2012年11月4日

Fw: Insider trading, Chinese style: Decoding the story of the Wen family billions


Insider trading, Chinese style: Decoding the story of the Wen family billions

By Peter Lee.

wen-jiabao-wef.jpg 
Image credit: World Economic Forum.

This article originally appeared on Asia Times Online, republished with permission.

Regarding the epic financial machinations allegedly practiced by the family of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, his supporters can draw consolation from the fact that the Wen family compares favorably to the Bo Xilai family in the matter of financial sophistication, investment success, and in not murdering its financial adviser.

They may also be heartened by the thought that China's tycoons are achieving parity with the West in best practices of legalized insider trading and self-dealing.

There is another group that definitely feels thrilled and empowered by the New York Times' blockbuster revelation concerning an alleged US$2.7 billion nest egg possessed by Premier Wen Jiabao's family. [1] That group is not China's dissidents. It is Western print journalists, who feel under siege around the world, and especially in China. The Guardian's media critic, Michael Wolff, took it to the next level, calling the revelations the biggest thing since the Pentagon Papers:

The New York Times' unraveling of the holdings of the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, and his family may be its most direct challenge to a sitting government since its publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Arguably, its forensic accounting will be even much more damaging and potentially transformational to the Chinese government than its seminal revelations about the roots of the war in Vietnam were to the Nixon government.

As with the Pentagon Papers, the Times now faces the concerted wrath of the government it has challenged. The Nixon administration took the Times to the US Supreme Court in a move that threatened to criminalize the company. The Chinese government has cordoned off the Times' digital reach into China and, effectively, declared it persona non grata in one of the world's most significant markets. In other words, it's a great day. [2]

Easy, tiger.

Actually, I think David Barboza's expose of wealth aggrandizement by the extended friends and family of Wen Jiabao might be the biggest thing in journalism since ... the Guardian's unconscionable butchering of the WikiLeaks release, but that's another story.

In the matter of the Pentagon Papers, the New York Times defied the advice of its lawyers and published the purloined documents at considerable legal risk without checking in with the US government. President Richard Nixon did not learn of the leak until he opened his morning paper.

The US government then tried to impose prior restraint - getting a court injunction to force the Times to stop publishing the ongoing expose - only to be rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The court, however, did not remove the New York Times from legal jeopardy, affirming for the most part that that the paper could be prosecuted after the fact for revealing state secrets under the Espionage Act (something that the Nixon administration considered but didn't pursue). Instead, infuriated by the leak, Nixon set up the "Plumbers" (leak-stoppers) covert operation that burgled the Watergate Apartments and eventually brought down his presidency. [3]

In the Wen Jiabao matter, Barboza collected the facts legally, and the Gray Lady gave the Chinese government a heads-up before publishing, as the New York Times' public editor reported:

On Friday, I interviewed the publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr about the story, the censorship and what it means for The Times's global push.

"I'm very proud of this work," he said of the story. "Our business is to publish great journalism. Does this have a business impact? Of course."

Mr Sulzberger said the publication of the article was preceded by "conversations with the Chinese government to discuss it".

"They wanted to air their concerns - which I listened to, as I should," Mr Sulzberger said. "And eventually, we made a decision to publish."

The Times' foreign editor, Joseph Kahn, also confirmed discussions with Chinese officials, and put the scoop in the proper perspective vis a vis the Pentagon Papers:

Mr Kahn said that as recently as Wednesday, Mr Sulzberger and the executive editor, Jill Abramson, met with Chinese government representatives at The Times. But the focus of that conversation was not about the journalism - it was about political and cultural differences In short, Chinese officials were making the case that The Times not publish the article.

"I'm gratified - there's no other word to describe it," Mr Kahn said about The Times's decision to publish it. "People cite the Pentagon Papers, but that involved defying a legal order." [4]

The New York Times is suffering genuine and significant financial losses from the story - one can assume its costly Chinese-language launch has been blown out of the water for at least a few months - and it should be commended for running the piece, but the level of institutional risk and political significance does not appear to rise to a Pentagon Papers level.

Pre-warned by the Times, the Chinese government moved into containment mode. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a huffy response that the report was a smear, the New York Times US and Chinese-language websites were blocked, and the word was put out to "harmonize", ie scrub, web and blog references to the New York Times, $2.7 billion, so on and so forth. In addition, Western journos in China were subjected to an aggravating slowdown of Internet service.

Within the People's Republic of China, the report - which is inevitably filtering through the Great Firewall - has apparently not excited a new tsunami of disgust against the Chinese Communist Party regime. The response seems to have been muddled by the fact that the article took pains not to implicate Wen Jiabao personally, and by the fact that Wen is regarded as a leader - albeit of suspect efficacy - of the reformist bloc, and giving him a black eye is considered as providing aid and comfort to the enemies of reform.

The fact that Wen is retiring after the 18th party congress, to be started a few days from now, also takes some of the heat out of the allegations. There were even indignant accusations that the revelations had been fed to the Times by partisans of disgraced party official Bo Xilai seeking revenge on Wen for his role in Bo's downfall earlier this year.

