，希望国家队能"尽快"变成一支卓越的球队。
That was in 1952. Four years later, after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) football team lost to a Yugoslav youth team, Mao met the Yugoslav side and (according to the PLA Daily) said, "We lost to you now and perhaps will keep losing for 12 years. But it would be very good to win in the 13th year." By 1969 Chinese football was instead in a shambles, amid the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.
那是 1952 年发生的事情了。1956年，在中国人民解放军足球队输给南斯拉夫青年队后，毛泽东接见了南斯拉夫队（据《解放日报》报道）并说道，"我们今天输给你们，明天输给你们，但13年之后要赢你们！"然而，时至 1969 年，处于"文化大革命"动荡期间的中国足球一片混乱。
This July, undeterred by the lack of progress in the intervening decades, Vice-President Xi Jinping, China's presumed next leader and also a football fan, added his own "three wishes": first, qualify for another World Cup; second, host a World Cup; finally, win a World Cup. Wisely, Mr Xi did not set any deadlines.
到今年七月，几十载荏苒岁月，中国足球止步不前，但很可能担任下一届领导人的国家副主席习近平并不为其所惧。他自己也是一个球迷，提出自己的"三个愿望"：第一，世界杯再次出线；第二，举办一届世界杯；最后，获得世界杯冠军。习近平的聪明之处在于他并没有设定任何一个截止日期。
So whatever ails Chinese football, it is not a lack of passion from the country's leaders. If anything, the opposite may be the problem. China's Party-controlled, top-down approach to sport has yielded some magnificent results in individual sports, helping China win more Olympic gold medals in Beijing in 2008 than any other country. But this "Soviet model" has proven catastrophically unsuitable for assembling a team of 11 football players, much less a nation of them.
因此，不管困扰中国足球因素是什么的，缺乏国家领导人的热情肯定不在其中。要是说有什么的话，倒是国家领导人的热情可能是问题所在。在个人大项运动中，中国政党控制、自上而下的体育管理方式取得了某些辉煌的成就，帮助中国在 2008 年北京奥运会上摘得比其他任何国家都多的金牌数。但是这种"苏联模式"被证明彻底不适合组建一支由 11 名足球运动员的团队，更不用说一个打造一个足球运动员国度了。
The first problem is the method of identifying young talent. The sport system selects children with particular attributes, such as long limbs, which could pay off in athletics, rowing, swimming, diving or gymnastics. These youngsters are the genetic wheat. But football's legends can emerge from the seeming chaff of human physiques: think of stocky Diego Maradona, perhaps the greatest ever player, or his Argentine successor, the tiny genius Lionel Messi.
第一个问题是鉴别有天赋的年轻球员的方法。中国体育制度采用某些奇特的素质来筛选儿童，比如，四肢颀长。在田径、划艇、游泳、跳水或是体操中，这些特质可能会奏效。这些青少年有小麦的基因。但是足球传奇人物可能从似是而非的糠麸体格中涌现出来：想想可能是有史以来最伟大的球员迭戈•马拉多纳 (Diego Maradona)吧，或是他的阿根廷继承者，矮小的天才球员莱昂内尔•梅西 (Lionel Messi)。
Then there is the matter of gold medals and opportunity costs. China pursues gold by funnelling athletes into obscure individual sports that can reap multiple medals in competitions. Football can only yield one medal or World Cup (two, counting the women: Chinese women have fared much better against a less-developed international field).
这样一来，就有了金牌数量与机会成本的问题。名不见经传的个人项目在比赛中可以收获多枚奖牌。中国通过把运动员输送到这些项目中来实现夺金目标。足球仅能斩获一枚奖牌或是赢得一次世界杯冠军（算上女子合计两枚或两次：中国女足在发展程度相对较低的国际比赛中的成绩远在男足之上）。
But the contradictions and weaknesses of Chinese capitalism have also played a part in the country's footballing ignominy. In the early 1990s, with economic reforms taking hold, China slowly allowed some of its state-run teams to act more like commercial ventures, eventually establishing a professional league of clubs with corporate sponsorships, investments and higher salaries. The pay for players was still quite low in comparison with Europe, but big domestic stars began earning hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, a fortune at the time. The "professional" football era began in 1994, but as with any other organised activity in China, the state retained control.
但是足球运动声名狼藉，中国资本主义的矛盾与弱点也难咎其责。20 世纪 90 年代初期，经济改革的影响显现，中国慢慢地允许有国家经营的球队更多地像商业投资一样地运作，最终成立一支俱乐部职业联赛，拥有企业赞助、公司投资以及更高薪酬。相比于欧洲，球员工资依旧很低，但是国内大牌球星开始一年收入几十万美金。这在当时可算一笔财富。"职业"足球时代开启于 1994 年，但是同其他任何一项有组织的活动一样，国家保留着控制权。
In the event, adding heaps of money to an unaccountable bureaucracy made matters worse. State-owned enterprises, seeking glory on the pitch, lavished government money on the teams they sponsored. Private corporate investors followed suit, and cut-throat competition dramatically raised star-player salaries. A similar pay spiral has afflicted other countries' leagues, too; but, in China, some clubs with less wealthy backers found distinctive and creative ways to survive.
结果，数额庞大的款项与不负责任的官僚体系相结合使得事情雪上加霜。谋求球场荣耀的国有企业慷慨地将政府资金施舍给他们赞助的球队。私营公司紧随其后。残酷的竞争大幅提升了明星球员的工资。类似的工资急剧上升也折磨着其他国家的联赛；但是，在中国，一些靠山财力不太雄厚的俱乐部找到了别出心裁的生存方式。
Investors would contrive to fix games as favours to the local officials who nominally controlled the clubs (these types of matches are called "favour", "relationship" or "tacit" matches, and are not viewed negatively by many within the game). Gambling syndicates, including the triads, began exerting influence over investors, referees, coaches and players. A spoils system evolved, and everyone took their cuts.