This seems unlikely. Barboza is a well-regarded and tenacious reporter who spent almost a year sorting through Chinese corporate records to get the story. Perhaps Wen's adversaries were willing to egg him on, but, as in the case with the Bloomberg expose on Xi Jinping this past June (see here - for which Bloomberg staff were reportedly subjected to death threats by disgruntled Xi cronies - it can be assumed he dug out the story on his own.

The Barboza article is a fascinating expose of how the wealth-creation sausage gets made in the People's Republic of China, revealing how a family with political connections and access to information can leverage opportunities in everything from diamond-trading to construction of wastewater treatment plants with the help of a few billionaire friends in the PRC and overseas.

However - barring further revelations - it is not the devastating legal and factual brief against Wen Jiabao that the excited coverage might lead one to believe. The New York Times made the understandable, if rather questionable decision, to hang its hat on the eye-popping figure of $2.7 billion, inviting the inference that Wen's family exemplified official corruption on a truly heroic scale.

However, $2.2 billion of that figure is derived from ownership of shares of stock of Ping An Insurance imputed to members of the Wen family, shares that were purchased by partnerships in 2002, apparently for around $65 million, and which skyrocketed in value after Hong Kong (2004) and Shanghai (2007) IPOs.

As for those partnerships, the Times was unfortunately unable to come up with a clear determination as to whether they were simply front companies for Wen family skullduggery or, well, partnerships that provided privileged access for wealth creation for PRC and foreign elites, some of whom were members of the Wen family.

The Times carefully characterized the partnerships as:

Partnerships controlled by Mr Wen's relatives - along with their friends and colleagues - made a fortune by investing in the company before the public offering.

Wen family fingerprints are apparently all over these partnerships, but nailing down issues of legitimacy and control are, understandably, slippery issues.

Around $1.3 billion of the purported Wen family stake in Ping An is controlled by Tianjin Taihong, which in turn is controlled by one of the PRC's richest people, Mdme Duan Weihong, who is in turn generally characterized as an old friend of the Wen family and, more specifically of Wen's allegedly rapacious wife Mdme Zhang Beili. [5]

The question can seriously be raised as to whether Mdme Duan is simply a bag-woman for the Wen family, or a close family friend who has benefited herself - and members of the Wen family - through a carefully constructed, morally questionable, but legally defendable web of obligation and opportunity.

A look at Taihong reveals something that looks more like a plausible business enterprise than a slush fund or cut-out. Taihong apparently achieved considerable success in property management and, subsequently, development in Premier Wen's home town of Tianjin. Taihong's English-language name is Great Ocean Group.

On its website, it touts its strategic investment in Ping An (stating that "outstanding returns ... reflect the group's foresight and execution ability"): In 2002, the Great Ocean Group acquired a major share in Ping An Group, one of China's largest insurance and financial services companies entitling it to a seat on the company's Board of Directors. [6]

Duan Weihong took that seat on the Ping An (supervisory) board from 2003 through 2009.

The Ping An deal shows the hallmarks of privileged information and access; it does not, however, exhibit significant signs of interference by the Wen family to assure Ping An's success. The Great Ocean investment occurred in 2002. The lifting of restrictions on domestic insurance operations - which paved the way for highly successful IPOs by Ping An and other insurance companies - did not occur until 2004. Spotting Ping An as an up-and-comer would not have been extremely difficult, even without the help of a high ranking communist official.

By 2002, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs had already been strategic investors in Ping An for eight years; in 2002, HSBC also put in another $600 million (it would subsequently buy out Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs for $1 billion).

The company had employed McKinsey and Co to advise it on its business operations, staffed its company through a well-known European headhunter, and in 2005 it was named one of Asia's best managed companies by Euromoney magazine. It subsequently achieved the distinction of serving as subject of a fawning case study by a leading Western business school.

In short, Ping An's primary identity is as a private company backed by international financial muscle, not a sclerotic state-owned-enterprise relying on government favoritism and protection. Therefore, the corrupt-dealing framing provided for the Times article is, perhaps, not completely apt to the Ping An situation:

As prime minister in an economy that remains heavily state-driven, Mr Wen, who is best known for his simple ways and common touch, more importantly has broad authority over the major industries where his relatives have made their fortunes. Chinese companies cannot list their shares on a stock exchange without approval from agencies overseen by Mr Wen, for example. He also has the power to influence investments in strategic sectors like energy and telecommunications.

Investing in Ping An prior to its IPO and sensational run-up in stock price was something of a no-brainer.

Of course, getting an opportunity to invest prior to the IPO is something else.

It would perhaps be most informative to ask Ping An's hard-charging boss, Peter Ma, or strategic investors Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC - all of whom had seats on the Ping An board - to provide some context as to how Taihong/Great Ocean was privileged to get a sweetheart pre-IPO deal.

Mdme Duan married a Hong Kong investment banker, Desmond Shum, who perhaps provided the deal-making expertise to enable Great Ocean to leverage its Ping An windfall into a very successful foray into active, managed investment: the construction of the massive freight logistics center at Beijing Airport, the "Airport City Development Limited" or ACL, with a total first-stage investment of 4 billion yuan (US$640 million). Mr Shum served as vice chairman and chief executive officer for the project, which was completed in 2007. [7]

In 2011, Great Ocean sold its 40% interest in ACL to Singapore's Global Logistic Properties Ltd for around US$270 million (the New York Times may be in error here by imputing the full $400 million proceeds of the sale to Great Ocean; the shares of another company, "Trade Year Properties Limited," amounting to 15% of ACL, were also sold to Global Logistics as part of the deal).

Interestingly, the Times did not choose to impute the ACL deal to Wen-related shenanigans, even though the high profile and highly political deal (involving approvals by the Ministry of Commerce, the Civil Aviation Administration of China, the Beijing municipal government, the General Administration for Customs - which "consult[ed] eight ministries and commissions" - the National Resources Development Council, and the State Council) would seem to welcome influence peddling in a way that the largely opportunistic and passive Ping An investment did not.

In true nouveau riche style, Mdme Duan has turned to high-profile philanthropy to enhance the reputation of her enterprise. Great Ocean established the Kai Feng charitable foundation, which funded the construction of Tsinghua University's new library and, in 2012, sponsored the Yehudi Menuhin violin competition in Beijing. Under the sobriquet of the "Whitney and Desmond Shum Fellowships", the family funded a program to send two Harvard graduate students to China each year to pursue research in the social sciences.

Mdme Duan blotted her tycoon copybook, however, with a flustered response to the most damning piece of evidence unearthed by Barboza: apparently part of Taihong/Great Ocean's stake in Ping An was held in the name of Premier Wen's ancient mother.

Apparently not aware that the correct response to dangerous and intrusive inquiries from the press is "Talk to my lawyer", Mdme Duan provided a novel explanation:

"When I invested in Ping An I didn't want to be written about," Ms Duan said, "so I had my relatives find some other people to hold these shares for me."

But it was an "accident", she said, that her company chose the relatives of the prime minister as the listed shareholders - a process that required registering their official ID numbers and obtaining their signatures. Until presented with the names of the investors by The Times, she said, she had no idea that they had selected the relatives of Wen Jiabao.

It can be assumed that the purpose of this legerdemain was not to enrich Wen Jiabao's oblivious mother. Perhaps the motive was to park some shares in the name of a clueless retail investor - one who would not be subject to the lock-up obligations imposed on strategic and institutional investors in the Ping An IPO - for prompt disposition at a favorable price.

In any case, the case of granny's Ping An shares - which had a value of $120 million in 2007, though it is unclear that they are still in her name - would be an interesting area of exploration for China's securities regulators, if they decided to pursue it.

Of course, if the way the case plays out is that Mdme Duan takes the rap for parking the shares, the Wen family will be shielded from complicity and the matter will be recast as a securities enforcement matter. It may be that this is how things will turn out, and the Wen family will face no criminal consequences - and Wen Jiabao will not be subjected to Party disciplinary action.

Judging from the long list of business ventures described by Barboza - which even absent the Ping An shares amount to interests amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars - the greedy members of Wen Jiabao's immediate family (led by Wen's wife, brother, and son) were careful not to demand or take payoffs as a condition for deploying political influence. No "pay for play" in other words.

Instead, the currency employed was that of shared opportunity, mutual obligation, and the promise of future cooperation.

Nor did the immediate family hold assets in their own names - high party officials are required to disclose their own assets and those of close family members - allegedly relying instead on the good offices of a network of trusted relatives and associates.

In other words, the Wen family appears to have navigated the loopholes, opportunities, and perilous shoals of personal enrichment in an adroit, legalistic, and politically astute fashion that would be recognized and admired immediately by their spiritual brothers and sisters across the sea: the robber barons of Wall Street and the London bourse.

Whether Wen Jiabao and the CCP will see fit to untangle this web in the interests of transparency, decency, and the Party's political viability is an interesting question.

Notes:

1. Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, Yahoo! Finance, Oct 26, 2012.

2. The New York Times' China coup, The Guardian, Oct 26, 2012.

3. Rethinking the Pentagon Papers, National Affairs, Summer, 2010.

4. 'Great Journalism' That Has Unwanted Business Impact in China, NYT, Oct 26, 2012.

5. The Wen Family Empire, NYT, Oct 25, 2012.

6. Strategic China Investment, Great Ocean Group.

7. Airport City Development Lid, DocStoc.

8. China's Ping An Insurance kicks off Shanghai IPO, Reuters, Feb 1, 2007.

 

Insider trading, Chinese style: Decoding the story of the Wen family billions

Insider trading, Chinese style: Decoding the story of the Wen family billions

By Peter Lee.

wen-jiabao-wef.jpg 
Image credit: World Economic Forum.

This article originally appeared on Asia Times Online, republished with permission.

Regarding the epic financial machinations allegedly practiced by the family of Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, his supporters can draw consolation from the fact that the Wen family compares favorably to the Bo Xilai family in the matter of financial sophistication, investment success, and in not murdering its financial adviser.

They may also be heartened by the thought that China's tycoons are achieving parity with the West in best practices of legalized insider trading and self-dealing.

There is another group that definitely feels thrilled and empowered by the New York Times' blockbuster revelation concerning an alleged US$2.7 billion nest egg possessed by Premier Wen Jiabao's family. [1] That group is not China's dissidents. It is Western print journalists, who feel under siege around the world, and especially in China. The Guardian's media critic, Michael Wolff, took it to the next level, calling the revelations the biggest thing since the Pentagon Papers:

The New York Times' unraveling of the holdings of the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao, and his family may be its most direct challenge to a sitting government since its publication of the Pentagon Papers in 1971. Arguably, its forensic accounting will be even much more damaging and potentially transformational to the Chinese government than its seminal revelations about the roots of the war in Vietnam were to the Nixon government.