投资者会设法操纵比赛作为对名义上控制俱乐部的当地官员的恩惠（这些比赛称作"人情赛"、"友谊赛"或是"默契赛"，且并不被足球运动中的多数人消极看待）。包括三合会在内的赌博集团开始对投资者、裁判、教练以及球员施加影响。一种分赃制演化出来，每人拿取各自份额。
Blowing the golden whistle
揭发"金哨"
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear to some insiders that few people in football cared about the quality or integrity of the game. One of the pioneer investors, Wang Jianlin of the Dalian Wanda Group, a property conglomerate, gave up his company's sponsorship of the team in the north-eastern city of Dalian in 1999-2000―explaining years later that he did so in part because of the sport's infiltration by gambling interests. Geely, a carmaker, withdrew its support of a club in the southern city of Guangzhou in 2001, just eight months after agreeing to invest. "I was shocked," Geely's chief, Li Shufu, told the media. "For a match, bribes of one million, two million yuan [$120,000-240,000] were offered, and not a single football official or referee ever got caught."
到 20 世纪 90 年代后期，足球界几乎没什么人在乎足球运动的质量或正直。这对于某些圈内人士而言显而易见。房地产跨业企业大连万达集团的王健林是早期的投资者之一。他放弃了 1999-2000 年万达对大连球队的赞助。数年之后，他解释部分原因在于足球运动遭赌博利益渗透。汽车制造商吉利在 2001 年撤消了对广州一家俱乐部的支持，此时距同意投资仅过了八个月。"我震惊了，"吉利老总李书福对媒体说。"一场比赛，行贿一百万、两百万（合 120,000-240,000 美元），但一个足球官员或裁判都没抓。"
Almost no one got caught because, in proper Communist fashion, an organisation that was deeply involved in fixing matches, the Chinese Football Association, was the same authority charged, in 2001, with investigating and punishing misconduct. A whitewash was the outcome, not coincidentally just months before China's first World Cup finals in 2002.
几乎没人被捕的原因在于，2001 年深深卷入操纵比赛漩涡的中国足球协会恰恰也是授权调查与惩罚非法行为的机关，而这正是共产主义的行事方式。结果就是掩饰真相。这发生在中国于 2002 年首次亮相于世界杯决赛阶段比赛的数月之前，并非巧合。
After China's ignominious exit from the competition, things got worse. Corporate sponsorships and investments declined, hitting salaries and making players yet more susceptible to gambling syndicates. At the same time, with the Chinese economy flourishing, the volume of betting rose dramatically.
中国在比赛中耻辱出局后，事态恶化了。公司赞助与投资消减，球员工资降低，也更容易受赌博集团的影响。与此同时，伴随着中国经济的繁荣，赌注规模也急剧飙升。
Finally, in 2007, an investigation of match-fixing in Singapore followed a trail back to Chinese ringleaders. Singapore's authorities tipped off police in north-eastern China, who uncovered match-fixing irregularities there, ultimately forcing, in 2009-10, a second, more severe reckoning for Chinese football. (Likewise, probes into financial crimes in Hong Kong have occasionally ensnared mainland officials who might otherwise have escaped punishment.) This time some 20 people, including a referee previously considered the game's most honest―and known as the "golden whistle" for his incorruptibility―were caught in the crackdown.
最终，在 2007 年，一项针对发生在新加波的操纵比赛调查顺藤摸瓜，引向中国的罪魁祸首。新加坡当局向揭发当地操纵比赛违法行为的中国东北警方告密，最终迫使中国在 2009-2010 年再次掀起了一场针对足球界更为严厉的惩罚。（同样，香港的金融犯罪调查偶尔也会卷入或许会逃脱惩罚的大陆官员。）在此次打击活动中，约 20 名人员被捕，包括一名以前视为中国足球运动中最为诚实的裁判（因其廉洁正直而被冠以"金哨"称号）。
As officials were detained, a parade of tearful confessions and recriminations played out on national television. Huang Junjie, a referee and one of those in tears, explained that he had once refused a bribe from a club to fix a match only because a leading football association official had already asked him to rig it. Mr Huang gave the public an idea of match-rigging lingo as well: when an official texted him to provide "even-handed justice", it meant he should favour a visiting team over the home side.
随着官员批捕，一串串泪眼朦胧的忏悔以及一声声指责批评之词出现在国家电视台里。黄俊杰就是眼含泪水的一名裁判。他解释说，自己曾拒绝一家俱乐部行贿以操纵比赛，只是因为一位知名的足协官员要求他操纵比赛，他才这么做的。黄俊杰也告诉了公众关于操纵比赛说行话的办法：当一位官员发信息告知他奉上一场"不偏不倚的判决"时，这意味着他应照顾客队多于主队。
俄罗斯 11分，中国 0分
Those caught gave damning justifications, candid in a way that officials in other corruption scandals are typically not allowed to be. "In the general environment of Chinese football at that time, it felt like if one doesn't do it, one loses out," said Yang Xu in televised comments: "one just seems like a fool." An executive of Guangzhou Pharmaceutical FC, Mr Yang and his club had agreed to pay 200,000 yuan to another club to throw a game in 2006, so Guangzhou could get promoted to the Chinese Super League.
那些被捕人员给出的解释理由使得罪行昭然若揭，而这种直白的解释方式在其他腐败丑闻中通常并不被允许。"在当时中国足球的大环境中，感觉如果一个人不这样行事，那么他就会出局，"杨旭在电视播出的评论节目中说道："他看上去就像一个傻瓜。"杨旭是广药足球俱乐部的一名经理。他同广药俱乐部同意向另外一家俱乐部支付200,000 元，使其故意输掉比赛，这样广州就可晋级中超联赛。
The rot of corruption went to the top: Nan Yong, then boss of the Chinese Football Association. Mr Nan reportedly confessed that players could buy spots on the national team for 100,000 yuan―though that was hardly a shock. Officials have long pressured national coaches to select or field certain players. In one recent stretch of about two years, more than 100 players were named to the national squad, a suspiciously high number and roughly double the usual figure. If even the most prized honours have become sellable commodities or patronage gifts, can Chinese football hope to have any heroes?
腐败延伸至高层：时任中国足协主席的南勇。据报道，南勇招认运动员支付100,000 元可以进入国家队――仅管这并不令人吃惊。长久以来，官员们就向国家队教练施压以遴选特定运动员或指定运动员上场比赛。在最近两年左右的时间里，一百多名运动员被提名进入国家队。这一数字约为通常数字的两倍，高得令人生疑。如果就连最为珍视的荣誉都变成了可以出售的商品或是恩惠的礼物，那么中国足球还能希望拥有任何的英雄吗？
Mao's long wait
毛泽东的漫长等待
Some rather unlikely candidates have stepped forward to be the saviours of Chinese football: property developers. In the hierarchy of cartoon villains in Chinese society, developers are among the most reviled, alongside the corrupt officials some allegedly cut deals with to take people's land.