As with the Pentagon Papers, the Times now faces the concerted wrath of the government it has challenged. The Nixon administration took the Times to the US Supreme Court in a move that threatened to criminalize the company. The Chinese government has cordoned off the Times' digital reach into China and, effectively, declared it persona non grata in one of the world's most significant markets. In other words, it's a great day. [2]

Easy, tiger.

Actually, I think David Barboza's expose of wealth aggrandizement by the extended friends and family of Wen Jiabao might be the biggest thing in journalism since ... the Guardian's unconscionable butchering of the WikiLeaks release, but that's another story.

In the matter of the Pentagon Papers, the New York Times defied the advice of its lawyers and published the purloined documents at considerable legal risk without checking in with the US government. President Richard Nixon did not learn of the leak until he opened his morning paper.

The US government then tried to impose prior restraint - getting a court injunction to force the Times to stop publishing the ongoing expose - only to be rebuffed by the Supreme Court. The court, however, did not remove the New York Times from legal jeopardy, affirming for the most part that that the paper could be prosecuted after the fact for revealing state secrets under the Espionage Act (something that the Nixon administration considered but didn't pursue). Instead, infuriated by the leak, Nixon set up the "Plumbers" (leak-stoppers) covert operation that burgled the Watergate Apartments and eventually brought down his presidency. [3]

In the Wen Jiabao matter, Barboza collected the facts legally, and the Gray Lady gave the Chinese government a heads-up before publishing, as the New York Times' public editor reported:

On Friday, I interviewed the publisher Arthur Sulzberger Jr about the story, the censorship and what it means for The Times's global push.

"I'm very proud of this work," he said of the story. "Our business is to publish great journalism. Does this have a business impact? Of course."

Mr Sulzberger said the publication of the article was preceded by "conversations with the Chinese government to discuss it".

"They wanted to air their concerns - which I listened to, as I should," Mr Sulzberger said. "And eventually, we made a decision to publish."

The Times' foreign editor, Joseph Kahn, also confirmed discussions with Chinese officials, and put the scoop in the proper perspective vis a vis the Pentagon Papers:

Mr Kahn said that as recently as Wednesday, Mr Sulzberger and the executive editor, Jill Abramson, met with Chinese government representatives at The Times. But the focus of that conversation was not about the journalism - it was about political and cultural differences In short, Chinese officials were making the case that The Times not publish the article.

"I'm gratified - there's no other word to describe it," Mr Kahn said about The Times's decision to publish it. "People cite the Pentagon Papers, but that involved defying a legal order." [4]

The New York Times is suffering genuine and significant financial losses from the story - one can assume its costly Chinese-language launch has been blown out of the water for at least a few months - and it should be commended for running the piece, but the level of institutional risk and political significance does not appear to rise to a Pentagon Papers level.

Pre-warned by the Times, the Chinese government moved into containment mode. The Chinese Foreign Ministry issued a huffy response that the report was a smear, the New York Times US and Chinese-language websites were blocked, and the word was put out to "harmonize", ie scrub, web and blog references to the New York Times, $2.7 billion, so on and so forth. In addition, Western journos in China were subjected to an aggravating slowdown of Internet service.

Within the People's Republic of China, the report - which is inevitably filtering through the Great Firewall - has apparently not excited a new tsunami of disgust against the Chinese Communist Party regime. The response seems to have been muddled by the fact that the article took pains not to implicate Wen Jiabao personally, and by the fact that Wen is regarded as a leader - albeit of suspect efficacy - of the reformist bloc, and giving him a black eye is considered as providing aid and comfort to the enemies of reform.

The fact that Wen is retiring after the 18th party congress, to be started a few days from now, also takes some of the heat out of the allegations. There were even indignant accusations that the revelations had been fed to the Times by partisans of disgraced party official Bo Xilai seeking revenge on Wen for his role in Bo's downfall earlier this year.

This seems unlikely. Barboza is a well-regarded and tenacious reporter who spent almost a year sorting through Chinese corporate records to get the story. Perhaps Wen's adversaries were willing to egg him on, but, as in the case with the Bloomberg expose on Xi Jinping this past June (see here - for which Bloomberg staff were reportedly subjected to death threats by disgruntled Xi cronies - it can be assumed he dug out the story on his own.

The Barboza article is a fascinating expose of how the wealth-creation sausage gets made in the People's Republic of China, revealing how a family with political connections and access to information can leverage opportunities in everything from diamond-trading to construction of wastewater treatment plants with the help of a few billionaire friends in the PRC and overseas.

However - barring further revelations - it is not the devastating legal and factual brief against Wen Jiabao that the excited coverage might lead one to believe. The New York Times made the understandable, if rather questionable decision, to hang its hat on the eye-popping figure of $2.7 billion, inviting the inference that Wen's family exemplified official corruption on a truly heroic scale.

However, $2.2 billion of that figure is derived from ownership of shares of stock of Ping An Insurance imputed to members of the Wen family, shares that were purchased by partnerships in 2002, apparently for around $65 million, and which skyrocketed in value after Hong Kong (2004) and Shanghai (2007) IPOs.