一些极不太可能的候选者已经自告奋勇、走向前来，要做中国足球的拯救者：房地产开放商。在中国社会讽刺画的反派人物等级中，开发商与腐败官员是遭谩骂讽刺最多的群体。一些开发商涉嫌与腐败官员达成协议夺取人民土地。
But developers do have cash. The Evergrande Real Estate Group, which is controlled by billionaire and Communist Party member Xu Jiayin, and which acquired the disgraced Guangzhou Pharmaceutical club in 2010, is spending money like Real Madrid. Evergrande pays generous salaries and victory bonuses, reducing players' incentives to fix matches, and is building a huge football school. After 11 years away from the sport, Mr Wang of Wanda (also a party member) has taken on a three-year, 195-million yuan sponsorship of the Chinese Super League―reportedly with the encouragement of a member of China's Politburo, Liu Yandong.
但是开发商的确拥有现金。由亿万富翁、共产党员许家印控制的恒大地产集团在 2010 年收购了声名狼藉的广药俱乐部。恒大出手颇像皇马 (Real Madrid)。恒大支付给球员的薪资待遇与赢球奖金颇为丰厚，削弱球员操纵比赛的积极性，而且正在修建一所庞大的足球学校。远离足球 11 年后，万达的王健林（也是一名党员）已经承担起为期三年、总额 1.95 亿元的中超赞助费用。据报道，这一举动受到了政治局委员刘延东的鼓励。
These days the owners of 13 of the 16 clubs in the Chinese Super League are either developers or have big property interests. Some have reportedly received cheaper land from local administrations in exchange for their support. Several intend to build more football pitches on it.
当今， 16 支中超俱乐部中有 13 支的所有者不是开发商就是拥有巨大的房产利益。据报道，某些人士接收到了地方政府更为低廉的土地以获取他们的支持。一些人打算在这些土地上修建更多的足球场。
Will children come out to play, though? Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Chinese children are not queuing up to be football stars. Perhaps above all other factors, this is why hopes for the future of football are dim. From 1990 to 2000 there were more than 600,000 teenagers in China playing organised football, according to official counts of registered players; from 2000 to 2005 that number dropped to an average of 180,000; today (with statistics kept differently) Chinese football officials estimate the number of teenagers playing some form of organised football to be little more than 100,000.
但是，孩子们会出来踢球吗？或许中国儿童不会排着队伍要当足球明星，这也不足为奇。这或许是中国足球未来为什么渺茫的最重要原因吧。据官方登记的运动员统计数字，1990 年至 2000 年超过600,000 中国青少年打有组织的足球比赛；从 2000 年到 2005 年，这一数字跌至 180,000 的均值水平；时至今日（数据统计不一），中国足球官方估计参加某种有组织的足球比赛的青少年人数略高于 100,000 人。
Another grim indicator was the 11-0 embarrassment of a team from Beijing's Ditan Primary School at the nimble feet of some diminutive Russian children from Irkutsk in Siberia. The Siberian youngsters won five of six friendly matches in a late October visit to Beijing (drawing the sixth), prompting a round of self-flagellation in the Chinese media and online postings explaining how youth football had arrived at this sorry state.
另一项严峻的指标是北京地坛小学的一支球队被来自西伯利亚的伊尔库次克的儿童灌了 11-0 的尴尬比分。伊尔库次克的这些儿童身材矮小、脚法灵活。他们在十月末访问北京期间的六场友谊赛中赢了五场（最后一场以平局收场），促发了中国媒体的一轮自责，也引发了网上对青少年足球如何走到今天这种糟糕局面的发帖讨论。
However keen they are to watch the game, years of scandal and failure have made parents sceptical about encouraging their children to play it. They worry that the football world is dirty and will corrupt their offspring. In any case, most don't want their children―especially only children―to waste their time on sport. The education system is geared toward standardised tests, requiring hours of after-school work, which are considered by many to be the lone path to upward mobility.
不管家长们多么热衷于观看足球比赛，多年的丑闻与失败已经使得他们对鼓励孩子们踢球产生了质疑。他们担心足球世界肮脏不堪，会毁掉后代。无论如何，大多数家长不想自己的孩子――尤其是独生子女――把时间浪费在体育上。教育体制的设计倾向于标准化测试，通常需要几个小时的课外学习。这些考试也被大多数家长视为通向上层社会的独木桥。
When children do seek a diversion in sport, many find it on the basketball court. America's NBA, with the help of Yao Ming, one of its stars until his recent retirement, has been marketed much more aggressively in China than have the European football leagues. Basketball also requires a much smaller patch of dirt to play on, and land is a scarce commodity (and so hugely profitable). The few pitches that are being set aside by developers will help, but thousands more are needed.
而当孩子们确实在寻求体育娱乐时，许多孩子在篮球场上找到了这份消遣。相比欧洲足球联赛，美职篮 (NBA) 在姚明的帮助下（直到最近才退役的球星）在中国的市场营销要积极得多。打篮球需要的场地也小得多，而土地则是稀缺商品（且盈利颇丰）。开发商预留出的微乎其微的场地会有所裨益，但中国还需要成千上万块球场。
Still, if the resilient fans are any indication, hope is not entirely lost. Millions watch the Chinese Super League's matches on television, which often draw better ratings than basketball in the regions where they are broadcast (reportedly embarrassed by the fecklessness in football, national CCTV stopped airing league games in 2008). Tens of thousands fill big-city stadiums to see their countrymen play badly.
不过，如果适应力强的球迷身上有些迹象的话，那么并非全无希望。成百上千万观众在电视上观看中超比赛。中超比赛通常在转播区域的收视率也高于篮球（据报道，受中国足球的窝囊表现而蒙羞的央视在 2008 年停止转播中超比赛）。成千上万名中国人填满大城市的体育场观看中国队拙劣的球技。
Today's game is described by insiders as cleaner than it has been since the professional era began―the logical but perhaps fleeting dividend of any high-profile corruption crackdown. There are still fans in the stands chanting "hei shao" or "black whistle", and sometimes, as in the case of the chip shot in the botched Qingdao fix, "da jiaqiu" ("playing fake ball"). Connections and relationships continue to rule.
圈内人士称今天的比赛是足球职业化以来最为干净的――任何一场高调的反腐运动在逻辑上必然的收获，但这种收获有可能转瞬即逝。仍然有球迷在看台上反复呼喊"黑哨"，而且时不时地喊出"打假球"（正如在那场搞砸的青岛队操纵的比赛中的吊球例子）。关系继续大行其道。
Evergrande's South Korean manager Lee Jang-soo, the longest-serving foreign coach in Chinese football, says that Chinese players don't put in the same effort as footballers in the world's leading leagues: "Perhaps all they think of is to establish good relationships with their superiors," he said. "Most clubs are like this. It's mainly about connections, not hard work." The best players at Evergrande, the nation's top club, are mostly foreigners earning millions of dollars a year.
恒大的韩国主教练李章洙是在中国足球界服役时间最久的外籍教练。他说，中国球员并不像世界顶级联赛的足球运动员那样投入同样的精力。"或许他们只是想着与监管者建立良好的关系，"李章洙说。"大多数都是这个样子。主要是关系，而不是努力工作。"作为中国的顶级俱乐部，恒大最优秀的运动员主要是一年挣几百万美元的外国人。
After, arguably, more than 2,000 years, China still awaits its first home-grown football star. Spectacularly able though it is to overcome its problems in other kinds of competition, in football, at least, China's wait for glory looks set to be a long one.
可以说，过了 2,000 多年，中国仍在等待第一位本土培养的足球明星。仅管中国能够成绩斐然地克服在其他竞争领域的困难，但是至少在足球领域，中国等待辉煌的日子注定漫长。
中国足球萎靡不振，原因何在？
Little red card
小红牌
The telling reasons why, at least in football, China is unlikely to rule the world in the near future
在不久的将来，中国至少在足球领域不太可能统治世界的有力理由
Dec 17th 2011 | from the print edition
The Buddha tells the people he can fulfil only one of their wishes. Someone asks: "Could you lower the price of property in China so that people can afford it?" Seeing the Buddha frown in silence, the person makes another wish: "Could you make the Chinese football team qualify for a World Cup?" After a long sigh, the Buddha says: "Let's talk about property prices."
佛说，他仅能实现人的一个愿望。有人问："您能把中国房价降到人们承受得起的水平吗？"见佛眉头紧蹙、一言不发，那人许下另一个愿望："您能让中国足球队打进世界杯吗？"佛一声长叹，说道："我们来谈下房价吧。"
THE pass back to the goalkeeper seemed routine for Qingdao Hailifeng FC in its match against Sichuan FC in September 2009, even if the ball was struck a little too hard and the keeper only just managed to stop it running past him and into the net. Qingdao was safely ahead 3-0 with two minutes left in a meaningless match in China's second division. What could be amiss?
在 2009 年 9 月青岛海利丰足球俱乐部对阵四川队的比赛中，回传守门员似乎成了海利丰的惯例。即使稍稍用力击打皮球，守门员也只是刚好能够停球跃身入网。在一场无足轻重的中甲比赛中，青岛队在比赛时间还剩两分钟时 3-0 领先对手，锁定胜局。哪根经抽了？
Then a Qingdao assistant coach gestured for the keeper to come forward from the penalty area. Another Qingdao player promptly chipped the ball over him and towards the net, missing an own goal by inches. The final whistle blew soon afterwards.
随后，一名青岛助理教练示意守门员从禁区位置提上。另外一名青岛队员旋即一角吊球，皮球越过守门员，直奔球网，差几英寸就自摆乌龙。接着比赛终场哨声吹响。
Qingdao's owner Du Yunqi was irate―at his team's utter incompetence. As he would later admit to investigators, he had just lost a bet that there would be a total of four goals scored in the game. His humiliated assistant coach said on national television, "Afterward the boss was angry and scolded me, saying I bungled things and couldn't even fix a match."
青岛队老板杜允琪对于球队的无能表现十分恼火。正如日后向调查人员所供认的，他刚输掉了一场关于本场比赛进四球的赌局。蒙羞的青岛队助理教练在国家电视台上说："比赛结束后，老板生了气，训斥了我，还说我把事搞砸了，连一场比赛都搞不定。"
The hapless case of "chip-shot gate", as the Qingdao game came to be known, is just one low point in aeons of Chinese footballing ineptitude. The only time China qualified for the World Cup finals, in 2002, its side failed to score in any of its three matches; the team has never won a game at the Olympics. And Chinese players are sometimes too incompetent not only to win matches, but also to rig them.
中国足球技能低下由来已久。这次逐渐为人所知的青岛队"吊球门"霉运事件只是这一漫长历程中的一个低点而已。中国男足仅打进过 2002 的世界杯。当时，中国队三场比赛未进一球。在奥运会比赛中，中国男足未曾赢过一场胜利。而且，中国运动员有时能力低下到不仅无法赢得比赛，就连操纵比赛都不能如其所愿。
In a country so proud of its global stature, football is a painful national joke. Perhaps because Chinese fans love the sport madly and want desperately for their nation to succeed at it, football is the common reference point by which people understand and measure failure. When, in 2008, milk powder from the Chinese company Sanlu was found to have been tainted with melamine, causing a national scandal, the joke was: "Sanlu milk, the exclusive milk of the Chinese national football team!"
中国如此在乎自己的全球地位，而足球却是一个令人痛心的民族笑柄。或许是因为中国球迷疯狂地热爱这项运动，迫切地渴求国足功成名就，足球也就成了人们理解和衡量失败的共同参考点。当 2008 年查出三鹿奶粉遭三聚氰胺污染，招致民族丑闻时，就有了这样的笑话："三鹿奶粉，国足指定专用奶粉！"
Everyone is free to take aim, and publicly. When China was dispatched 2-0 by Belgium in the 2008 Olympics in Beijing (pictured above), a presenter on national CCTV said: "The Chinese football team decided to get out quickly, so as not to affect the people's mood while they watch the Olympics." Chinese fans chanted for the ouster of the head of China's Football Association, Xie Yalong. The authorities sacked Mr Xie shortly after the games.
每个人都可以自由地公开开炮。当 2008 年北京奥运会上中国队遭比利时 2-0 拿下时（见上图），央视的一名主持人说："中国国足可能是怕影响大家看奥运开心的心情，所以决定提前退出比赛。"中国球迷反复高喊口号，要求中国足协主席谢亚龙下课。当局在奥运会结束后解雇了谢亚龙。
All this hints at something rather unique and powerful about the place of football in Chinese society. It is, like all organised sport in China, ultimately the domain of the government; so, according to the Communist Party's normal methods, senior football officials should be provided at least some protection from scrutiny. In general the secretive state machinery of sport is shielded from public inspection, as it manufactures medal-winning Olympic athletes in dozens of disciplines. Chinese football, though, is so flagrantly and undeniably terrible and corrupt that all potshots are allowed: at officials, referees, owners and players―even, implicitly, at the heart of the communist system itself.