As for those partnerships, the Times was unfortunately unable to come up with a clear determination as to whether they were simply front companies for Wen family skullduggery or, well, partnerships that provided privileged access for wealth creation for PRC and foreign elites, some of whom were members of the Wen family.

The Times carefully characterized the partnerships as:

Partnerships controlled by Mr Wen's relatives - along with their friends and colleagues - made a fortune by investing in the company before the public offering.

Wen family fingerprints are apparently all over these partnerships, but nailing down issues of legitimacy and control are, understandably, slippery issues.

Around $1.3 billion of the purported Wen family stake in Ping An is controlled by Tianjin Taihong, which in turn is controlled by one of the PRC's richest people, Mdme Duan Weihong, who is in turn generally characterized as an old friend of the Wen family and, more specifically of Wen's allegedly rapacious wife Mdme Zhang Beili. [5]

The question can seriously be raised as to whether Mdme Duan is simply a bag-woman for the Wen family, or a close family friend who has benefited herself - and members of the Wen family - through a carefully constructed, morally questionable, but legally defendable web of obligation and opportunity.

A look at Taihong reveals something that looks more like a plausible business enterprise than a slush fund or cut-out. Taihong apparently achieved considerable success in property management and, subsequently, development in Premier Wen's home town of Tianjin. Taihong's English-language name is Great Ocean Group.

On its website, it touts its strategic investment in Ping An (stating that "outstanding returns ... reflect the group's foresight and execution ability"): In 2002, the Great Ocean Group acquired a major share in Ping An Group, one of China's largest insurance and financial services companies entitling it to a seat on the company's Board of Directors. [6]

Duan Weihong took that seat on the Ping An (supervisory) board from 2003 through 2009.

The Ping An deal shows the hallmarks of privileged information and access; it does not, however, exhibit significant signs of interference by the Wen family to assure Ping An's success. The Great Ocean investment occurred in 2002. The lifting of restrictions on domestic insurance operations - which paved the way for highly successful IPOs by Ping An and other insurance companies - did not occur until 2004. Spotting Ping An as an up-and-comer would not have been extremely difficult, even without the help of a high ranking communist official.

By 2002, Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs had already been strategic investors in Ping An for eight years; in 2002, HSBC also put in another $600 million (it would subsequently buy out Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs for $1 billion).

The company had employed McKinsey and Co to advise it on its business operations, staffed its company through a well-known European headhunter, and in 2005 it was named one of Asia's best managed companies by Euromoney magazine. It subsequently achieved the distinction of serving as subject of a fawning case study by a leading Western business school.

In short, Ping An's primary identity is as a private company backed by international financial muscle, not a sclerotic state-owned-enterprise relying on government favoritism and protection. Therefore, the corrupt-dealing framing provided for the Times article is, perhaps, not completely apt to the Ping An situation:

As prime minister in an economy that remains heavily state-driven, Mr Wen, who is best known for his simple ways and common touch, more importantly has broad authority over the major industries where his relatives have made their fortunes. Chinese companies cannot list their shares on a stock exchange without approval from agencies overseen by Mr Wen, for example. He also has the power to influence investments in strategic sectors like energy and telecommunications.

Investing in Ping An prior to its IPO and sensational run-up in stock price was something of a no-brainer.

Of course, getting an opportunity to invest prior to the IPO is something else.

It would perhaps be most informative to ask Ping An's hard-charging boss, Peter Ma, or strategic investors Morgan Stanley, Goldman Sachs, and HSBC - all of whom had seats on the Ping An board - to provide some context as to how Taihong/Great Ocean was privileged to get a sweetheart pre-IPO deal.

Mdme Duan married a Hong Kong investment banker, Desmond Shum, who perhaps provided the deal-making expertise to enable Great Ocean to leverage its Ping An windfall into a very successful foray into active, managed investment: the construction of the massive freight logistics center at Beijing Airport, the "Airport City Development Limited" or ACL, with a total first-stage investment of 4 billion yuan (US$640 million). Mr Shum served as vice chairman and chief executive officer for the project, which was completed in 2007. [7]

In 2011, Great Ocean sold its 40% interest in ACL to Singapore's Global Logistic Properties Ltd for around US$270 million (the New York Times may be in error here by imputing the full $400 million proceeds of the sale to Great Ocean; the shares of another company, "Trade Year Properties Limited," amounting to 15% of ACL, were also sold to Global Logistics as part of the deal).

Interestingly, the Times did not choose to impute the ACL deal to Wen-related shenanigans, even though the high profile and highly political deal (involving approvals by the Ministry of Commerce, the Civil Aviation Administration of China, the Beijing municipal government, the General Administration for Customs - which "consult[ed] eight ministries and commissions" - the National Resources Development Council, and the State Council) would seem to welcome influence peddling in a way that the largely opportunistic and passive Ping An investment did not.

In true nouveau riche style, Mdme Duan has turned to high-profile philanthropy to enhance the reputation of her enterprise. Great Ocean established the Kai Feng charitable foundation, which funded the construction of Tsinghua University's new library and, in 2012, sponsored the Yehudi Menuhin violin competition in Beijing. Under the sobriquet of the "Whitney and Desmond Shum Fellowships", the family funded a program to send two Harvard graduate students to China each year to pursue research in the social sciences.

Mdme Duan blotted her tycoon copybook, however, with a flustered response to the most damning piece of evidence unearthed by Barboza: apparently part of Taihong/Great Ocean's stake in Ping An was held in the name of Premier Wen's ancient mother.

Apparently not aware that the correct response to dangerous and intrusive inquiries from the press is "Talk to my lawyer", Mdme Duan provided a novel explanation:

"When I invested in Ping An I didn't want to be written about," Ms Duan said, "so I had my relatives find some other people to hold these shares for me."

But it was an "accident", she said, that her company chose the relatives of the prime minister as the listed shareholders - a process that required registering their official ID numbers and obtaining their signatures. Until presented with the names of the investors by The Times, she said, she had no idea that they had selected the relatives of Wen Jiabao.

It can be assumed that the purpose of this legerdemain was not to enrich Wen Jiabao's oblivious mother. Perhaps the motive was to park some shares in the name of a clueless retail investor - one who would not be subject to the lock-up obligations imposed on strategic and institutional investors in the Ping An IPO - for prompt disposition at a favorable price.

In any case, the case of granny's Ping An shares - which had a value of $120 million in 2007, though it is unclear that they are still in her name - would be an interesting area of exploration for China's securities regulators, if they decided to pursue it.

Of course, if the way the case plays out is that Mdme Duan takes the rap for parking the shares, the Wen family will be shielded from complicity and the matter will be recast as a securities enforcement matter. It may be that this is how things will turn out, and the Wen family will face no criminal consequences - and Wen Jiabao will not be subjected to Party disciplinary action.

Judging from the long list of business ventures described by Barboza - which even absent the Ping An shares amount to interests amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars - the greedy members of Wen Jiabao's immediate family (led by Wen's wife, brother, and son) were careful not to demand or take payoffs as a condition for deploying political influence. No "pay for play" in other words.

Instead, the currency employed was that of shared opportunity, mutual obligation, and the promise of future cooperation.

Nor did the immediate family hold assets in their own names - high party officials are required to disclose their own assets and those of close family members - allegedly relying instead on the good offices of a network of trusted relatives and associates.

In other words, the Wen family appears to have navigated the loopholes, opportunities, and perilous shoals of personal enrichment in an adroit, legalistic, and politically astute fashion that would be recognized and admired immediately by their spiritual brothers and sisters across the sea: the robber barons of Wall Street and the London bourse.

Whether Wen Jiabao and the CCP will see fit to untangle this web in the interests of transparency, decency, and the Party's political viability is an interesting question.

Notes:

1. Billions in Hidden Riches for Family of Chinese Leader, Yahoo! Finance, Oct 26, 2012.

2. The New York Times' China coup, The Guardian, Oct 26, 2012.

3. Rethinking the Pentagon Papers, National Affairs, Summer, 2010.

4. 'Great Journalism' That Has Unwanted Business Impact in China, NYT, Oct 26, 2012.

5. The Wen Family Empire, NYT, Oct 25, 2012.

6. Strategic China Investment, Great Ocean Group.

7. Airport City Development Lid, DocStoc.

8. China's Ping An Insurance kicks off Shanghai IPO, Reuters, Feb 1, 2007.

 

2012年10月10日

Debating China’s economic future , consensus of china's eco trajectory fall between 5% ~7% , fewer expect more than 7%

Debating China's economic future

Panelists:

  • Michael Pettis, professor of finance, Peking University
  • Victor Gao, director of the China National Association of International Studies; former translator for Deng Xiaoping

Pettis said he believes China faces an inevitable and painful transition, with economic growth falling to a 3-4% rate in the next decade. Its growth model involves a systematic transfer of wealth from the household sector to support growth, and three mechanisms facilitate this process:

  1. Undervalued currency: a direct subsidy on the net export sector, but a consumption tax on households.
  2. Widening gap between Chinese wage growth and productivity growth: reduces labor's share of GDP.
  3. Financial repression: low interest rates transfer wealth from savers to borrowers.

Pettis said he believes that as marginal returns on capital slow, it will become more difficult to find economically viable projects. China's savings rate will need to decline and its consumption-to-GDP ratio must increase, which will only occur if household income captures a larger share of GDP. Pettis outlined four policy options:

  1. Reverse transfer mechanism from households to other sectors, leading to a sharp increase in the value of the yuan and potential major recession (unrealistic).
  2. Gradually reduce distortions, which could take a decade (they've run out of time).
  3. Massive privatization program to transfer wealth from state sector to households (politically difficult).
  4. Expand government debt to absorb private-sector debt (possible, but economically inefficient).

Gao countered with a far-more-upbeat assessment, though he liberally relied on history and China's great transformation over the past three decades. He said he expects China's economy to continue to grow at close to 8% thanks to four megatrends he doesn't believe will change: industrialization, modernization, urbanization and globalization.

Our view

At Schwab, we believe that as China's economy matures and shifts from over-reliance on government investment to increased private consumption as a percent of GDP, slower growth is likely the new normal. However, this transition won't be accomplished overnight; the government will likely need to enact market-based reforms and reduce its grip on the economy, and the transition could be accompanied by bumps in the road.