所有这些都暗示出足球在中国社会中相当独特而又强大的地位。同中国所有的组织性体育项目一样，足球最终属于政府的管辖领域；因此，依共产党的正常做法，最少也会提供高级足球官员某些免于审查的保护。当秘密的国家体育机构在数十个奥林匹克分项运动中培养出摘牌运动员时，它会一般会免于公众审查。然而，中国足球表现糟糕、腐败堕落、臭名昭著且不容辩驳，所有的肆意抨击都未加禁止：官员、裁判、老总以及球员都是抨击对象――甚至还隐含这对共产主义制度核心的抨击。
Solving the riddle of why Chinese football is so awful becomes, then, a subversive inquiry. It involves unravelling much of what might be wrong with China and its politics. Every Chinese citizen who cares about football participates in this subversion, each with some theory―blaming the schools, the scarcity of pitches, the state's emphasis on individual over team sport, its ruthless treatment of athletes, the one-child policy, bribery and the corrosive influence of gambling. Most lead back to the same conclusion: the root cause is the system.
这样一来，解开中国足球糟糕表现之谜也就成为一项颠覆性的调查。这一调查涉及到阐明中国及其政治在多大程度上出现了差错。每一位关心足球的中国公民都参与到了这场颠覆性的调查中，每个人都提出了某种理论――责备学校，球场稀缺，国家对个人的重视高于对团队的重视，国家对待运动员的无情态度，独身子女政策，贿赂以及赌博的腐蚀。大多数调查都回到同一个结论：根源是制度。
A recent crackdown on football corruption offers little solace; it simply mirrors the pyrrhic campaigns against official corruption elsewhere in China. A mid-level functionary in China's state security apparatus puts it candidly: "You know all those problems with society that you like to blame on China's political system? Well it really is like that with football."
最近的打击足球腐败鲜有慰藉之用；只不过同那些付出极大代价打击其他领域的官员腐败如出一辙罢了。一位中国国家安全机构的中层官员坦率地指出："你知道所有那些你可能会怪罪到中国政治体制头上的社会问题吗？好吧，足球真的就像那么回事儿。"
Three little wishes
三个小愿望
China cherishes its many inventions, real and purported. It recently laid official claim to creating Mongolian throat singing (much to Mongolia's consternation). With the blessing of the international football body FIFA, China also claims the world's earliest recorded mention of a sport similar to football, during the Han dynasty in the 2nd century BC. A version of the game cuju, or "kick ball", involved a single, elevated net and two sides of 12 men.
中国珍视自己的许多发明创造，真实的也好，宣称的也罢。最近，中国正式声称创造了蒙古喉音唱法（这令蒙古惊慌失措）。经国际足协同意，中国也宣称在公元前 2 世纪的汉代就提到了一项类似足球运动的记载，为世界之最。这项运动是"蹴鞠"的变体，也称"踢球"。它涉及一个高架网以及两组队员，每组各12名。
In later centuries a version of the sport prevailed that favoured individual over team skill. China's rulers took an interest; one Ming-era painting depicts the Xuande Emperor watching his subjects kick the ball around at court. However, by the time football was indigenously innovated in England in the 19th century, cuju and its variants had all but disappeared.
在随后的几个世纪里，蹴鞠的一个变体兴盛了起来，它偏重个体而非团队技能。中国统治者对此别有一番兴致；一幅明朝时期的绘画描绘了宣德皇帝观看臣民在宫廷中踢球的场景。然而，到 19 世纪足球在英格兰本土发明时，蹴鞠及其变体几乎杳无踪影了。
Football was then introduced to modern China as a foreign invention―but the young nationalists who would later lead the nation still took to it. In his early 20s Mao Zedong played keeper at a teachers' college in his native Hunan Province. Deng Xiaoping spent precious francs to watch football at the 1924 Olympics in Paris, where he was studying. After he became one of China's most powerful leaders, Deng, still a football fanatic, paid a visit to the national team, saying that he hoped they would become an excellent side "as soon as possible".
随后，足球作为一项外国发明引进至现代中国――但是未来领导这个国家的民族主义青年们仍然对它产生了好感。20 岁出头的毛泽东在家乡湖南省的一所师范学院打守门员的位置。留法期间，邓小平花费不菲法郎观看 1924 年巴黎奥林匹克足球赛。成为中国最有权势的领导人之一之后，邓小平依旧是个足球迷。他参观过国家队，希望国家队能"尽快"变成一支卓越的球队。
That was in 1952. Four years later, after the People's Liberation Army (PLA) football team lost to a Yugoslav youth team, Mao met the Yugoslav side and (according to the PLA Daily) said, "We lost to you now and perhaps will keep losing for 12 years. But it would be very good to win in the 13th year." By 1969 Chinese football was instead in a shambles, amid the chaos of the Cultural Revolution.
那是 1952 年发生的事情了。1956年，在中国人民解放军足球队输给南斯拉夫青年队后，毛泽东接见了南斯拉夫队（据《解放日报》报道）并说道，"我们今天输给你们，明天输给你们，但13年之后要赢你们！"然而，时至 1969 年，处于"文化大革命"动荡期间的中国足球一片混乱。
This July, undeterred by the lack of progress in the intervening decades, Vice-President Xi Jinping, China's presumed next leader and also a football fan, added his own "three wishes": first, qualify for another World Cup; second, host a World Cup; finally, win a World Cup. Wisely, Mr Xi did not set any deadlines.
到今年七月，几十载荏苒岁月，中国足球止步不前，但很可能担任下一届领导人的国家副主席习近平并不为其所惧。他自己也是一个球迷，提出自己的"三个愿望"：第一，世界杯再次出线；第二，举办一届世界杯；最后，获得世界杯冠军。习近平的聪明之处在于他并没有设定任何一个截止日期。
So whatever ails Chinese football, it is not a lack of passion from the country's leaders. If anything, the opposite may be the problem. China's Party-controlled, top-down approach to sport has yielded some magnificent results in individual sports, helping China win more Olympic gold medals in Beijing in 2008 than any other country. But this "Soviet model" has proven catastrophically unsuitable for assembling a team of 11 football players, much less a nation of them.