Our view on China's economic trajectory is in keeping with the results of a poll during the conference:

Source: BCA Research Inc., as of September 18, 2012.

2012年10月7日

Japan in Chinese history

Analects 论语
China 中国

Japan in Chinese history
中国历史舞台上的日本

Cross-currents
友好与不幸并存


Sep 27th 2012, 11:00 by J.J. | BEIJING



AT A restaurant just up the street from Japan's embassy on Sunday, September 23rd, local diners were lining up to take advantage of a regular weekend buffet that features tempura, sashimi, sushi and other Japanese delicacies. Just inside the door stood two prominently displayed Chinese national flags. Restaurant staff said business was getting back to normal, but added that it might recover more quickly if both ends of their street were not still blocked off by military-style barricades and police standing watch in full riot gear.

9月23号是星期日,日本大使馆街头的一家餐馆门前排起了长队,这家餐馆每周末提供自助餐,主要包括天妇罗、生鱼片、寿司等日本美食。餐馆内显眼处悬挂着两面中国国旗。餐馆员工表示生意已经回归正常,并补充道如果街道两头类似军事障碍移除,全副武装的警察撤离的话,生意就会恢复的更快。

The anti-Japanese protests which roiled several Chinese cities last week have subsided, but the situation remains tense. The emotion and vitriol unleashed against Japan during last week's demonstrations was a reminder that anti-Japanese nationalism remains a potent―and potentially destabilising―force in China.

上周席卷了中国许多城市的反日抗议活动已经降温,但是局势依然紧张。此次怒气高涨,不受控制的反日游行示威提醒我们,反日民族主义在中国仍然是一股潜在的不稳定势力。

Zhou Enlai once characterised the relationship between the two countries as "2,000 years of friendship and five decades of misfortune". The latter referring to the period that began with the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 and lasted to the end of Japan's occupation of China at the end of the Second World War. The history of Japan's invasion of China, in particular, remains a painful and traumatic memory for many Chinese, including very many who were not yet born at the time. Old wounds from that era are kept fresh through the media, in television dramas and movie plots, as well as in the "patriotic history" curriculum taught in the mainland's schools.

周恩来曾这样描述中日关系"两千年友好,五十年不幸"。这五十年指的是从1894-1895年中日甲午战争到二战后期日本占领中国的这一阶段。特别是日本侵华的历史给许多中国人民留下了充满痛苦和创伤的记忆,甚至对于当时并未出生的人也是如此。媒体,电视剧,电影,以及中国大陆学校的爱国主义历史课程都使过往年代的伤痛记忆犹新。

Zhou's 2,000 years of friendship refers to a long history of cultural cross-pollination. Chinese historians never tire of listing the many contributions China made to the development of Japanese politics, literature, religion and culture. Buddhism represented a key conduit for the exchange of intellectual, philosophical and aesthetic ideas between China and Japan.

周恩来所说的两千年友好指的则是文化上相互传播的悠久历史。中国历史学家总乐此不疲地罗列中国对日本政治,文学,宗教,文化等方面的诸多贡献。佛教则是中日两国思想,哲学,美学等交流的重要渠道。

Even in the bleak years that followed Japan's humiliating defeat of the Qing empire in 1895―a defeat which resulted in China's cession of both Taiwan and the chain of islets currently in dispute―thousands of Chinese students went abroad to study in Japan. Their numbers included Chiang Kai-shek, the author Lu Xun, and the female revolutionary martyr Qiu Jin. Sun Yat-sen travelled there many times, organising the Chinese overseas students and recruiting among them for his Revolutionary Alliance.

1895年清王朝的战败之耻,导致中国割让了台湾岛和如今的争议岛链。但即便在战后阴郁的几年里,依然有数千名中国学生赴日留学,其中就有蒋介石,作家鲁迅,和革命女烈士秋瑾等人。孙中山也曾多次到日本组织海外留学生,并为同盟会收纳成员。
In Japan students learned about medicine, science and the social sciences, and along the way they adopted a new vocabulary to describe the modern world. Literally. Japanese translators used their version of a Chinese Buddhist term sekai (Chinese:shijie), a combination of characters which indicated a distinction in time and space and was used to mean "generation", and adapted it to mean "the world," replacing the older Chinese term tianxia, or "all under Heaven". Last month a programme director for CCTV 1, Xu Wenguang, reminded his microblog followers of the staggering number of Chinese words, especially in the social sciences, which were likewise reimported from Japan. Japanese translators in the 19th and 20th centuries, faced with the daunting challenge posed by concepts like "society", "philosophy" and "economics", often simply borrowed classical Chinese phrases, imbuing them with new meaning along the way―creating what Victor Mair, a Sinologist, refers to as "round-trip words". Centuries after Japanese culture had incorporated Chinese characters as a major component of its own writing system, Chinese students would return from Japan with a new lexicon for scholarship of their own. 