因此，不管困扰中国足球因素是什么的，缺乏国家领导人的热情肯定不在其中。要是说有什么的话，倒是国家领导人的热情可能是问题所在。在个人大项运动中，中国政党控制、自上而下的体育管理方式取得了某些辉煌的成就，帮助中国在 2008 年北京奥运会上摘得比其他任何国家都多的金牌数。但是这种"苏联模式"被证明彻底不适合组建一支由 11 名足球运动员的团队，更不用说一个打造一个足球运动员国度了。
The first problem is the method of identifying young talent. The sport system selects children with particular attributes, such as long limbs, which could pay off in athletics, rowing, swimming, diving or gymnastics. These youngsters are the genetic wheat. But football's legends can emerge from the seeming chaff of human physiques: think of stocky Diego Maradona, perhaps the greatest ever player, or his Argentine successor, the tiny genius Lionel Messi.
第一个问题是鉴别有天赋的年轻球员的方法。中国体育制度采用某些奇特的素质来筛选儿童，比如，四肢颀长。在田径、划艇、游泳、跳水或是体操中，这些特质可能会奏效。这些青少年有小麦的基因。但是足球传奇人物可能从似是而非的糠麸体格中涌现出来：想想可能是有史以来最伟大的球员迭戈•马拉多纳 (Diego Maradona)吧，或是他的阿根廷继承者，矮小的天才球员莱昂内尔•梅西 (Lionel Messi)。
Then there is the matter of gold medals and opportunity costs. China pursues gold by funnelling athletes into obscure individual sports that can reap multiple medals in competitions. Football can only yield one medal or World Cup (two, counting the women: Chinese women have fared much better against a less-developed international field).
这样一来，就有了金牌数量与机会成本的问题。名不见经传的个人项目在比赛中可以收获多枚奖牌。中国通过把运动员输送到这些项目中来实现夺金目标。足球仅能斩获一枚奖牌或是赢得一次世界杯冠军（算上女子合计两枚或两次：中国女足在发展程度相对较低的国际比赛中的成绩远在男足之上）。
But the contradictions and weaknesses of Chinese capitalism have also played a part in the country's footballing ignominy. In the early 1990s, with economic reforms taking hold, China slowly allowed some of its state-run teams to act more like commercial ventures, eventually establishing a professional league of clubs with corporate sponsorships, investments and higher salaries. The pay for players was still quite low in comparison with Europe, but big domestic stars began earning hundreds of thousands of dollars a year, a fortune at the time. The "professional" football era began in 1994, but as with any other organised activity in China, the state retained control.
但是足球运动声名狼藉，中国资本主义的矛盾与弱点也难咎其责。20 世纪 90 年代初期，经济改革的影响显现，中国慢慢地允许有国家经营的球队更多地像商业投资一样地运作，最终成立一支俱乐部职业联赛，拥有企业赞助、公司投资以及更高薪酬。相比于欧洲，球员工资依旧很低，但是国内大牌球星开始一年收入几十万美金。这在当时可算一笔财富。"职业"足球时代开启于 1994 年，但是同其他任何一项有组织的活动一样，国家保留着控制权。
In the event, adding heaps of money to an unaccountable bureaucracy made matters worse. State-owned enterprises, seeking glory on the pitch, lavished government money on the teams they sponsored. Private corporate investors followed suit, and cut-throat competition dramatically raised star-player salaries. A similar pay spiral has afflicted other countries' leagues, too; but, in China, some clubs with less wealthy backers found distinctive and creative ways to survive.
结果，数额庞大的款项与不负责任的官僚体系相结合使得事情雪上加霜。谋求球场荣耀的国有企业慷慨地将政府资金施舍给他们赞助的球队。私营公司紧随其后。残酷的竞争大幅提升了明星球员的工资。类似的工资急剧上升也折磨着其他国家的联赛；但是，在中国，一些靠山财力不太雄厚的俱乐部找到了别出心裁的生存方式。
Investors would contrive to fix games as favours to the local officials who nominally controlled the clubs (these types of matches are called "favour", "relationship" or "tacit" matches, and are not viewed negatively by many within the game). Gambling syndicates, including the triads, began exerting influence over investors, referees, coaches and players. A spoils system evolved, and everyone took their cuts.
投资者会设法操纵比赛作为对名义上控制俱乐部的当地官员的恩惠（这些比赛称作"人情赛"、"友谊赛"或是"默契赛"，且并不被足球运动中的多数人消极看待）。包括三合会在内的赌博集团开始对投资者、裁判、教练以及球员施加影响。一种分赃制演化出来，每人拿取各自份额。
Blowing the golden whistle
揭发"金哨"
By the end of the 1990s, it was clear to some insiders that few people in football cared about the quality or integrity of the game. One of the pioneer investors, Wang Jianlin of the Dalian Wanda Group, a property conglomerate, gave up his company's sponsorship of the team in the north-eastern city of Dalian in 1999-2000―explaining years later that he did so in part because of the sport's infiltration by gambling interests. Geely, a carmaker, withdrew its support of a club in the southern city of Guangzhou in 2001, just eight months after agreeing to invest. "I was shocked," Geely's chief, Li Shufu, told the media. "For a match, bribes of one million, two million yuan [$120,000-240,000] were offered, and not a single football official or referee ever got caught."
到 20 世纪 90 年代后期，足球界几乎没什么人在乎足球运动的质量或正直。这对于某些圈内人士而言显而易见。房地产跨业企业大连万达集团的王健林是早期的投资者之一。他放弃了 1999-2000 年万达对大连球队的赞助。数年之后，他解释部分原因在于足球运动遭赌博利益渗透。汽车制造商吉利在 2001 年撤消了对广州一家俱乐部的支持，此时距同意投资仅过了八个月。"我震惊了，"吉利老总李书福对媒体说。"一场比赛，行贿一百万、两百万（合 120,000-240,000 美元），但一个足球官员或裁判都没抓。"
Almost no one got caught because, in proper Communist fashion, an organisation that was deeply involved in fixing matches, the Chinese Football Association, was the same authority charged, in 2001, with investigating and punishing misconduct. A whitewash was the outcome, not coincidentally just months before China's first World Cup finals in 2002.