留学生在日本攻读医学,科学技术和社会科学,期间他们学习了新的词汇,对现代世界有了新的看法。文字方面,日本译员使用中国佛教用语"sekai"(世界)替换中文的"天下"来表示世界,用原意为"一代(人)"的"sekai"这一文字组合暗示语言时间和空间的差异。上个月中央电视台一套的节目导演吴文光在其微博中告诫粉丝汉字的数量岌岌可危,尤其是在社会科学领域,中国似乎用同样的方式从日本"再进口"。面对"社会""哲学""经济"等概念的巨大挑战,19,、20世纪的日本译员通常都借用经典的汉语词语并赋予他们新的含义,制造了许多汉学家维克多•玛尔所说的"往返词"。经过数个世纪,日本文化将汉字吸收融合成为日语书写体系的主要组成部分,于是中国赴日留学生又带着专业新词汇回到中国。

Nor were the preceding 2,000 years always ones of friendship.

然而,在这悠久的2000年历史中也不光是友谊。

In the seventh century, the forces of Tang China clashed with Japanese armies in the Battle of Baekgang. The two-day battle, fought along the Geum River on the Korean peninsula, bore many of the hallmarks that would characterise future conflicts. It began as a proxy war, with China and Japan lining up behind rival powers that were vying for control of the Korean peninsula. This was to be the first of many contests China and Japan would fight in which Korea played the role of a prize.

早在公元7世纪,唐朝的军队就曾与日本军队在白江口之战中交手。在朝鲜半岛的锦江河畔,两天的交战给中日两国未来冲突打上了印记。战争起初是因中日背后操控傀儡为朝鲜半岛的控制权爆发。此次战役是中日首次交手,朝鲜半岛则是战利品。

In the 13th century, the armies of Kublai Khan, the founder of the Yuan empire, carried out a pair of major raids against the Japanese "home islands" (pictured above, courtesy Fukuda Taika). Hopelessly outmatched by the Mongols, the Japanese defenders dug in and prayed. Successfully, as it were, for both times the Mongol fleets suffered enormous damage from sudden storms, divine winds that became known in Japanese as the kamikaze.

13世纪,元朝开国皇帝忽必烈汗的军队向"岛国"日本展开了两次进攻(如上图,福田大化)。节节败退的日本人只能挖好战壕默默祈祷。彷如祈祷成功,蒙古军队每次都遭到突如其来的风暴的重创。从此,有如神助的风在日本被称为kamikaze(神风)。

During the latter years of the Ming empire, the armies of Toyotomi Hideyoshi launched repeated attacks against Korea as part of a grander plan to conquer the mainland. The Koreans called on the Ming court to protect them. The result was a brutal war, featuring the use of early firearms and cannon. The casualties were enormous and the damage proved crippling to both sides―but especially to the Ming empire, which had already begun its final decline. Hideyoshi died in 1598, ending, at least for the moment, visions of a Japanese empire on the mainland.

明朝末期,作为征服大陆宏伟计划的一部分,丰臣秀吉带领军队向朝鲜人发起进攻。朝鲜人请求明朝政府提供保护。战况非常惨烈,动用了早期的火器和大炮。结果,双方伤亡惨重,尤其是已经开始没落的明朝。1598年丰臣秀吉的死亡,至少在当时结束了日本在大陆建立日本帝国的美梦。

In 1894, China and Japan once again found themselves backing opposed Korean factions and, once again, China―this time in the form of the Qing empire―saw itself acting in defence of a tributary state. Twenty-six years after the Meiji Restoration, Japan was undertaking an aggressive programme to modernise its industry and its army. It was also eager to join the ranks of Europe's imperialist nations. The Japanese victory dealt a terrible blow to both China's national pride and to those officials who had worked for decades to modernise China's own military and industrial bases. It also sparked a crisis of confidence among China's reformist elite. Never before had the Chinese nation seemed in greater danger of being carved up and divided among the world's imperial powers.

1894年,中日再次因为各自支持的朝鲜派系开战,中国的清政府又是为了保卫进贡国。明治维新后的26年里,日本在工业和军队现代化上有了长足的进步,也渴望加入欧洲帝国主义的行列。日本的胜利极大削弱了中国的民族自豪感,沉重打击了为中国军事和工业现代化奋斗了数十年的中国人,同时也使中国的改革精英们自信心受挫。此时的中华民族陷入了从未如此严峻的危险境地,似乎要被世界帝国主义强国瓜分殆尽。

In a web chat posted last week, two of our editors remarked on the similarities between 21st-century Asia and 19th-century Europe. There are parallels there, to be sure, but what is happening today between China and Japan can also be seen as the latest chapter in a centuries-old rivalry between the two pre-eminent powers in North-East Asia.

上周的一次网上交谈中,本刊两位编辑谈到21世纪亚洲同19世纪欧洲的相似之处。二者必定有相似之处,但是今日发生在中国和日本之间的事也可以被看作是东北亚最为杰出的两个国家数世纪来的斗争中的最新篇章。

If that history of conflict and violent competition seems to suggest a stormy course ahead in Sino-Japanese relations, an equally deep history of co-operation and cultural exchange must be borne in mind too. It might offer hope that China and Japan can find some way to reconcile their grievances and work together to keep a prosperous peace in the region―even when the newspaper headlines do not.

这样冲突和激烈竞争的历史似乎暗示了中日关系的暗淡前景,但是我们也不要忘了双方同样深刻,共同合作和文化交流的历史。这或许能给中日两国相互慰藉,共同致力于地区和平与繁荣带来一线生机――尽管这并不被媒体看好。