几乎没人被捕的原因在于，2001 年深深卷入操纵比赛漩涡的中国足球协会恰恰也是授权调查与惩罚非法行为的机关，而这正是共产主义的行事方式。结果就是掩饰真相。这发生在中国于 2002 年首次亮相于世界杯决赛阶段比赛的数月之前，并非巧合。
After China's ignominious exit from the competition, things got worse. Corporate sponsorships and investments declined, hitting salaries and making players yet more susceptible to gambling syndicates. At the same time, with the Chinese economy flourishing, the volume of betting rose dramatically.
中国在比赛中耻辱出局后，事态恶化了。公司赞助与投资消减，球员工资降低，也更容易受赌博集团的影响。与此同时，伴随着中国经济的繁荣，赌注规模也急剧飙升。
Finally, in 2007, an investigation of match-fixing in Singapore followed a trail back to Chinese ringleaders. Singapore's authorities tipped off police in north-eastern China, who uncovered match-fixing irregularities there, ultimately forcing, in 2009-10, a second, more severe reckoning for Chinese football. (Likewise, probes into financial crimes in Hong Kong have occasionally ensnared mainland officials who might otherwise have escaped punishment.) This time some 20 people, including a referee previously considered the game's most honest―and known as the "golden whistle" for his incorruptibility―were caught in the crackdown.
最终，在 2007 年，一项针对发生在新加波的操纵比赛调查顺藤摸瓜，引向中国的罪魁祸首。新加坡当局向揭发当地操纵比赛违法行为的中国东北警方告密，最终迫使中国在 2009-2010 年再次掀起了一场针对足球界更为严厉的惩罚。（同样，香港的金融犯罪调查偶尔也会卷入或许会逃脱惩罚的大陆官员。）在此次打击活动中，约 20 名人员被捕，包括一名以前视为中国足球运动中最为诚实的裁判（因其廉洁正直而被冠以"金哨"称号）。
As officials were detained, a parade of tearful confessions and recriminations played out on national television. Huang Junjie, a referee and one of those in tears, explained that he had once refused a bribe from a club to fix a match only because a leading football association official had already asked him to rig it. Mr Huang gave the public an idea of match-rigging lingo as well: when an official texted him to provide "even-handed justice", it meant he should favour a visiting team over the home side.
随着官员批捕，一串串泪眼朦胧的忏悔以及一声声指责批评之词出现在国家电视台里。黄俊杰就是眼含泪水的一名裁判。他解释说，自己曾拒绝一家俱乐部行贿以操纵比赛，只是因为一位知名的足协官员要求他操纵比赛，他才这么做的。黄俊杰也告诉了公众关于操纵比赛说行话的办法：当一位官员发信息告知他奉上一场"不偏不倚的判决"时，这意味着他应照顾客队多于主队。
俄罗斯 11分，中国 0分
Those caught gave damning justifications, candid in a way that officials in other corruption scandals are typically not allowed to be. "In the general environment of Chinese football at that time, it felt like if one doesn't do it, one loses out," said Yang Xu in televised comments: "one just seems like a fool." An executive of Guangzhou Pharmaceutical FC, Mr Yang and his club had agreed to pay 200,000 yuan to another club to throw a game in 2006, so Guangzhou could get promoted to the Chinese Super League.
那些被捕人员给出的解释理由使得罪行昭然若揭，而这种直白的解释方式在其他腐败丑闻中通常并不被允许。"在当时中国足球的大环境中，感觉如果一个人不这样行事，那么他就会出局，"杨旭在电视播出的评论节目中说道："他看上去就像一个傻瓜。"杨旭是广药足球俱乐部的一名经理。他同广药俱乐部同意向另外一家俱乐部支付200,000 元，使其故意输掉比赛，这样广州就可晋级中超联赛。
The rot of corruption went to the top: Nan Yong, then boss of the Chinese Football Association. Mr Nan reportedly confessed that players could buy spots on the national team for 100,000 yuan―though that was hardly a shock. Officials have long pressured national coaches to select or field certain players. In one recent stretch of about two years, more than 100 players were named to the national squad, a suspiciously high number and roughly double the usual figure. If even the most prized honours have become sellable commodities or patronage gifts, can Chinese football hope to have any heroes?
腐败延伸至高层：时任中国足协主席的南勇。据报道，南勇招认运动员支付100,000 元可以进入国家队――仅管这并不令人吃惊。长久以来，官员们就向国家队教练施压以遴选特定运动员或指定运动员上场比赛。在最近两年左右的时间里，一百多名运动员被提名进入国家队。这一数字约为通常数字的两倍，高得令人生疑。如果就连最为珍视的荣誉都变成了可以出售的商品或是恩惠的礼物，那么中国足球还能希望拥有任何的英雄吗？
Mao's long wait
毛泽东的漫长等待
Some rather unlikely candidates have stepped forward to be the saviours of Chinese football: property developers. In the hierarchy of cartoon villains in Chinese society, developers are among the most reviled, alongside the corrupt officials some allegedly cut deals with to take people's land.
一些极不太可能的候选者已经自告奋勇、走向前来，要做中国足球的拯救者：房地产开放商。在中国社会讽刺画的反派人物等级中，开发商与腐败官员是遭谩骂讽刺最多的群体。一些开发商涉嫌与腐败官员达成协议夺取人民土地。
But developers do have cash. The Evergrande Real Estate Group, which is controlled by billionaire and Communist Party member Xu Jiayin, and which acquired the disgraced Guangzhou Pharmaceutical club in 2010, is spending money like Real Madrid. Evergrande pays generous salaries and victory bonuses, reducing players' incentives to fix matches, and is building a huge football school. After 11 years away from the sport, Mr Wang of Wanda (also a party member) has taken on a three-year, 195-million yuan sponsorship of the Chinese Super League―reportedly with the encouragement of a member of China's Politburo, Liu Yandong.
但是开发商的确拥有现金。由亿万富翁、共产党员许家印控制的恒大地产集团在 2010 年收购了声名狼藉的广药俱乐部。恒大出手颇像皇马 (Real Madrid)。恒大支付给球员的薪资待遇与赢球奖金颇为丰厚，削弱球员操纵比赛的积极性，而且正在修建一所庞大的足球学校。远离足球 11 年后，万达的王健林（也是一名党员）已经承担起为期三年、总额 1.95 亿元的中超赞助费用。据报道，这一举动受到了政治局委员刘延东的鼓励。
These days the owners of 13 of the 16 clubs in the Chinese Super League are either developers or have big property interests. Some have reportedly received cheaper land from local administrations in exchange for their support. Several intend to build more football pitches on it.
当今， 16 支中超俱乐部中有 13 支的所有者不是开发商就是拥有巨大的房产利益。据报道，某些人士接收到了地方政府更为低廉的土地以获取他们的支持。一些人打算在这些土地上修建更多的足球场。
Will children come out to play, though? Unsurprisingly, perhaps, Chinese children are not queuing up to be football stars. Perhaps above all other factors, this is why hopes for the future of football are dim. From 1990 to 2000 there were more than 600,000 teenagers in China playing organised football, according to official counts of registered players; from 2000 to 2005 that number dropped to an average of 180,000; today (with statistics kept differently) Chinese football officials estimate the number of teenagers playing some form of organised football to be little more than 100,000.
但是，孩子们会出来踢球吗？或许中国儿童不会排着队伍要当足球明星，这也不足为奇。这或许是中国足球未来为什么渺茫的最重要原因吧。据官方登记的运动员统计数字，1990 年至 2000 年超过600,000 中国青少年打有组织的足球比赛；从 2000 年到 2005 年，这一数字跌至 180,000 的均值水平；时至今日（数据统计不一），中国足球官方估计参加某种有组织的足球比赛的青少年人数略高于 100,000 人。
Another grim indicator was the 11-0 embarrassment of a team from Beijing's Ditan Primary School at the nimble feet of some diminutive Russian children from Irkutsk in Siberia. The Siberian youngsters won five of six friendly matches in a late October visit to Beijing (drawing the sixth), prompting a round of self-flagellation in the Chinese media and online postings explaining how youth football had arrived at this sorry state.
另一项严峻的指标是北京地坛小学的一支球队被来自西伯利亚的伊尔库次克的儿童灌了 11-0 的尴尬比分。伊尔库次克的这些儿童身材矮小、脚法灵活。他们在十月末访问北京期间的六场友谊赛中赢了五场（最后一场以平局收场），促发了中国媒体的一轮自责，也引发了网上对青少年足球如何走到今天这种糟糕局面的发帖讨论。
However keen they are to watch the game, years of scandal and failure have made parents sceptical about encouraging their children to play it. They worry that the football world is dirty and will corrupt their offspring. In any case, most don't want their children―especially only children―to waste their time on sport. The education system is geared toward standardised tests, requiring hours of after-school work, which are considered by many to be the lone path to upward mobility.
不管家长们多么热衷于观看足球比赛，多年的丑闻与失败已经使得他们对鼓励孩子们踢球产生了质疑。他们担心足球世界肮脏不堪，会毁掉后代。无论如何，大多数家长不想自己的孩子――尤其是独生子女――把时间浪费在体育上。教育体制的设计倾向于标准化测试，通常需要几个小时的课外学习。这些考试也被大多数家长视为通向上层社会的独木桥。
When children do seek a diversion in sport, many find it on the basketball court. America's NBA, with the help of Yao Ming, one of its stars until his recent retirement, has been marketed much more aggressively in China than have the European football leagues. Basketball also requires a much smaller patch of dirt to play on, and land is a scarce commodity (and so hugely profitable). The few pitches that are being set aside by developers will help, but thousands more are needed.
而当孩子们确实在寻求体育娱乐时，许多孩子在篮球场上找到了这份消遣。相比欧洲足球联赛，美职篮 (NBA) 在姚明的帮助下（直到最近才退役的球星）在中国的市场营销要积极得多。打篮球需要的场地也小得多，而土地则是稀缺商品（且盈利颇丰）。开发商预留出的微乎其微的场地会有所裨益，但中国还需要成千上万块球场。
Still, if the resilient fans are any indication, hope is not entirely lost. Millions watch the Chinese Super League's matches on television, which often draw better ratings than basketball in the regions where they are broadcast (reportedly embarrassed by the fecklessness in football, national CCTV stopped airing league games in 2008). Tens of thousands fill big-city stadiums to see their countrymen play badly.
不过，如果适应力强的球迷身上有些迹象的话，那么并非全无希望。成百上千万观众在电视上观看中超比赛。中超比赛通常在转播区域的收视率也高于篮球（据报道，受中国足球的窝囊表现而蒙羞的央视在 2008 年停止转播中超比赛）。成千上万名中国人填满大城市的体育场观看中国队拙劣的球技。
Today's game is described by insiders as cleaner than it has been since the professional era began―the logical but perhaps fleeting dividend of any high-profile corruption crackdown. There are still fans in the stands chanting "hei shao" or "black whistle", and sometimes, as in the case of the chip shot in the botched Qingdao fix, "da jiaqiu" ("playing fake ball"). Connections and relationships continue to rule.
圈内人士称今天的比赛是足球职业化以来最为干净的――任何一场高调的反腐运动在逻辑上必然的收获，但这种收获有可能转瞬即逝。仍然有球迷在看台上反复呼喊"黑哨"，而且时不时地喊出"打假球"（正如在那场搞砸的青岛队操纵的比赛中的吊球例子）。关系继续大行其道。
Evergrande's South Korean manager Lee Jang-soo, the longest-serving foreign coach in Chinese football, says that Chinese players don't put in the same effort as footballers in the world's leading leagues: "Perhaps all they think of is to establish good relationships with their superiors," he said. "Most clubs are like this. It's mainly about connections, not hard work." The best players at Evergrande, the nation's top club, are mostly foreigners earning millions of dollars a year.
恒大的韩国主教练李章洙是在中国足球界服役时间最久的外籍教练。他说，中国球员并不像世界顶级联赛的足球运动员那样投入同样的精力。"或许他们只是想着与监管者建立良好的关系，"李章洙说。"大多数都是这个样子。主要是关系，而不是努力工作。"作为中国的顶级俱乐部，恒大最优秀的运动员主要是一年挣几百万美元的外国人。
After, arguably, more than 2,000 years, China still awaits its first home-grown football star. Spectacularly able though it is to overcome its problems in other kinds of competition, in football, at least, China's wait for glory looks set to be a long one.
可以说，过了 2,000 多年，中国仍在等待第一位本土培养的足球明星。仅管中国能够成绩斐然地克服在其他竞争领域的困难，但是至少在足球领域，中国等待辉煌的日子注定漫长。
博文
没有评论:
发表评论